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CONTENTS

Autocracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe, II.....	Karl Loewenstein.....	755
Recent Developments in Political Geography, I.....	Richard Hartshorne.....	785
Roosevelt's Latin-American Policy.....	John M. Mathews.....	905
American Government and Politics.....		
Fascism in America?.....	H. Arthur Steiner.....	821
The "Patent" Way to Balance the National Budget.....	Forrest R. Black.....	830
The Contributions of Samuel J. Randall to the Rules of the National House of Representatives.....	Albert V. House, Jr.....	837
Public Administration.....		
Development of National Administration in the United States, 1932-35.....	Roger V. Shumate.....	842
Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the United States.....	L. F. Schmeckebier.....	853
Foreign Governments and Politics.....		
The Five Hundredth Anniversary of the Swedish Riksdag.....	Eric C. Bellquist.....	857
International Affairs.....		
Is the International Labor Organization Autonomous?.....	Paul G. Steinbicker.....	866
Appointment of American Delegates to the International Labor Organization.....	James A. Gathings.....	870
News and Notes, Personal and Miscellaneous.....	Managing Editor.....	872
The Social Science Research Council's Committee on Public Administration.....	John M. Gaus.....	876
Book Reviews and Notices.....		879
Recent Publications of Political Interest.....	Charles S. Hyneman.....	920
Books and Periodicals.....	Miles O. Price.....	937
Government Publications.....		

(For list of Book Reviews, see next page)

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS

<i>Elliott</i> , The Need for Constitutional Reform. W. W. Willoughby..	879
<i>Lyon et al.</i> , The National Recovery Administration. James T. Young.....	881
<i>Millspaugh</i> , Public Welfare Organization. Paul T. Stafford.....	883
<i>Salter</i> , Boss Rule; Portraits in City Politics. Joseph D. McGoldrick.	885
<i>Lepawsky</i> , Home Rule for Metropolitan Chicago. Edwin A. Cottrell.....	886
<i>White et al.</i> , Civil Service Abroad; <i>Walker</i> , Training Public Employees in Great Britain. Oliver P. Field.....	888
<i>Kennedy</i> , Essays in Constitutional Law. W. Y. Elliott.....	890
<i>Huus</i> , Financing Municipal Recreation. Orren C. Hormell.....	892
<i>Bauer and Gold</i> , Public Utility Valuation for Purposes of Rate Control. Orren C. Hormell.....	893
<i>Davis</i> , Capitalism and Its Culture. E. Allen Helms.....	895
<i>Painsod</i> , International Socialism and the World War. Arnold J. Zurcher.....	897
<i>Noble</i> , Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919. Sidney B. Fay.....	898
<i>Buchan</i> , The People's King; George V; <i>Somervell</i> , The Reign of George V. John A. Fairlie.....	900
<i>Loewenstein</i> , After Hitler's Fall: Germany's Coming Reich. James K. Pollock.....	901
<i>Burns</i> , Challenge to Democracy. Russell M. Story.....	902
Briefer Notices.....	903
<i>Smith</i> , The Citizen and His Government; <i>Peel and Donnelly</i> , The 1928 Campaign; <i>Ickes</i> , Back to Work; <i>Joeckel</i> , The Government of the American Public Library; <i>Alderfer et al.</i> , Report of the Pennsylvania Local Government Survey; <i>Wu</i> , Chinese Government and Politics; <i>Bakke</i> , Insurance or Dole?; <i>Fournier</i> , Railway Nationalization in Canada; <i>Keith</i> , Letters on Imperial Relations; <i>Schmeckebier</i> , International Organizations in Which the United States Participates; <i>Larson</i> , The Earliest Norwegian Laws; <i>Lippincott</i> (ed.), Government Control of the Economic Order; <i>Harvey</i> , Samuel Gompers; etc.	

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NO. 5

AUTOCRACY VERSUS DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE, II*

KARL LOEWENSTEIN

Yale University

V

Having made some general observations on the aspirations and obstacles of fascist ideology in democratic countries, we shall now attempt to weigh the actual possibilities of a further spread of autocratic rule in the principal states of Europe. Herein we cannot abstain from a certain amount of prophecy, with all the hazards of statements not entirely based on undisputable fact; but we shall try to keep the forecast within reasonable bounds and to fortify it by reference to actual experience in the different countries under survey. Instead of travelling rather haphazardly over Europe, we should prefer a systematic grouping of the different countries which have not yet adopted autocracy. However, we shall find it rather difficult to discover a reasonable line of division; and accordingly we shall deal with each state separately and determine in the course of our journey whether some synoptical conclusions are permissible.

We have observed that those countries where a safe tradition of self-government and democracy is lacking are more susceptible to fascist propaganda and therefore more exposed to a surreptitious change of government. It is by no means impossible, or even improbable, that some or all of these countries will one day succumb to dictatorship. Under this aspect, the position of the only Balkan states which have thus far retained the outward appearance of constitutional life, Rumania and Greece, is of a disquieting precariousness.

It is, perhaps, more to the point to speak of Rumania as an

* This instalment covers developments to September 1, 1935.

autocracy rather than as a constitutional state. The constitution of 1923 describes Rumania as a constitutional monarchy, with parliamentary institutions of the pattern which prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe before the war. The political reality, however, shows a government class in which the big landowners and the aristocracy are predominant in controlling the parliament. The suffrage is nominally free, but in fact the government manipulates the elections. The government party is labelled liberal, while the large masses of the peasants have almost no share in the government. To call this system democratic in the Western sense of the term would be utterly misleading.

Rumania's political structure is not unlike the system existing since 1929 in Yugoslavia, and, with some sociological differences, since 1920 also in Hungary. In Yugoslavia, a military caste is the rallying-point of the autocratic forces behind the crown, while in Hungary a petty gentry of landowners and public officials has dislodged the formerly ruling aristocratic class of the big agricultural interests which the territorial cessions imposed upon Hungary by the treaty of Trianon had shorn of their traditional financial resources. Rumania is a sort of autocracy under the guise of a still working parliamentary machine, and she may follow any day in the path which Bulgaria, although nominally a constitutional monarchy, took in 1934. The Iron Guards of Cealea Codreanu which, as the rumor goes, are supported by German money, have met so far with official disapproval, but the success of the government against plain fascism may be only temporary, because, as a recent manifesto of leading parliamentarians in favor of racism shows, large and influential parts of the nation sympathize with the new movement. The position of the king is not strong enough to check a fascist rising which any moment may sweep the country. Unlike Scandinavian monarchy, the institution of royalty in Rumania will be no serious obstacle against fascism. The popular animosity toward the Jews in this country of traditional anti-Semitism, the desolate situation of the exploited peasants, and the manifest corruption of the ruling classes provide a fertile soil for fascist seed.

In Greece, the political scene since the war has undergone a kaleidoscopic change. Monarchy, republic, and even a short-lived dictatorship of the military junta of General Pangalos succeeded rapidly one another until, in 1927, a democratic constitution on

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familiar lines was adopted. Under the leadership of the builder of the Greek national state, Eleutherios Venizelos, a period of peaceful reconstruction was inaugurated, to be followed, however, by an alarming revival of monarchist tendencies allegedly sponsored by the generals controlling the Tsaldaris government. In March, 1935, the tension between the two rival factions provoked a violent rebellion of the Venizelists against the government. Yet the attempt to overthrow the government by force lost the day because a resolute government in command of the ordinary military powers cannot fail to win the upper hand. After a bloody civil war, Venizelos fled to Italy, and sweeping constitutional changes in the direction of a concentration of powers in the hands of the government party are already under way. Whether in the future the democratic constitution will be more than a camouflage of fascist government remains to be seen. Too often, in similar situations, when a rebellion against the government in power was defeated, the repressive measures for the pacification of the country followed the beaten track of quasi-fascist methods and ended in full-fledged fascism in which the victorious faction stabilizes its domination by the single-party system and the complete suppression of civil liberties. The precedent of Austria is a striking example of such a development.

At the present moment, the problem of autocratic versus democratic government has receded somewhat to the background because the strife of parties focuses on the restoration question. At the general elections in June, 1935, the victorious Tsaldaris government had little difficulty in obtaining a crushing majority, since Royalists and Republicans, although for different reasons, boycotted the balloting. Since then, the trend toward restoration has been visibly increasing. The ultimate result of the plebiscite on the restoration to be held in November is less doubtful, despite the outspoken republican predilections of large sections of the people, since recently the government, controlling the political machine and the press, came into the open with a conversion to monarchy. Anyway, monarchy in succession to dethroned democracy cannot but be a veiled form of autocratic rule, even under the flag of constitutionalism, because monarchy deprived of its legitimate tradition must necessarily rely on force instead of genuine allegiance. The situation is similar in Austria and Hungary, where reestablished monarchy does not involve a return to the free play of public

opinion in accepted democratic forms. The coming new era of kings does not mean an abolition of autocratic instrumentalities in practice.

The political situation of Spain seems to develop on similar lines. Only after centuries of absolutist rule, and after a comparatively short period of constitutional monarchy, has a democratic republic been established in that country. In reality, the clerical classes and the big land-owners were always in unrestricted possession of the state and its resources. When the mild fascism under the leadership of the well-meaning Primo de Rivera failed, the political pendulum swung vehemently to the left, and in 1931 a republican constitution was imposed upon a nation untrained and inexperienced in self-government. The inevitable results were that the extremists of the left wing—Socialists, Communists, and Syndicalists (always very radical in a country of continued suppression)—came to power and used it unwisely in a premature attempt to eradicate the deep-rooted preponderance of the Catholic Church, and to shift, by a redistribution of the land, the agrarian property from the big landowners to the farmers, who always had been democratically minded but were unable to run the farms without the support of a system of extended agrarian credit. The old powers, recovering from the first shock, won the elections of 1933. Like Germany, Spain failed to build up a strong middle-class party holding the balance between right and left. What was called the reactionary spirit of the democratic minority of Señor Lerroux's government provoked, in October, 1934, an ill-advised revolt of the left parties, aided by a feeble fraction of the intelligentsia, against the armed forces of the state. But, like similar enterprises in other countries, it was doomed to failure from the start, and accelerated the return to power of the reaction. The menace of a dictatorship of the proletariat served as a pretext for the organization of a ruthless white terror preparing the way for the establishment of fascist or authoritarian rule.

The similarities between the downfall of the German democracy and the developments in Spain are obvious. The Spanish socialists were not backed by a substantial section of the bourgeoisie, and the conservative forces of the middle classes were not versatile enough to adapt themselves to the exigencies of a moderating influence on the old powers striving for the reconquest of the lost domain. The triumphant entry of the combined forces of clerical-

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ism and conservatism of the old capitalistic type seems only a question of time and tactics, and already plans have been launched to supplant the allegedly worn-out forms of parliamentary democracy by the new catch-word of the corporative state, which means nothing less than the reestablishment of the old order under the guise of a new principle complying with the demands of the current political fashion. The leader of the Catholic People's party, Señor Gil Robles who already has obtained the key position as minister of war in a badly balanced cabinet, proclaimed openly as his ultimate aim the establishment of a Christian fascism on a corporative basis (not unlike the political system existing in Austria) into which the restoration of monarchy might fit in time. A dictatorship of one kind or another will possibly ensue. In history, democracy has never been reached in the first attempt, and the recrudescence of autocracy in the transition from absolutist to democratic order is a rule without exception. Fascism in Spain, however, will take the form of social reaction as it has done in Austria, and not of an ambitious middle-class revolution as in Italy and Germany. When the follies of the Spanish extremists have paved the way to power for fascism, Spanish dictatorship will probably follow the pattern set by other dictatorships, and will be a far less magnanimous specimen of the new order than Primo de Rivera's benevolent régime. Civil war has accumulated enough hatred to bid for a ferocious application of the fascist suppression. Although the chances of Spain to avoid dictatorship are not yet fully exhausted, it is very likely that the Aristotelian cycle will be closed in the near future, and fascism may boast that it has conquered a new province in its world-wide empire.

Among the countries where democracy is on trial, Czechoslovakia is in a very singular position. It offers a manifest demonstration of the vitality of the democratic idea. Under the rule of that wise leader, the venerable President Masaryk, democracy has worked surprisingly well and has been shown to be admirably suited to the mentality of the Czech people, where a ruling class in the strict sense does not exist. The masses of workingmen, peasants, and the middle-class bourgeoisie agree in their national aims, and no provocative social distinctions between the different layers of society constitute a target for fascist propaganda. The deep democratic conscience of the grand old man in the Hradshin, his sense of duty, and his unequalled prestige as a leader make a

fascist development impossible during his lifetime. However, Thomas Masaryk is in the biblical age and national differences in the tripartite community are strained. National Socialism arose in Bohemia long before Hitler was known. The advent to power of the Nazis on the other side of the border has kindled the fascist fire among the German-speaking population, and only the stringent defense measures against political associations addicted to fascist forms and aims, the prohibition of the National Socialist party, and the warning example of Gayda's abortive military "putsch" have for some time been successful in repressing a dangerous extension of fascist ideas among the three millions of Germans living in the territory.

Yet the well-tried political technique of organizing the masses by using democratic instrumentalities and undemocratic moral pressure could not be prevented from displaying itself among the republic's German-speaking population. By a sudden flash, the general election of May, 1935, revealed the beginnings of a dangerous situation. Herr Konrad Henlein, a gymnastics instructor in a German town of northern Bohemia—yesterday an unknown man, but one who might come very soon into the center of the scene in Central Europe—succeeded in welding almost the whole German population into a single party, the Sudetendeutsche Front, thereby not only decimating the Socialists but also making his party the strongest numerically in all Czechoslovakia. The new *Führer*, as he is officially styled by his followers, proved himself an excellent tactician; during the electoral campaign, he paid abundant lip service to the principles of democracy and the necessity of maintaining the unity of the state. But his triumph at the polls was due less to his oratorical talents than to the unblushing reference to and appliance of German National Socialist symbols, catchwords, and devices, to which the German Bohemians, witnessing the revival of nationalism beyond the border, were decidedly susceptible. The enigmatic man has not yet shown his hand. He found it wise to proclaim loyalty to the common state and form of government, and what he demanded, in a sensational speech in August, 1935, was nothing more than the full recognition of minority rights within the frame of the state. Furthermore, he has carefully abstained from any open connection with official National Socialism. But it is beyond doubt that in his Sudetendeutsche Front, which is Hitlerite to the last fiber, he has created an efficient and powerful

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fascist organization which, while formally avoiding conflict with the letter of the law, is ready at a moment's notice for any action. Although Masaryk's presumptive successor, Edward Beneš, is a strong personality commanding universal confidence, the situation might become pregnant with danger when, in the midst of international troubles, the Reich should attempt to fulfill its racial dream of incorporating all Germans into a Greater Germany.

Yet, on the whole, optimists may expect that the tangible advantages of a prosperous democracy, by which the Czechoslovakian state would be able to remain an island of the rule of law in the midst of a surrounding fascist sea, are appreciated even by the German-speaking population of the state. They must certainly be fully aware of the fact that fascism in Czechoslovakia would mean a Czech brand of the new order and not a German one. If the old feud between the two races were renewed, the prospects would be hopeless for the German Bohemians, unless the Reich should step in to protect the German irrendenta. Fascism in a community racially so divided as Czechoslovakia is a double-edged enterprise. The situation is similar in Switzerland, where a fascist form of government cannot but lead to the disruption of the unity of the state and the extermination of the country's independence. The test of democracy will still have to come in Czechoslovakia, but there is much reason to believe that the country will, for emotional and rational motives, remain faithful to democracy. A second generation educated in democracy is slowly coming to the front now; with the advent of the sons, the worst is usually over and the democratic form has found its stability, as shown by France after 1875.

Next, we may turn to the Scandinavian states. Although according to reliable sources, German money, to promote fascist ideology, has been spent lavishly in Sweden, Finland, and perhaps also in Denmark, the fascist movement has made no headway at all in these countries. The three northern monarchies are on a sound basis economically, and unemployment, from which fascism usually draws its recruits at the beginning, has never reached disquieting figures. They have withstood the crisis surprisingly well, and the political education of more than a century has helped to develop an immunity against the temptations of autocracy. Fascism, in the form of National Socialism, is negligible in Denmark, a country which always has been very reluctant to imitate the political institutions of its southern neighbor. In Norway,

where the influence of the British example is felt in every walk of public life, National Socialism has also failed completely. Foreign policy in Denmark and Norway has never been pro-German.

Even Sweden, where the potentialities of German influence traditionally have been greater than in any other European country, has taken a firm stand against fascist ideas and practices. This has disappointed National Socialist hopes inasmuch as, during and after the war, the Swedes displayed a staunch loyalty to the German cause—a circumstance engendered and fostered by a deep appreciation of German culture among the educated classes. Furthermore, the Swedish nation, in its racial homogeneity, is dear to National Socialism, because of its affinity to the Nordic ideal preached by the official creed. No device of Nazi propaganda, therefore, was left untried to persuade Sweden to follow the German pattern. But in vain; the socialist and liberal majorities in Sweden combined forces with the conservatives to oppose a form of government which is alien to national traditions and national spirit. Moreover, the Swedes are Protestants, like the mass of the North-Germans, and the fight of the state against the church in Germany has destroyed much of the customary sympathy for Germany. It was from Sweden that three centuries ago the great hero of Protestantism, Gustavus Adolphus, led his soldiers south for the liberation of the faithful from Catholic oppression. To religious antipathy aroused by the persecution of the Protestant church in Germany must be added the impressions of the "purge" of June 30, which horrified the law-abiding nations of the North.

The Scandinavian governments, dominated by parties of the left during the critical years, did in time, as militant democracies, what republican Germany failed to do: they used their parliamentary powers to enact the necessary legislation against the fascist propaganda and laid a strict ban on the display of fascist paraphernalia. The wearing of uniforms and badges and of other insignia of party allegiance and the formation of semi-military associations were forbidden by laws of 1933 and 1934, directed against Nazism as well as against communism. Moreover, military symbols used by fascism are devoid of attraction in northern countries. Military submission is not considered a distinction and a pleasure, but rather a burden undertaken only as a patriotic duty for the defense of the soil. Communism, which might constitute a menace, is less radical in Scandinavia (with the exception of Finland) because of

the absence of big cities. Industrialization has not proletarianized a population of small landowners and farmers who toil laboriously on the land and know no social discriminations. In the three Scandinavian countries, the rôle of the monarchy in maintaining the rule of law and free institutions is not to be under-estimated. In face of the decline of monarchical prestige after the war, Scandinavia has been able to hold her own, and the moderation and modesty of the royal rulers has been rewarded by a popularity which in the long run has proved to be one of the priceless assets of kingship in all constitutional monarchies. Thus the death of King Albert in Belgium and the royal wedding and the Silver Jubilee in England were events of great political implications. Fascism has in Scandinavia less chance than in any other country of the world. At the last communal elections in Sweden, which form the basis for the composition of the Senate, the National Socialist party was unable to obtain a single mandate.

In Finland, at times the dangers were greater. Communism, strong because of the influence of adjacent Russia, was successfully suppressed when the Riksdag backed a government determined to steer a middle course, as in the other Scandinavian nations. On the other hand, the government, in its efforts to avoid dangerous experiments, was able to suppress the fascist Lapua movement which in 1930 threatened the existence of democratic government. Finland offers an encouraging instance of a country where extremists from the left and from the right meet with the strong resistance of the middle classes against political expedients that arouse the hostility of strong sections of the nation.

Similarly, in the Netherlands the national character is disinclined to the violence and suppression of free institutions essential in fascist doctrine. Liberty of the faith has been won through endless sacrifice in the resistance to Catholic Spain. Civil liberty is not less cherished by a nation which for centuries has enjoyed the blessings of a popular and constitutional monarchy. The bourgeois life of a respected and beloved queen corresponds to the bourgeois style of living in a country where thus far the capitalistic order has not created a militant labor movement as in other countries of similar economic structure. The communist disturbances in Amsterdam in 1934 are by no means symptomatic of the situation in Holland. The predominant middle classes from which fascism usually draws its strength are disciplined and unambitious. The

weight of the crisis on a country dependent on world trade and the high price of raw materials is borne, if not with complacency, with the patience and experience of a mature commercial mind. The uniform-wearing habit in Holland seems even more ridiculous than in the Scandinavian countries; for goose-stepping before a so-called leader is not in the least within the inclination of the slow, freedom-loving, anti-militaristic, and individualistic mentality of the Dutchman. Fascism has found no response in the soul of the people, and the efforts of a few busybodies, ambitious for the laurels of their colleagues in other countries, are regarded with unrelenting suspicion. In Holland, also, the government has taken the necessary legislative precautions against the formation of private armies and the building up thereby of a dangerous militant opposition. The pan-German activities have not failed to increase its watchfulness, because in the dreams of a Greater Germany the Dutch are meant to be incorporated; but the Dutch are proud of their independence and of their achievements of national self-expression.

At the provincial elections of April, 1935, however, the new Dutch National Socialist party won a substantial victory, polling eight per cent of the total vote, and thereby sending, for the first time in history, representatives to the upper chamber. As usual, the success was obtained at the expense of the moderate democratic parties of the center, and the National Socialist vote was especially heavy in the provinces bordering upon Germany and hence particularly exposed to fascist enterprise. The fact as such is by no means alarming inasmuch as it is not indicative of a fundamental change in political trends; the Netherlands only paid tribute to the political fashion of the day. The cabinet crisis in July, 1935, by which the government of Colijn fell, only to be commissioned again, revealed the typical defects of the present parliamentary structure under which the government, relying on changing majorities, is unable to steer a straight course. The next step might be the reshaping of parliamentary government in the form of an enabling law with wide powers in order to deal with the crisis and under ultimate parliamentary responsibility, such as has been tried successfully in France and Belgium. More and more, it appears that the old democracies seek a remedy for lack of decision in the new devices of delegated authority under democratic control, rather than permit themselves to surrender to mystical belief in the wisdom

and vision of popularly irresponsible leaders according to fascist ideology. Summing up, it may be said that the political traditions and mentality of Dutchmen build up a solid dyke against the rising tide of fascism, and there is every prospect that in the Netherlands democratic institutions will remain safe against autocracy.

In Belgium, the situation is more complicated. The country is highly industrialized and thickly populated, and it labors under the racial cleavage between the French-speaking Walloons and the idiomatically different Flemish population. The severe pressure of the crisis, the prolonged maintenance of the gold standard, and the alleged inadequacy of parliamentary government provide a favorable ground for fascist propaganda. In fact, among the Flemish elements of the population, where, during the war, nationalism was cultivated by Germany for political reasons, a fascist movement of Green-shirts has grown up and has reached a considerable momentum by skillful imitation of the German pattern, and aided probably by monetary subsidies from outside. The government, however, has shown a firm hand in dealing with the fascist danger, and the results of the purge of June 30 in Germany could not fail to make themselves felt. Here again the old traditions of democratic and parliamentary government, the *pouvoir modérateur* of a young and inspired king, the relative stability of parliamentary majority rule, the absence of radicalism, even among the Walloon miners, and, foremost, the unemotional clear-thinking of the middle classes, work together to maintain an atmosphere of good-will and mutual confidence which thrive only if the self-expression of the nation is unfettered. No fascist leader of conspicuous ability appeals to the masses, which retain the customary lines of party organization. Moreover, the resentment aroused by the German occupation during the war is still alive, and everything coming from Germany encounters suspicion and distrust.

The situation would be different if France were to turn fascist. It is true that the political dependency of Belgium on France is less marked than the cultural affinity; the Belgian parliamentary system is shaped more on the lines of the English than of the French, and the outstanding defects of the French parliamentary structure, namely, the instability of governments and the influence of extra-parliamentary powers, are less manifest in Brussels than in Paris. Yet the fate of Belgian democracy is tied up with French

Dequille

political events, and France crossing the floor in search of fascism would inevitably draw Belgium behind her. For the moment, however, the customary parliamentary system has shown the elasticity needed in times of serious crisis. When Belgium recently was compelled to abandon the gold standard, the parliament, free from coercion, delegated vast powers to the government for a given period, thus following the example of other democratic countries such as England and the United States. Parliamentary democracy under economic or political strain has always been in a position to adapt itself to emergency by conferring adequate powers upon the executive without endangering the structure of the governmental fabric.

★ Before turning to France, however, we may briefly describe the situation in Switzerland. At first sight, the aspect is discouraging enough. The "fronts," as the fascist groups are called, have developed a mushroom growth and appear not only in the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino and in the German-speaking regions, but lately are growing up also in the French cantons of western Switzerland. The atmosphere is heated; political factions clash all over the country; public meetings and theatrical performances are disturbed by opposing parties. Even the stolid peasant in the mountains is stirred up; semi-military bands demonstrate in public places in the cities. Communism is gaining force, and the Socialist party is militant and radical. The deflation crisis affects the traditionally well-to-do middle classes, while unemployment figures rise in a country to a great extent dependent on travellers and foreign exports. The language of public opinion, which always was frank, and even rude, in Switzerland, is nothing short of belligerent. Good will and understanding between the different sections of the population, which have been a priceless treasure in the past, and which withstood the severe trial of the war, appear shattered. Furthermore, the Swiss citizen, albeit peace-loving and sober, has acquired, from time immemorial, the habit of wearing and using arms, and the service-gun hangs behind the door in almost every Swiss house. The Swiss is not militaristic, but he has a martial mind and military obedience and discipline are among his most conspicuous virtues. Military training in fascist associations is not needed to make the citizens a military body. The strong capitalistic structure of the bourgeois classes serves as a point of attack for radicalism, while the counter-reaction of the fascist ideology will

not fail to appeal to the irrational motives of blood and soil which invade the country from the German border.

The significance, however, of these menacing elements must not be overrated, for behind the agitation on the surface there is still a solid body of democratic conviction, and the political maturity of the Swiss will overcome the alluring slogans of a new order unsuited to their national character. The greater part of the Swiss population realizes that fascism of any kind must ultimately lead to the disruption and dissolution of the Eidgenossenschaft. Fascism in Switzerland is tantamount to a German plus a French plus an Italian fascism. The Italian would hardly submit to a German dictator, and it is inconceivable that the Germans, comprising three-fifths of the whole state, would yield to an Italian fascism. Fascism would break up the Swiss nation in three parts, drawing the Italians to Italy, the western cantons to France, and the German parts to a fascist Germany. Only the institutions of free self-government were able to insure the peaceful coexistence of the three races united in the confederation during an age of extreme nationalism. Fascism would mean the end of Swiss independence, for which the Swiss have fought against German emperors, the duke of Burgundy, and many other aggressors. The basic idea of Swiss nationality, namely, the peaceful amalgamation of the three different races under one independent jurisdiction of a free self-governing Swiss nation, is inconsistent with the acceptance of fascism as a form of government. Switzerland turning fascist would deprive the world of one of its finest examples of political wisdom and tradition. Emotional and rational considerations alike argue against the abolition of a government which has weathered so many storms.

Furthermore, closer investigation reveals the fact that Swiss fascism has already reached its climax. The idea is visibly disintegrating. The existing organizations of the fascist "fronts" are in process of rapid dissolution. Dissensions among groups and "leaders" contending for supremacy are a daily experience. Sordid libel suits involving the infallible "leaders" are a hilarious or repulsive spectacle for the majority of the nation. Without exception, the so-called "leaders" exhibit no more than a second-rate appeal, and their moral authority is by no means impressive—a fact which counts for much in a small country where everybody knows everybody. The vigilant authorities are strongly determined to main-

tain democratic standards and the achievements of free institutions, although in March, 1934, a moderate extension of police powers for the Federal Council was rejected by a referendum.

It is true that in Switzerland much ground for complaint exists, and that not a few among the prosperous classes secretly sympathize with a movement which might stabilize the existing capitalistic order against an attempt at social reconstruction. It is not less true that the Swiss bourgeois classes are perhaps the least idealistic among the democratically-minded nations in Europe; they enriched themselves in the war and commercialized their ideals in peace. Plutocratic society needs a rejuvenation more than any other. They are complacent and saturated with luxury and still entangled in what is called in this country "rugged individualism," and each sacrifice for the common weal involves bargaining and haggling.

Despite these visible defects of the existing socio-political system, the Swiss people demonstrated twice within recent months that they still adhere to the principles of democratic government bequeathed to them by their ancestors. First, in March, 1935, came the failure of a popular initiative intended to grant to the Federal Council wide powers to fight the crisis, similar to emergency legislation in other democratic countries. While this proposal was sponsored largely by the left parties, another movement in favor of a complete revision of the constitution of 1874 was launched by the fascist "fronts" and was supported by considerable sections of the Conservatives and the Catholics. The latter took up the corporative idea, although in a modified and tentative form, to the effect that the referendal democracy should be replaced to a large extent by an authoritarian technique of government concocted from Italian and Austrian recipes. Thus the only novel contribution to the total revision of the constitution came from conservative quarters. The "fronts" have been unable to offer a constructive program of reform; when the ruthless agitation against the existing democratic institutions boils down to the necessity of making concrete proposals which must be submitted at the polls by way of the constitutional referendum, it may appear that fiery speeches in the public halls are easier than the sober work of drafting a reform bill. Although the combined forces of the revision movement had but barely obtained the figures prescribed by the consti-

tution for the initiative, the decisive result of the referendum itself came as a surprise. In September, 1935, the plan for a total revision was rejected by an overwhelming majority, which incidentally revealed that the "fronts" have no roots in the masses, despite or because of the wild and reckless agitation against the existing democratic system. The Swiss are national inasmuch as they vehemently disapprove of political ideals imported from abroad.

Moreover, the Swiss people have always bowed to popular decision; the referendum having unmistakably revealed the numerical weakness of the fascist movement, the deep-rooted habits of democratic government will render futile any attempt to seize the power of the state by violence. In the case of Switzerland, the application of democratic institutions may serve fatally to expose the fascist technique. Furthermore, the shots of the firing squads of June 30 had a reverberating echo in the Swiss mountains. The Swiss is self-critical and over-skeptical. He does not believe in the infallibility of others where he can rely on his own judgment. With him, the political spellbinder has no great chance. The atmosphere of lawlessness and vaingloriousness in fascist countries is alien to his nature, and he sets against mass movements the sobering attitude of his individualism. His educational standard is too high to make him an easy prey for ready-made slogans. Unless an unforeseen emergency like war arises, Switzerland will, despite the disquieting appearance of her political life, remain a stronghold of liberalism and the heart of democratic tradition in Europe.

The unknown x in the political equation of Europe is at the present moment France, a riddle which causes deep anxiety to all lovers of peace and freedom. Since 1789, France has served the world as a political laboratory. All forms of government and constitutions have been on trial there, from a radical democracy and mass rule to a despotic one-man government of the most totalitarian type. Twice France has been under a dictatorship, the first inspired by the genius of the greatest war lord of modern times, Napoleon Bonaparte, the second under his shrewd nephew; yet both ended in defeat, and the French paid for what Lamartine has called "the burial of public conscience under a flag of glory" with political humiliation and territorial losses at Waterloo and Sedan.

Since 1870, democracy has steadily won its way among the

French people, who were supposed to be more fit for monarchy than any other European nation. At one time, the French democracy was imperiled, when, in 1889, General Boulanger failed by only an inch to sway the nation into dictatorial rule again. Even the earthquake of the *affaire Dreyfus*, the most formidable political scandal of modern times, could not destroy democracy, although the political foundation of the state trembled. A second generation living under the frame-work of the emergency constitution of 1875 developed, against expectation, a sincere loyalty to liberal principles and democratic institutions. After disquieting vicissitudes, France emerged gloriously from the pandemonium of the war, another serious trial of her democratic structure. While the defeated nations without exception were forced to change their form of government, France could maintain the democratic system which had demonstrated an amazing adaptability to the necessities of the concentration of powers demanded by the war. The usual argument against democracy, that in foreign policy it is inferior to monocratic government, was disproved.

The economic crisis reached this rich and socially well-balanced country later and with less vehemence than any other European nation. We are on safe ground in assuming that the political intelligence of the French middle class, which is identical with the greater part of the population, is still permeated by the conviction of the advantages of democratic institutions. Most Frenchmen are still imbued with the traditional ideology of liberalism and deeply conscious of the shortcomings of the communist and fascist paradises which a spirited press depicts daily in glowing colors or in bitter irony, as the case may be. It is true that there have recently been scandals of far-reaching consequence, and that the prestige of several cabinets has been seriously compromised. It is also true that, from the unsuccessful attempt to clear the *affaires*, belief in the impartiality of justice has suffered. It is obvious that the political instability of the French ministries is a commonplace object for attacks on parliamentary government. The system compares unfavorably with the apparent stability of British cabinets, not to speak of the apparently unshakable stability of the "strong man's rule" in fascist states. The assault on parliamentary democracy usually relates to French politics. Monsieur Doumergue's abortive reform of the French constitution in 1934 was intended as a remedy against this evident deficiency.

On the other hand, it is generally overlooked that the administrative machinery with which the ordinary citizen comes in contact in the daily routine functions tolerably well. The average Frenchman is far too intelligent not to realize that behind the swift changes of his governments the solid system of the permanent bureaucracy fulfills its task with skill and competence. There is less real poverty in France than elsewhere, though Paris, with the striking contrasts of a metropolis, is an exception. The laboring classes exposed to unemployment have not yet severed their ties with the agricultural basis of the population, and this fact so far has prevented the proletarianization of the strong middle-class elements. On the whole, the living standard of France has not deteriorated. The complaint is better founded that it is too high as compared with the income of the *rentier* class. None of the commonplace incentives to the emergence of fascism in other countries are visible.

Despite the absence of all factors engendering a violent change of government, despite the manifest benefits of the democratic system and its traditional environment, France is, according to the best observers, in permanent danger of a revolution which, after the fashion of the period, revolves around a fascist or a communist reorganization of the state. Why things have gone so far nobody can understand, for everybody agrees that it is utterly unnecessary. Nevertheless, the tension is real. Perhaps the only plausible explanation of the phenomenon consists in the admission of a sort of mental instability and psychological changeability resulting from the prolonged political strain of the last twenty-five years. The pathological causes are more discernible in Germany, where the pressure of the peace treaty and its exactions on the national self-respect necessitates an outlet for the disturbance of the mental equilibrium.

In France, the national restlessness has not found a compensation for the restoration of the parallelogram of the forces. On France, with her declining birthrate, the war imposed a terrific sacrifice in manhood. The attempt, dictated by national ambition, to enforce a political leadership on a politically unbalanced continent has assigned to France a task which she is unable to bear, and which her pride forbids her to renounce. She is in the position of an elderly man who undertakes a mountaineering excursion far beyond his real strength, but keeps up the appearance of enjoying it because the admission of yielding powers would mean for him

the humiliation of failure. This protracted drain on her moral and political strength has resulted in an irritability and instability of mind which the remotest occasion may upset; a growing impatience with the existing political conditions may set loose any moment an outbreak of revolutionary activity which the insight of the majority of the nation abhors and is yet unable to repress. If it is true that Germany has fallen a victim to fascism by the operation of what has been called an inferiority complex, France is exposed to political upheaval by what paradoxically may be termed a superiority complex, all the more disquieting because the evil is a result of a long and glorious history.

The situation may be summed up in the Portuguese phrase: *Nenha o qui vier sea come foristo na pode continuar* ("Come what may, be it what it will, things cannot go on in this manner"). There is no leader aspiring to power; there is not even the typical preparation of public opinion by descriptions of the paradise which the fascist ruler will bring to his country; there is no semi-military organization of fascist forces of any importance; the advocacy of the corporative state is weak and fails to attract public attention; there is not even a class sponsoring fascism for the maintenance of the existing capitalistic order; youth also is rather evenly divided among both camps of right and left. In short, there is nothing which is fascism in the proper sense of the term. Nevertheless, in an amazingly short time fascism in this ultra-democratic and liberal France has developed from a topic of theoretical discussion among political scientists into a threatening reality.

It is true that thus far none of the several groups with fascist leanings has got hold of the general mass of the population. In a nation so deeply imbued with republican and democratic traditions, fascist ideology cannot break its way into the people so easily as in other countries suffering from the crisis and deprived of the moral resistance which a long tradition of self-government has given the French. Although various antiparliamentarian groups or "movements" were competing for political or moral influence, until recently none of them—with negligible exceptions—professed an outspoken fascist creed. All of them, however, are intent upon replacing what they call a vacillating and weak parliamentary democracy by a strong authoritarian government. While the royalists in the *Action Française* are by far the noisiest among the supporters of an anti-parliamentary movement, their program finds

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no favor with the other anti-clerical and decidedly republican associations, such as the *Jeunesses Patriotes* (founded by Taittinger) and the league of the *Croix de Feus*. The only clearly fascist associations are at present the *Solidarité Française*, created by the industrialist Coty, which apparently defends the existing capitalistic order of society, and, last and not least, the so-called Francists, a vehemently nationalist and anti-Semitic group which, built up on lines similar to Nazism, is in many parts of the population not even known by name.

While until the spring of 1935 none of these groups could claim ascendancy over the others, the *Croix de Feus* suddenly emerged as the most powerful center of authoritarian opposition which, against all expectations, might yet be able to focus dispersed anti-parliamentarian dissatisfaction into a unified and strongly organized front for a political turnover. The *Croix de Feus* consists mainly of war veterans, to whom are added organizations of the younger generation under the same military code of obedience and discipline. Its undisputed leader, Colonel de la Rocque, a soldier trained in colonial warfare and administration under Marshall Lyautey, became almost overnight a political power; in his taciturn and deliberate manner, he exercised influence for and against outgoing and incoming governments in the grave financial crisis which shook the country in the spring of 1935. He has carefully refrained from revealing his ultimate political ambitions, and it would even be without foundation to call the *Croix de Feus* a fascist organization in the proper sense of the term. M. de la Rocque has never proclaimed any fascist doctrines, and his republican convictions may not be doubted. What he aims at is a revolution of the *moeurs* rather than of the form of government. He seems, however, willing and prepared to employ the organized forces under his command, which are secretly supported by regular army officers, against any attempts at revolutionary action from the left. Paradoxically enough, it may be said that the *Croix de Feus* constitutes a party army without a party, while in Italy and Germany the building up of the Black- and Brown-shirts corresponded closely to the expansion of the respective party organizations in those countries. Once again the democratic governments of the day in France are not in a position to forbid the display of semi-military organizations rivaling the regular forces of the state if they remain within the borders of the guaranteed institutions of free speech and free assembly, and

thus M. de la Rocque, as well as the *Front Populaire*, was allowed to show his strength in public demonstrations in Paris on July 14. Owing to the good-humoured discipline of the Parisians, this critical day passed, however, without incident. But it would be unwise to overlook the fact that the *Croix de Feus* has become the nucleus of a potent antiparliamentarian movement and that, in the person of Colonel de la Rocque, a leader of at least conspicuous organizing and tactical abilities has arisen.

On the other side of the fence stands the *Front Populaire*, which at present embraces, at least theoretically, the totality of the left parties, extending from the former *Front Commun* of the Communists and the Socialists to the great bourgeois party of the Radical Socialists. Beyond doubt, the fighting potentialities of this levian created for defense against fascism are much stronger than that of the German *Reichsbanner*, once considered an effective counterweight against the National Socialists. Many of the former *combattants de la guerre* have joined the ranks of the *Front Commun*, and French revolutionary tradition will most probably lead this militant body of opposition to attempt proletarian dictatorship rather than submit ignominiously to a fascist *coup d'état*. On the other hand, the actual constructive values of this strange copartnership between heterogeneous sections of public opinion as represented by Cachin, Paul-Boncour, and Herriot should not be overestimated. It has shown impressive strength in public demonstrations, but it lacks cohesion, unity of command, and identity of political ideals. With the exception of determined minorities in both camps, none of the groups mentioned is intent upon anticipating the normal course of French politics.

The real danger, however, lies in the high mental tension of a nation which is no longer under the control of causality. Because of the absence of most of the preliminaries of a fascist upheaval, the situation does not fit into the familiar picture of the transitory stage of a country on the way to fascism. Any casual irregularity in the realm of public order can mobilize the two opposing armies of the left and of the right, which may attack out of fear of being attacked. Both sections of the nation fear the dictatorial ambitions of the other and are therefore determined to anticipate the arbitrariness of the others by imposing their own autocracy. There is no doubt about the ultimate result. Any government, even if sincerely addicted to democracy—and France would not tolerate

a ministry with fascist leanings—might be forced to apply fascist methods, namely, martial rule and suppression of the civil rights to cope with a disturbance of order and safety. France could not stand another February 6 without running the risk of a civil war spreading like a running fire through the provinces, which, for once in French history, would claim their share in deciding the political fate of the country.

So far, no attempt to establish the dictatorship of a socialistic or communistic pattern has been successful in any country, the majority of which consists of peasants or small property-owners; the Bolshevik experiments in Bavaria and in Hungary in 1919 were not more successful than the desperate uprising of Austrian Socialists or the Spanish masses in 1934 or the general strike of British labor in 1926. If the regular forces of the army and the police remain loyal to the government of the day which calls upon them for the repression of a leftist rising, the application of the *état de siège* will inevitably develop into a permanent dictatorial system justified by past dangers and possible recurrence in the future. Only from this angle can the failure of Doumergue's constitutional reform be understood. It had the moral support of a great part of the nation and would have provided a remedy against some of the major defects of the French parliamentary system without impairing democracy at large. It failed, however, because both the camps in which the nation is aligned apprehended that the powers entrusted to a government would ultimately be used for the suppression of the one section by the other. France suffers from a latent Caesar-complex explainable by her history.

No one may venture beyond the limits of reasonable prophecy by forecasting coming events.

In May, 1935, the cabinet of Laval succeeded in obtaining, by a sweeping enabling act unprecedented in French history in peacetime, the indispensable powers for the salvation of the franc and the stabilization of the budget, after the Chamber had denied such powers to Premier Flandin and the one-day government of M. Buisson. Evidently thinking more in terms of economics and less of party politics, Laval, with surprising courage and determination, embarked upon a wide program of planned deflation and enacted by *décrets-lois* many financial and economic reforms which otherwise never would have passed the Palais Bourbon. Despite violent agitation from the left parties, the bulk of the French nation is too

clever to overlook the necessity of the reforms. But the cabinet becomes the target of unpopularity and stands much in the same position as the government of Brüning in Germany after the emergency decrees of December, 1932, which amounted to an equally fruitless attempt at mitigating the crisis by deflation. The inevitable crisis will be accelerated if Parliament, meeting probably again in November, should, for the sake of party tactics in view of the coming general elections, abrogate some of the important decrees—which, however, is not too likely. But the fact remains that, more and more, unrest and nervousness accumulate from diverging political and economic theories.

Will the truce last, and will the menace of fascism be removed from France, a country which has lost nothing of its thorough democratic structure or of its abhorrence of violence and dictatorial pressure? The internal difficulty remains a serious one, and the spectre of fascism is not yet banned from the smiling fields of one of the most beautiful countries of the world. Yet to another grave danger attention must be called, namely, the implications of the serious international situation for France. If the crisis provoked by Germany's rearmament calls for action, the internal dissensions will certainly be submerged by patriotic unity, and democracy once more will yield the concentration of power needed in the case of national emergency. Will the government on which such a plight is incumbent be strong enough, when the danger has passed, to waive the dictatorial powers it was forced to assume?

In no country do better prerequisites for a successful stand against fascist doctrine and practice exist than in Great Britain. Two factors contribute to the expectation that England will be immune from fascism. One is the time-honored acceptance of democratic ideals and institutions in the country in which free government originated. The British mind is given to compromise and to attempts at solutions which appeal to both parties. The other reassuring fact is that England, having apparently reached the deepest point of the depression, seems on the way to recovery. One must bear in mind that fascism not only is a political device but displays far more the qualities of a para-political creed, namely, the hope of the despairing, the refuge of those outwitted by the burden of daily life. Now, unemployment has been steadily declining in Great Britain without the artificial aid of relief by public works and similar unproductive enterprises. After the devaluation

of the sterling currency was undertaken at the right moment, and without the attempt to raise prices and wages by questionable inflationary methods, trade and industry gained ground slowly but unremittingly. The customary tenacity and the traditional self-confidence of the English mind bear fruit, and England has set to work without much talk about the psychological reinforcement of public opinion. On the other hand, the British governmental structure has been elastic enough to concentrate the powers necessary for crisis government in a cabinet more morally supported than effectively controlled by Parliament. The general elections of October, 1931, provided for a National government which rallied, by constitutional means, an overwhelming and unchallengeable majority. This result of the verdict of the electorate was the significant contribution of Great Britain to crisis government, a government with quasi-dictatorial powers in substance but not in form and entirely on the basis of the constitution. The cabinet of Mr. MacDonald attained monocratic powers without impairing a single one of the fundamental principles of the British constitution. The events in England are exemplary of the elasticity of the democratic structure, which permits the adoption of monocratic powers without recourse to the methods of violence and repression detestable to the British mind.

The policy followed by the National government may be open to criticism in details, but it has accomplished its historical mission to maintain democracy under the pressure of an unprecedented economic crisis. The British variety of fascists, Sir Oswald Mosley's Black-shirts, did not get hold of the country because the middle classes, which in England are less affected by the crisis than in other parts of Europe, are repelled by violent methods of political behavior imported from abroad and Englishmen do not believe in the advantages of government by dictation over discussion and persuasion. The success of British fascists has so far been much less than the noise it makes in line with the policy suggested by fascist propaganda. In other countries less endowed with political talent and tradition, Sir Oswald could have become a leader for the masses. One must be careful, however, not to over-estimate his prospects as a fascist leader, especially since the initial advantage of apparently substantial monetary support and benevolence from influential quarters has been withdrawn. Since his catastrophic failure at the general elections in 1931, he has not dared to present

his cause to the nation in by-elections or in local elections whence rising fascist movements usually derive their first successes. The stability of the British system could even afford the advertising publicity given to the fascists by a recent libel suit of Sir Oswald against a metropolitan newspaper, resulting in a judgment which was nothing short of an endorsement by the Lord Chief Justice of the legality of the movement. Furthermore, in no other country has the German "purge" of June 30 done more harm to fascist aspirations. Immediately after the fateful day, Lord Rothermere dissociated himself from the Black-shirt movement and joined the united front of indignant public opinion against what British sentiment called a relapse into mediæval arbitrariness repulsive to the humanitarian spirit of the country.

In the opinion of the parliamentary majority of the House of Commons, the existing democratic institutions were deemed so strong that Parliament desisted from a legislative prohibition of armed private forces and the display of uniforms and party badges in public, which has been repeatedly advocated in public discussion. So far, the confidence of the government and the reasonableness of the public mind have been justified and the visible effects of the unobtrusive work for the improvement of the economic situation have done more to weaken fascist tendencies than any prohibitory measures could have achieved.

Yet a chance is left for fascism in Great Britain, to which attention must be called as a warning. The Labor party bids for power at the next general elections, which will normally be held in 1936. After five years of conservative rule, the swing of the pendulum may be strong enough to bring a working majority of Labor to the next House of Commons. Much of the ultimate fate of England, and perhaps of Europe, depends on the use this Labor government will make of its constitutionally unrestricted powers. If the left-wing radicals in the party get the upper hand, and if an ill-advised attempt should be made to transform the bourgeois society of the country into a Socialist Commonwealth, then the appointed hour for fascism in Great Britain may strike. Against the expected extravagances of an extreme socialism, a violent and militant reaction would be called to arms which will be supported by the conservative part of the nation, even if the conformity of the Labor stratagem with the rules of the political game was not challenged. Conservative reaction could hardly refrain from the application of

fascist devices to meet what will be called "the attack against the foundations of society." Perhaps Sir Oswald waits for this opportunity in order to be called upon as the rescuer of the state from the "red menace," and it is up to the wisdom of the Labor leaders to determine whether or not he will have his chance. A conservative victory at the next election might avert this danger. Perhaps the moderating influence of a revived liberal party holding the balance of power between right and left will ensue; perhaps the new leaders of Labor will be moderate enough to continue on the traditional path of evolution in Great Britain. In the latter alternative, the chances of fascism in Great Britain will be none too auspicious.

It is rather indicative of the cogency of British traditions that the Irish Free State thus far has avoided deviation from the principles of free self-government universally accepted as the basis of the new state in 1922. On the Green Island, the conditions for political violence inherent in fascism are particularly favorable. During 1934 the outlook for the maintenance of democracy in Ireland was gloomy, if the term democracy may be applied to a government whose parliamentary majority renders it constitutionally monocratic. It is remarkable that every country which has grown up under the direct or indirect influence of British parliamentary traditions finds, after a period of political oscillation, the center of political gravity in the two-party system. Ireland emerged comparatively soon from the ambiguities of the multiple-party dynamics, and public opinion began to run in the channels of two great political groups absorbing more or less all minor ramifications of political interests. Even proportional representation, which usually fosters the growth of many small parties, could not delay the advent of a system in which two great parties or two groups of affiliated parties bid for power. When Mr. de Valera's republican party finally succeeded in dislocating the Anglo-phil constitutional party of Mr. Cosgrave, the latter was, by natural development, compelled to become the alternative power in the contest of parliamentary forces.

The rise of a fascist party, the Blue-shirts, significantly under the leadership of a soldier, General O'Duffy, could not surprise anyone in a country where violence and the drastic methods of political warfare had been practiced against the common enemy over a long period. The economic pressure in an agricultural country, ag-

gravated by the anti-English policy of the government, paved the way for the emergence of a fascist party appealing to the Irish temperament of the impoverished masses of peasants and the lower middle class. The fascist movement combined forces with the formerly constitutional party of Mr. Cosgrave in the attempt to recapture the control of the state by non-parliamentary methods. It is very doubtful whether this desperate effort could have been successful, because the majority of the country stood firmly behind the constitutionally appointed Prime Minister de Valera. Yet the country was in fact for some months on the verge of a fascist turnover. The attacks of the Blue-shirts would have forced Mr. de Valera also to apply dictatorial methods against the aggressor. The unholy alliance between Mr. O'Duffy's Blue-shirts advocating a corporative state and the former government party under Mr. Cosgrave broke down, and Mr. de Valera was enabled to continue to govern Ireland democratically. The traditional appeal of the two-party system was stronger than the untried scheme of a corporative state. It remains to be seen whether a lasting return of Ireland to the normalcy of alternative government will be possible or whether the government will be forced to resort openly to dictatorial forms.

VI

We have so far confined the scope of this survey to the European nations, but if we cast a hasty glance over other parts of the civilized world, it appears that democracy is comparatively stable in all countries enjoying the privilege of British free traditions and democratic institutions. What has been said of the mother country is equally true for the dominions beyond the sea. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are still parliamentary democracies where the constitution works, if not altogether smoothly, yet tolerably well, and fascism has failed to implant itself. We may omit Japan, which never has been a genuine democracy, but always a more or less disguised camouflage of semi-military dictatorship apparently suited to a country with a religious veneration of authority and scarcely emancipated from the influence of mediaeval traditions. The cruder forms of fascism crouch around the corner. If communism extends its power, they might leap upon the country, unless the patriotic fervor of a war should temporarily subdue both tendencies.

We may equally dismiss from our survey the South American and other Latin American countries where unmitigated dictatorships alternate with a sort of unstable and precarious parliamentarism, not excepting the politically most advanced nations of Argentina and Chile where *Aprismo* offers a new variety of revolutionary impulses. We shall, therefore, conclude our survey by mentioning the United States.

This country is so remote from European experience in fascism and the ideology of fascism is so alien to American thought, nourished by the British traditions of self-government over a long period, that it seems unreasonable to expect the appearance or the growth of any brand of European fascism. The efforts of some irresponsible elements—adventurers or idealists—to import the European brand of fascism and dictatorship seem hopeless. It is possible, however, that under continued economic pressure, the governmental powers will be so enlarged that the time-honored institutions of free self-government may become assimilated to the needs of a government monocratic in substance if not in form. Whether this result is compatible with the maintenance of the classical institutions of democratic type, and whether the political mentality of the average American will offer resistance to a development in the direction of monocracy, belongs to another chapter.

Attention, however, must be called to one specific feature of the battle between democracy and autocracy which has been revealed by recent European experiences, namely, the fact that confidence in the superiority of democratic institutions and belief in the soundness and reasonableness of the masses do by no means suffice to safeguard the existing order against the constitutionally cloaked ambition of the crypto-fascists. European contemporary history is abundant in warning examples. To protect democracy in these times of unparalleled moral and economic crisis, perhaps some democratic rights which are exposed to misuse by the enemies of free government, and which in normal times may be deemed indispensable, must be jettisoned. *Nomina sunt odiosa*, but the masses are unreliable and forever waiting for their messiah. Any observer of American contemporary politics who desires the maintenance of American democracy cannot but feel grave apprehensions when he notices the apparent incapacity of the existing

economic system to absorb the vast mass of unemployed forming the nucleus of a future fascist army. On the other hand, he realizes with increasing anxiety the readiness of many average Americans hit severely by the crisis to accept the economic fallacies and the political catchwords propagated by the "Pied Pipers" as solutions of our present discontents. Spiritual movements of today have a common aetiology and demand a common therapy. No democratic government which has to bear the brunt of economic responsibility should disregard the warning experience of democracies in Europe under similar strain. *Videant consules, ne quid detrimenti capiat res publica.*

VII

If we may summarize the results of our travel around the contemporary European political scene, we are on safe ground in stating that, at the present moment, the army of fascist countries in Europe may enlist, as new recruits for fascist rule, all states in which democracy is not rooted in long tradition and experience, and where democratic self-expression is not strong enough to overcome the dangers arising out of the economic or political situation, viz., Spain, Rumania, Greece, all of the Baltic states, and eventually the Irish Free State. On the other hand, democracy seems safe in Great Britain, in the Scandinavian states of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, in Switzerland, in Belgium and Holland, and, certainly for the lifetime of Thomas Masaryk—and perhaps even after that—in Czechoslovakia. He who wishes the future of civilization well, and who believes in the prospects of mankind for peace and happiness, would gladly add to this list France. In reality, France is the critical point in the battle waging between dictatorial and democratic rule, which coming generations will probably consider as the predominant political feature of our age. The relapse of France into authoritarian rule of any kind would be the worst blow to the future of democracy and free institutions conceivable, while the adherence of France to democracy will be an impregnable obstacle to autocracy and a definite check on the further spread of fascism in Europe. France is once more the milestone in European history from which the path bifurcates to democracy and peace or fascist imperialism and war. The present situation confirms the dictum: If France is quiet, all Europe is quiet.

VIII

It is a widely different problem whether the existing European dictatorships are stable enough to allow for a certain permanence in the near future. Here no prophecy resting on scientific assumptions is permissible. It is a matter of political belief, which is not less controversial than religion itself. The author is personally convinced that dictatorship in all countries, with the possible exception of Russia, is a temporary expedient originating in the post-war disturbances of international equilibrium and in the economic crisis, both of which will disappear in the normal evolution of history. Modern history is an unrelenting process of revolutionary movements from autocracy to democracy, in which each retrogression is in turn followed by a progression towards the ultimate end. We do not wish to convey the impression that we regard democracy in its present form as the final and ultimate type of free government, but we think that the dictatorships of today, which are incompatible with much of what has been accepted by human dignity, will not last.

It would be premature to state that the dictatorial form of government has already reached its zenith as to time or geographical extension, although in at least two dictatorships there are unmistakable signs that, after the disappearance of the dominating figure, public opinion slowly begins to assert itself again, namely, in Poland after Marshal Pilsudski's and in Yugoslavia after King Alexander's death. Viewing impartially, however, the main strongholds of dictatorship in Europe (Russia has always been and is still an Asiatic power), namely Italy and Germany, world opinion is more and more inclined to believe that this most interesting experiment of irresponsible one man-rule is beginning to lose the day. It may be different in countries where political education remains undeveloped, and where monocratic government is more or less in harmony with national traditions, as is the case in Russia, Turkey, and some of the Balkan and Baltic states. But on the whole, the moral, and even the technical, superiority of an admittedly defective democratic organization over unrestricted monocratic rule cannot fail to win over even those whom dissatisfaction with some lamentable results of democracy has driven into the opposite camp. We must always bear in mind that human institutions share the imperfection of the human mind.

One conclusion, at least, may be drawn from observation of the structure of modern autocracies, namely, that the downfall of one of the principal dictatorships of contemporary Europe must necessarily be fatal to all of the others. The apparent stability of dictatorship rests on the assumption that autocracy has entrenched itself as the definite form of modern government. If one of the régimes breaks down, by internal rebellion or (what is more likely) by a failure in foreign policy entailing internal revolution, autocracy at large is likely to suffer such a loss of prestige that an ultimate replacement by a more liberal and democratic form of government in all of the other dictatorial states will in the long run become inevitable.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, I*

RICHARD HARTSHORNE

University of Minnesota

The border position of geography between the natural and the social sciences is fairly generally recognized. Concerned primarily with differences in the different areas of the world, geography studies both natural and cultural features. In some universities, it is included among the natural sciences, in others among the social sciences. In England and America, geographers have particularly cultivated that portion of their field which leads naturally into economics, i.e., economic geography. Much less attention has been paid to the relations with history, although various geographers and historians have studied what has variously been called historical geography or geographic history. Even less have geographers in the English-speaking countries concerned themselves with that portion of their subject which bears upon the political areas of the world. The territorial problems of the war and post-war period, however, stimulated activity in this field both in England and America, the most notable product of which is Bowman's *The New World*, consisting in large part of the materials gathered for the American Commission to the Peace Conference.¹

With that one exception, no major work in political geography has been published in the United States, and not more than two or three in England. It is therefore perhaps not surprising to find this branch of the field handled very briefly, if at all, in the various resumés that have recently been published in this country concerning the general field of geography.²

* This paper is, in part, a result of studies made as a fellow of the Social Science Research Council in 1931-32.

¹ Isaiah Bowman, *The New World: Problems in Political Geography* (Chicago, 1921, 4th ed., 1928). Dr. Bowman was chief territorial adviser and executive officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence.

² In the most detailed of these, Isaiah Bowman, *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences* (Part V of the *Rept., Comm. on Soc. Stud.*, Amer. Hist. Assoc., New York, 1934), political geography is discussed in ten pages (pp. 205-215), with almost no bibliography. In Carl Sauer's chapter on "Cultural Geography" in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (Phila. and London, 1927), three pages are devoted to this branch of the field (pp. 207-210), chiefly criticisms, in part justified but based on an evidently very limited survey. In Jean Brunhes' chapter on "Human Geography" in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (H. E. Barnes,

Nowhere in English can I find an adequate summary, to say nothing of a discussion,³ of the notable developments of the past twenty years in political geography on the Continent, particularly by the Germans.⁴ It is unfortunate that this work should remain largely unknown to political scientists and historians, as well as to geographers, in this country. For this reason, the writer has prepared this paper, which, it is hoped, may also help to clear up misunderstandings as to the character of the subject. The paper will therefore present briefly the historical development of the field, explain the various concepts of the subject held by different groups of workers, and describe the scope of the field thus defined.⁵

I. HISTORY OF THE FIELD

Political Geography Before the World War. While it is true that the greatest developments in this field owe their stimulus to the changes caused by the World War, it is incorrect to consider political geography as a new field of knowledge first opened up at that time. In a sense, it is as old as the science of geography itself.⁶

ed., New York, 1925), the discussion of political geography, pp. 71-74, 101-102, is limited almost entirely to a consideration of one book, that of Brunhes and Vallaux. (Cf. Sauer's comments on Brunhes' treatment of his subject). In the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, political geography appears only in a short paragraph under "Political Science" in which only Ratzel and Kjellén are mentioned. (For contrast, see "Politische Geographie" in the *Staatslexicon*, or the *Politisches Handwörterbuch*.)

³ A small exception is offered in the utilization of recent work of German students on the geography of political boundaries, in my "Geographic and Political Boundaries in Upper Silesia," *Annals Assoc. Amer. Geog.*, Dec., 1933, pp. 195-228.

⁴ That the Germans should be particularly interested in the subject since the War is obvious, but they have always shown more interest in it than has any other group. The environmental reasons for this, as well as for the lack of interest in this country, are discussed by Derwent Whittlesey in "Environment and the Student of Human Geography," *Scientific Monthly*, 1932, pp. 265-267.

⁵ The references in the footnotes provide a considerable up-to-date bibliography, not readily available elsewhere. The largest bibliography, including references to over 700 writers and fairly complete through 1924, is given in the footnotes of Otto Maull, *Politische Geographie* (Berlin, 1925), especially pp. 703-710. Bowman, *The New World*, pp. 747-775, presents also a very large bibliography of a different sort, consisting chiefly of references to materials in economic geography, history, politics, etc., of value for the study of different countries. The writer regrets that he is limited to the literature in English, French, and German. In none of the bibliographies studied are there more than one or two important titles in any other modern language, though Haushofer speaks, in passing, of "prominent students of Geopolitik in Fascist Italy."

⁶ For a detailed discussion of the development of political geography, see Maull, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-30.

If Herodotus was a geographer, he was also a political geographer; Strabo certainly was both, as his description of the geographic basis of the Roman Empire shows. The relation of states to the natural conditions of their areas has been a subject of speculation of historians and philosophers as well as geographers from Plato through Montesquieu and Kant⁷ to the present time. These speculative students developed a great wealth of hypotheses which they were not in a position to prove, but which provide a stimulating body of ideas for present students in the field, and which should make it unnecessary for them to spend much effort in that phase of investigation.⁸

In contrast to the hypothetical work of the philosophic writers, Carl Ritter, often called the founder of modern geography in Germany, first attempted (1817) to base conclusions of political geography on the growing body of material of physical geography. Since then, a whole host of geographers have considered this subject, chiefly in terms of the relation of physical geography to political and military history.⁹

Among the earlier workers were two of Ritter's disciples, the Swiss-American, Guyot (1849), and the early master of French geography, Elisée Reclus (*L'Homme et la terre*, 6 vols., 1905-08); the Russian geographer Metchnikoff, who wrote on the relation of civilization to the great river valleys (1889); a group of German writers headed by H. F. Helmolt, who published nine volumes of geographic history under the title of *Weltgeschichte* (1899, later

⁷ In his discussion of geography, Immanuel Kant provides for a political geography "founded entirely on physical geography." "Kant's *Physiche Geographie*," *Philos. Bibl.*, B.A. 51, 2 Aufl. (Leipzig, 1904), p. 17 (after Maull).

⁸ At least one of these hypotheses is of special interest in comparison with certain current theories. The Arab historian, Ibn Chaldun, held that the fourth temperature zone, of the seven zones of the Arab geographers, was the most favorable for civilization, as shown by the lands included in it—those of the Arabs, Romans, Persians, Jews, Greeks, Hindus, and Chinese. Maull, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁹ Two non-geographers, a French historian, Febvre, and an American sociologist, Franklin Thomas, have made excellent detailed studies of the development of thought in this field, though Febvre's study was in fact written about 1914 and Thomas was not acquainted with the recent work in Germany. Both writers give somewhat exaggerated impressions of the importance of this aspect of geography in the general field, since neither is familiar with more recent developments. Lucien Febvre, *La terre et l'évolution humaine* (in the series "L'Évolution de l'Humanité," 2d. ed., Paris, 1924), trans. as *A Geographical Introduction to History* (in the series "The History of Civilization," New York, 1925); Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society; A Study in the History of Sociological Thought* (New York, 1925).

translated into English); two English geographers, Mackinder (1890) and Hereford George (1901); and three American geographers who studied the relation of geography to American history: Shaler (1891), Brigham (1903), and Semple (1903).¹⁰

More recently, there have been significant contributions by Fairgrieve, Cornish, and Kermack in England, and by Semple and Wright in America, not to mention the works in foreign languages.¹¹ Huntington's special studies of the relation of climate to history are well-known.¹² In addition, the standard geographies of major world regions, such as those of Lyde, Mackinder, Partsch, Hettner, etc., have usually included sections on historical or political geography.¹³

¹⁰ The dates are those of the first publications of the respective writers in this field. Titles of these and a number of similar works may be found in the bibliography in Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 317-329. Two have recently been republished: Hereford B. George, *The Relations of Geography and History* (rev. and enl. by Howarth and Fawcett, Oxford, 1924); Ellen C. Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions* (rev. by C. F. Jones, Boston, 1933). Mackinder enlarged upon his earlier papers, notably "The Geographical Pivot of History" (*Geog. Jour.*, April, 1904), in which Haushofer finds much of the world history of 1914-24 correctly predicted, in *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (London, 1919).

¹¹ James Fairgrieve, *Geography and World Power* (London, 1915, 1921); V. Cornish, *The Great Capitals; An Historical Geography* (London and New York, 1922); W. R. Kermack, *Human Environment and Progress; The Outline of World Historical Geography* (chiefly the British Isles) (Edinburgh and London, 1927), and two previous studies of Scotland and the British Empire; Ellen C. Semple, *Geography of the Mediterranean Region: Its Relation to Ancient History* (New York, 1931); J. K. Wright, *The Geographical Basis of European History* (New York, 1928). To these should be added the study of this continent by the English geographer, Rodwell Jones, Part I of L. R. Jones and P. W. Bryan, *North America; An Historical Economic, and Regional Geography* (New York, 1924), and especially C. O. Paullin (J. K. Wright, ed.), *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States* (New York, 1932), abstract by Wright: "Sections and the National Growth," *Geog. Rev.*, 1932, pp. 353-360.

¹² Of Ellsworth Huntington's many publications, the most significant in this connection are *World Power and Evolution* (New Haven, 1919), and two studies of the geography of Biblical history: *Palestine and Its Transformation* (Boston, 1911) and Chaps. XII-XVII in *The Pulse of Progress, Including a Sketch of Jewish History* (New York, 1926).

¹³ Aside from these well-known works, mention might be made of two early ones: C. Naumann and Josef Partsch, *Physikalische Geographie von Griechenland, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das Altertum* (Breslau, 1895), pp. 97 ff; Theobald Fischer, "Die iberische Halbinsel," in Kirchhoff's *Länderkunde von Europa* (Vienna, 1893), Pt. 2, 2nd half; and of two more recent: Alfred Hettner, *Russland, eine geographische Betrachtung von Volk, Staat, und Kultur* (Leipzig, 1916); and I. Bowman, *Desert Trails of Atacama* (New York, 1924), Chap. V.

In the field of political geography as distinct from the more general historical geography, the foundations were laid by Friedrich Ratzel, whose *Politische Geographie*,¹⁴ published in 1897, is universally recognized as the first systematic treatment of the subject.¹⁵ In France, where his *Anthropogeographie* was already well known, this volume was discussed at great length by Vidal de la Blache,¹⁶ a condensed article by Ratzel was published in French,¹⁷ and Vallaux later used the *Politische Geographie* as the basis, at least for departure, of his two volumes in the same field.¹⁸

Unfortunately, Miss Semple, on whom geographers in England and America have largely depended for their knowledge of Ratzel's ideas, did little with his political geography.¹⁹ In this field, a more important follower was the Swedish political scientist Kjellén, whose work was to have such a profound influence on the development of the subject in Germany after the World War. But for a generation Ratzel's work was almost the only major authority in the field, the framework for studies by Hassert, Schöne,²⁰ Sieger, Maull, Haushofer, and a few others.

On the whole, however, Ratzel's study did not have the effect that he expected. Geography was for some time carried along in the general up-swing of the physical sciences (especially in America under the leadership of W. M. Davis). It was not until the World War emphasized the need for development of the social sciences in general, and in particular stimulated popular as well as academic

¹⁴ Fr. Ratzel, *Politische Geographie* (Munich, 1897); 2nd. ed. with additional title *oder die Geographie der Staaten, der Verkehrs, und des Krieges*, 1903; 3rd. ed. rev. with chapter on the historical development of the subject by E. Oberhummer, (Munich and Berlin 1923). In addition should be listed: *Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse* (Munich, 1900); *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika*, Bd. 2. *Politische Geographie* (Munich, 1893); and various special studies in *Kleine Schriften*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1906).

¹⁵ Abstract by Otto Schlüter in *Z. Geo. f. Erdkunde* (Berlin, 1898), pp. 126-140.

¹⁶ Vidal de la Blache, "La géographie politique d'après les écrits de M. Fr. Ratzel," abstract and rev. in *Ann. de Geog.* (March, 1898), pp. 97-111.

¹⁷ Ratzel, "Le sol, la société, et l'état," *Année Sociol.* 1898-99.

¹⁸ See the preface to each of Camille Vallaux, *Géographie sociale: le mer* (1908), and *Le sol et l'état* (1911, Paris).

¹⁹ Though in her great treatise which is derived in large part from his *Anthropogeographie* she devotes a chapter or so to political geography. E. C. Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment* (New York, 1911), Chap. III and parts of Chap. VII.

²⁰ Emil Schöne's little book was intended as "a popularization of the ideas of Ratzel," *Politische Geographie* (Aus Natur- und Geisteswelt series, Leipzig, 1911).

interest in political geography, that that part of their subject attracted the attention of many geographers.²¹

Summarizing for the century preceding the World War, the work in the border area between history and political science on the one hand and geography on the other was in large part that of geographers. Although historians have frequently had good reason to object to exaggerated conclusions or too simple generalizations in some of these geographic interpretations of history (compare with the school of economic interpretation), many historians have appreciated the value of the new point of view and methods offered. Thus, the French historian, Febvre, in his masterly examination of the work of this period—especially that of Ratzel, Vallaux, and Vidal de la Blache—pays this tribute: "Anyone nowadays who wants instruction on the relation between the land and history—I mean conscientiously and with guarantees—must apply to them [the geographers] first."²²

More recently, many geographers have changed their concept of "historical geography" to denote the geography of past periods, and have classified studies of geographic influences in history as "geographic history," i.e., rather a part of the field of history than of geography.²³ Nevertheless, it was the work of the geographers that brought this subject to the attention of historians like Turner²⁴

²¹ Nevertheless, Haushofer feels that the subject, as developed by Ratzel, Vallaux, and Mackinder, did have a notable influence on political thought and action in England and France—in the latter through the *École de Politique*—but unfortunately little or none in Germany. "Politische Erdkunde und Geopolitik," in *Freie Wege Vergleichender Erdkunde* (Festgabe E. v. Drysgalski, Munich, 1925), pp. 94 ff.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 17. In the bibliography, pp. 369–379 (mostly French sources), and in that of Franklin Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 317–329, are a considerable number of studies in this field by others than geographers. To these should be added E. A. Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*, 2 vols. with atlas (3rd ed. London, 1903).

²³ Brunhes, "Human Geography," in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, pp. 100–101 (according to Brunhes, Hettner stated this conclusion in the *Geog. Z.* for 1898); Harlan H. Barrows, "Geography as Human Ecology," *Annals Assoc. Amer. Geog.*, 1922, pp. 11–12; Suaer, *op. cit.*, p. 200. Similar conclusions were expressed at a joint meeting of geographers and historians in England, reported in "What is Historical Geography?," *Geography* (1932), pp. 39–45.

²⁴ Frederick J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920); *The Significance of Sections in American History* (New York, 1932). In a quotation in the introduction to the latter, Turner, it seems to me, very clearly expresses the contrast between the position of an historian and that of a geographer: "The central interest of my [life] study has been that of these maps of population advance—not as a student of a region but of a process."

and Vogel,²⁵ and geographers trust to see other historians, adequately trained in geography, make use of geographical methods and concepts in their historical studies.

The World War and Political Geography. The changes in the political map of Europe which were discussed in all countries during and after the War drew the attention of geographers in America, as well as in Europe, to specific problems in political geography. Many were drawn into active work for their governments, and the following, in particular, functioned as experts at the Peace Conference: Ogilvie for England, de Martonne for France, Romer for Poland, Cvijić for Serbia, and Bowman and Douglas Johnson for the United States.²⁶ A large number of others made special studies of particular boundary problems.²⁷ Several geographers published somewhat general studies of world political problems for non-academic readers, which expressed purely personal points of view but included much expert information.²⁸

Most of these geographers have returned to their former areas of work. On the whole, the products of this period reflect the lack of adequate development of political geography as a discipline, as well as a lack of sufficient grounding of most of the writers in the subject, even so far as it had been developed. Their problems were too complex for either their training or their information, and the nationalist spirit was usually the dominating influence. There were,

²⁵ Walther Vogel, *Das neue Europa und seine historisch-geographischen Grundlagen*, 2 vols. (Bonn and Leipzig, 1921, 1925); *Politische Geographie* (Leipzig, 1922); *Die Entstehung des modernen Weltstaatsystems* (Weltpol. Bücherei, Berlin, 1929).

²⁶ In addition, the following were engaged in cartographic work or prepared other special materials: de Margerie and Gallois (France), Marinelli and Ricchieri (Italy), and Jefferson, Lobeck, and Martin (United States). Sieger, who alone of the list had been an active student of political geography, came to Paris with the Austrian delegation, but had, of course, no opportunity to take part in the work of the Conference. Likewise the material which Teleki sent from Hungary had little effect; he was for a short period prime minister of Hungary. The above list, prepared chiefly from correspondence with several of the Americans mentioned, is probably not complete.

²⁷ Including Partsch, Penck, Krebs, Sapper, Volz, Sölch, Teleki, Gallois, Holdich, and Lyde.

²⁸ Alfred Hettner, *England's Weltherrschaft* (Leipzig, 1915, revised 1928); G. Wegener, *Die geographische Ursachen des Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1920), summarized in "Erdräum und Schicksal," *Z. f. Geopolitik*, 1931, pp. 542-57; H. J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (London, 1919); A. Demangeon, *Le déclin de l'Europe* (Paris, 1920, trans. as *America and the Race for World Dominion*, New York, 1921); O. D. Von Engeln, *Inheriting the Earth; or the Geographical Factor in National Development* (New York, 1922).

however, notable exceptions—not only men like Sieger and Maull, who had long been studying political geography, but also others like the physiographers Supan and Penck, who, in spite of intense nationalism, were able to make valuable contributions to the development of theory in the subject.²⁹

Political Geography Since the Period of the World War. The stimulus of the war and post-war period had, moreover, its more permanent effects. Especially in Germany, where dissatisfaction with the territorial settlements of the Peace Conference greatly increased popular as well as academic interest in the subject, has political geography developed.

Systematic treatises of the field, based fundamentally on Ratzel, have been published by Supan, Dove, Vogel, Dix, and Maull.³⁰ Of these, the most important is Maull's strikingly objective and scholarly, if somewhat too encyclopedic, work. In addition to a great wealth of factual material, the author provides a comparative study of the various points of view of nearly all his predecessors.³¹ Unfortunately, Sieger's plans for a full treatment of the subject were cancelled by his death (1926); his keen analysis and development of precise terminology are available only in a dozen or more articles scattered through various periodicals, some difficult to obtain.³²

²⁹ Penck, *Über politische Grenzen* (Rektoratsrede, Berlin, 1917). (Only the theoretical discussion, the major part, is of value now; it is unfortunate that the applications suggested for Europe, given in an address made during the heat of the war, could not have been omitted in publication.) Supan's work will be noted later. For other work in political geography in Europe during this period, notably that of Fleure, Newbigin, Cvijić, and Teleki, see the full list in W. L. G. Joerg, "Recent Geographical Work in Europe," *Geog. Rev.*, 1922, pp. 431-784. In America, the most important—other than Bowman, *The New World*—were Leon Dominian, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe* (New York, 1917), and Douglas Johnson's studies in the special field of military geography: *Topography and Strategy in the War* (New York, 1917), and *Battlefields of the World War*, 2 vols. (New York, 1921).

³⁰ Alexander Supan, *Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie: Naturlehre des Staates* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1918, 1922); K. Dove, *Allgemeine politische Geographie* (Leipzig, 1920); Walther Vogel, *Politische Geographie* (Leipzig, 1922); Arthur Dix, *Politische Geographie: Weltpolitisches Handbuch* (Munich, 1922, 1923); Otto Maull, *Politische Geographie* (Berlin, 1925).

³¹ "Without doubt it deserves a distinctly prominent place in the modern geographic literature." J. Sölch, review in *Geografiska Annaler*, 1925, pp. 251-255. Other reviews by Sieger in *Geog. Z.*, 1926, p. 379, and Schlüter in *Geog. Anz.*, 1926, pp. 62-66.

³² For an appreciation, with full bibliography, see J. Sölch: "Robert Sieger,"

Of special studies in the political geography of certain regions and boundary areas, there have been a great number by Obst, Passarge, Uhlig, Volz, Sölch, and others.³³

But increasingly the younger German geographers interested in the political aspect of the subject have taken their lead from Karl Haushofer,³⁴ the founder (with Obst) and editor of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. The work of this school is based in part directly on Ratzel, but particularly on the system of the Swedish political scientist Kjellén,³⁵ whose concept of the state as an organism was taken from Ratzel.³⁶ Taking the name of *Geopolitik* from Kjellén, and ultimately enlarging its scope greatly, the members of this group,³⁷ publishing in their monthly magazine as well as in numer-

Geog. Z., 1927, pp. 305-313. Perhaps the most valuable single reference is "Zur politische-geographischen Terminologie," *Z. Ges. f. Erdkunde Berlin*, 1917, pp. 497-529; 1918, pp. 48-69.

³³ Erich Obst, *England, Europa, und die Welt: eine geopolitische-, weltwirtschaftliche Studie* (Berlin, 1927); Johann Sölch, various articles on the Tyrol, including "The Brenner Region," in *Sociol. Review*, Oct., 1927, pp. 1-17; S. Passarge, *Ägypten und der Arabische Orient: eine politische-geographische Studie* (Weltpol. Bücherei, Bd. 28, Berlin, 1931). Special mention should be made of the cartographic work, as applied to political geography, in W. Volz and H. Schwalm, *Die deutsche Ostgrenze, Unterlagen zur Erfassung der Grenzerreisungsschäden* (Leipzig, 1927), and H. Overbeck and G. W. Saute, *Saar-Atlas* (Gotha, 1934); see my review in *Geog. Rev.*, Oct., 1934, pp. 680-682.

³⁴ Formerly a regular officer of the German army, Haushofer's intention to transfer to academic life was postponed by the War to 1920, when he retired as a major-general. Now professor at the University of Munich, his best work is on Japan, where he was stationed as military attaché in 1908-11. Karl Haushofer, *Das Nihon: Betrachtungen über Gross-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft* (Berlin, 1913); *Das Japanische Reich in seiner geographischen Entwicklung* (Vienna, 1921); *Japan und die Japaner, eine Landes- und Volkskunde* (Leipzig, 1923, 1933). For an appreciation of the work of this significant leader, see "Karl Haushofer, zum 60 Geburtstag," *Z. f. Geopolitik*, 1929, pp. 709-725.

³⁵ Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922). For an appreciation of his work, see "Kjellén" (by Vogel) in *Encyc. Soc. Sciences*, or, in more detail, by Sieger in *Z. f. Geopolitik*, 1924, pp. 339-346. Most important of his studies were: *Stormakterna*, 4 vols. (Stockholm, 1910-14 (trans. *Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1915, 22d ed., ed. by K. Haushofer, *Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkrieg*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1930); *Staten som livsform* (Stockholm, 1916, trans. *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Berlin, 1917, 1924); *Grundriss zu einem System der Politik* (Berlin, 1920).

³⁶ In addition to the work of Ratzel and Kjellén, Haushofer lays particular emphasis on Fairgrieve's study, *op. cit.*, which he has had published in German (trans. by Martha Haushofer, his wife) with an introduction by himself: J. Fairgrieve, *Geographie und Weltmacht, eine Einleitung in die Geopolitik* (Berlin, 1925).

³⁷ Of the original group, Obst and Maull, formerly co-editors with Haushofer of the *Zeitschrift*, seem to have dropped out. Most prominent now are Lautenach, Albrecht Haushofer (son), and Baumann.

ous pamphlets and books, have met with enthusiastic response among the nationalistic reading public in Germany, if not in academic circles. In the reconstruction of education in Nazi Germany, the subject of Geopolitik will apparently occupy that place of importance which its proponents have long been claiming for it.³⁸ Whether this is properly to be considered a part of geography, and not rather a part of political science, will be discussed later; at any rate, the work to date has largely been carried on by geographers.

While French geographers have not shown anything like the same interest, there have been many studies of boundaries and border areas by Gallois, Demangeon, de Martonne, and others, as well as two works of major importance. Demangeon wrote on the British Empire as a type study in "colonial geography, an independent branch of knowledge" which should "study the effects arising from the contact between the two types of people who are called upon to associate in a colony, the one civilized . . . the other isolated and self-centered."³⁹ For such a purpose, it seems unfortunate to have selected the very empire in which self-governing dominions are so important, areas that hardly fit the concept of "colony" from which the author starts.

More important is the theoretical treatise in which Vallaux, whose earlier work has already been mentioned, joined with Brunhes to write *La géographie de l'histoire*,⁴⁰ which includes a general survey of the field of political geography, based chiefly on Vallaux' earlier *Le sol et l'état*. Unfortunately, little cognizance is taken of the work done in Germany since Ratzel, and foreign students are disturbed by the marked national prejudice in the second

³⁸ It is perhaps significant that Kurt Vowinkel, who is not only the publisher of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* and nearly all the separate publications in Geopolitik, but is in a sense editor (*Schriftleiter*) of the periodical, is now the appointed head of the publishers' association of Germany. Haushofer, formerly honorary professor at the University of Munich, was in 1933 appointed a regular full (*ordinarius*) professor.

³⁹ Albert Demangeon, *L'Empire britannique: étude de géographie coloniale* (Paris, 1923), trans. as *The British Empire: A Study in Colonial Geography* (New York and London, 1925, German trans., Berlin, 1926).

⁴⁰ J. Brunhes and C. Vallaux, *La géographie de l'histoire: Géographie de la paix et de la guerre sur terre et sur mer* (Paris, 1921). Abstract and review by Douglas Johnson, *Geog. Rev.*, 1922, pp. 278-293. Mention may be made also of J. Brunhes and Deffontaines, "Géographie politique," Pt. 3 of *Géographie humaine de la France* (Vol. II of G. Hanotaux, *Histoire de la nation française*, Paris, 1926).

half of the book dealing with the World War and its settlement.

Recent publications in the English-speaking countries have been equally out of touch with the development of the subject in Germany. In England, the chief workers have been Mackinder, whose earliest work was contemporaneous with Ratzel, and Cornish and Fawcett.⁴¹ In American geography, Bowman's by-product of the Peace Conference stands alone as a major work. Wright's brief but excellent outline for the historical geography of Europe has already been mentioned. Other publications have been limited to periodical articles by Bowman, Wright, Whittlesey, and others.⁴²

II. DEFINITION OF THE FIELD

Our brief survey of the history of political geography shows it to be a field in which geographers have not merely laid out claims, but have done a very considerable amount of valuable work. Nevertheless, there is wide divergence of opinion, not only among geographers in general, but also among those working in political geography itself, as to the proper nature of that field and the scope that it should include.

Political Geography Defined as a Study of Relationships. If political geography is to be oriented properly in the general field of geography as a part of human geography, any definition of it must be based on a definition of the field of human geography.⁴³ Formerly, most geographers defined human geography in terms of

⁴¹ H. J. Mackinder, "The Physical Basis of Political Geography," *Scott. Geog. Mag.*, VI (1890), p. 73 ff.; *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (London, 1919); Vaughan Cornish, *The Great Capitals; An Historical Geography* (London, 1922), very largely political geography; *Geography of Imperial Defense* (London, 1922); C. B. Fawcett, *Frontiers; A Study in Political Geography* (Oxford, 1918); *A Political Geography of the British Empire* (London and New York, 1933).

⁴² A number of American geologists have made important studies of problems concerned with the control and production of mineral resources, which are, in part at least, based on economic geography. These include books and articles, chiefly in *Foreign Affairs*, by Bain, Leith, Spur, and George Otis Smith. A large number are listed in R. H. Whitbeck and O. J. Thomas, *The Geographic Factor* (New York, 1932), pp. 189-190, 207-209, 231-233.

⁴³ For a discussion of changing concepts of geography, see Alfred Hettner, *Die Geographie; ihre Geschichte, ihr Wesen, und ihre Methoden* (Breslau, 1927), pp. 73-109, 121-131; Febvre, *op. cit.*, 1-67; Carl Sauer, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," *op. cit.*; I. Bowman, *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences*, Chap. 1; and "Geography" in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, pp. 621 ff., sections by Sauer, Vallaux, and Sapper. Brunhes' chapter in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* contributes little beyond a detailed discussion of the points of view of Ratzel and Brunhes.

relationships between earth features, or natural environment, on the one hand, and man with his activities on the other.⁴⁴ Expressed in terms of "geographical control" or "geographic influences," this was, in part, derived from Ratzel's *Anthropogeographie*, though as Febvre (following Durkheim) shows, it represented only a part of Ratzel's view of the field.⁴⁵ That this concept of "environmentalism" has largely dominated the subject for a generation may well be a result, in part, of the fact that geography occupied no independent position in universities, outside of Germany, but was either the handmaiden of history, as in France and Belgium, or of economics, as in England, or was a side-line of geology, as in America.⁴⁶ The students of geography were constantly endeavoring to demonstrate its significance in terms of established fields, and so the subject was defined not so much in its own terms as in terms of its relations to other fields.

Although it is a gross error to assume that Ratzel tried to prove all human activities were geographically determined,⁴⁷ his terminology did lead easily to exaggeration, which Vidal de la Blache, the founder of modern geography in France, met by substituting the concept of "geographic possibilities." Many other geographers have criticized the extremist point of view as vigorously as have critics from the outside, and geographers in general feel justified in being a little weary of the continued attack on the straw-man of "geographic determinism."⁴⁸

⁴⁴ The two great critical studies of this type of geographic work, by Febvre and Thomas, have already been mentioned. Since those were published, there has appeared a significant successor to Miss Semple's great study which is much more moderate in its estimate of the importance of "geographic influences," i.e., Ray H. Whitbeck and Olive J. Thomas, *The Geographic Factor; Its Role in Life and Civilization* (New York, 1932). This book is particularly valuable as a resumé of the work in English and American geography of the last quarter-century.

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁶ Douglas Johnson describes these differences in development in "The Geographic Prospect," *Annals Assoc. Amer. Geog.* (1929), pp. 170-190.

⁴⁷ "Ratzel does not attempt to explain all political phenomena from environment (aus dem Broden)." Otto Schlüter, rev. in *Z. Ges. f. Erdkunde* (Berlin, 1898), p. 126.

⁴⁸ See Bowman's comment on Boas' criticism, *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences*, p. 70; and Sauer's comment on Thomas' critique, in "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," *op. cit.*, p. 170. It is particularly surprising that Thomas' chapter on "The Critics of Geographic Determinism" does not include a single critic from among the geographers themselves. Febvre's study suffers in this regard from having been published ten years after it was written.

A decade ago, Barrows sought to free geography from the danger of exaggerated claims, which the terms "control" or "influence" had inspired, and which had aroused the attack of social scientists. Reversing the approach, he spoke of man's adjustments to the natural environment, but he maintained the fundamental idea of geography as "a science of relationships."⁴⁹

Whichever way the definition is stated, the field for political geography as part of the main field can easily be derived from it: the study of the relations between man's political activities and organizations (including the state, but also parties, etc.) and the natural environment or earth conditions, whether stated directly or conversely. This is clearly the basis, either stated or implied, for the work of Vallaux, Fairgrieve, Newbigin, Fawcett, Brigham, and Semple. As Vallaux puts it, the essential problem of political geography is to determine whether "the life of political societies is determined, in part at least, by the natural frame in which they develop; in what manner the soil, air, and water . . . relate themselves to the collective action of men."⁵⁰

With this concept of human geography in mind, Fawcett, in his recent study of the British Empire, states as his object: "to set out and examine those geographical facts which are of direct importance in their influence on the development and organization of the British Empire and its component parts." With such a definition (Fawcett, *op. cit.*, p. v), it is not surprising to find the excellent material of his book presented in a confused mixture of general and political geography.

At the present time, much of the work in Geopolitik in Germany is pursued on a very similar basis. According to the founder, Haushofer, "Geopolitik is the study of the earth relations (*Erdgebundenheit*) of political occurrences. . . . The character of the earth's surfaces . . . gives to Geopolitik its frame within which the course of political events *must* [*italics mine*] take place if they are to have permanent success."⁵¹

⁴⁹ H. H. Barrows, "Geography as Human Ecology," in *Annals Assoc. Amer. Geog.*, 1922, pp. 1-16; for a favorable response in England, see P. M. Roxby, "The Scope and Aims of Human Geography," *Brit. Assoc. Ad. Sc.* (Sec. E. Bristol, 1930); also published in *Scot. Geog. Mag.*, 1930, pp. 276-290.

⁵⁰ *Le sol et l'état*, pp. 7-8. Similarly in Brunhes and Vallaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25, 267.

⁵¹ Haushofer, Obst, Maull, and Lautensach, *Bausteine zur Geopolitik* (Berlin, 1928).

Clearly, such definitions provide the political geographer a wide range for his activities, so wide that it need not surprise one if he reaches far into the area of political science, where his lack of complete training betrays him into fallacious and exaggerated conclusions, to say nothing of gross national partisanship. No wonder then, that in spite of the fruitful work of many of these students, their critics within the field of geography have often wanted to ban political geography completely.

An Alternative Definition. Bowman presents a more practical, and at the same time less controversial, definition by suggesting that geography "is also and chiefly a study of the living conditions of mankind as affected by regional combinations of specific soil types . . . [and other environmental conditions], together with production habits and possibilities, and landscape effects that give every area its characteristic stamp."⁵² Geography, then, "has political implications because it helps to provide an understanding of the adaptations of group life to the environment of a given area of political control," . . . it "helps indicate the scope of national limitations and possibilities."⁵³ Further, from his critique of Maull's *Politische Geographie*, we may infer that geography should "offer organized expert knowledge of what we may call the original set-up of the world," and "judgments respecting the political set-up of the world today . . . ; rational information of use to policy-makers in government."⁵⁴

That the geographer should be able and ready to supply expert knowledge is not to be questioned. But what is the field within which his knowledge may be presumed to be, in fact, "expert"? Few geographers will be in a position to pass judgments on all of the questions which these statements might include. In his own treatment of world problems, Bowman clearly does not intend to keep within any definite limitation of the field.

Geography as the Science of Earth-Areas. In recent decades, many geographers, notably in Germany and Belgium, more recently in this country, have defined their field in terms not of relationships between things, but in terms of the things themselves, namely, the individual areas or regions of the earth, with all the elements, both natural and otherwise, which in their varied combinations, form

⁵² *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁵⁴ *Geog. Rev.*, 1927, pp. 511-512.

the character of those areas. Hettner shows that this "chorological" conception of geography is far from new.⁵⁵ Based on the concept, as well as the term itself, of Ptolemy and Strabo, it reappeared in the geography of Humboldt and Ritter and was definitely expressed by F. v. Richthofen, who first among modern geographers used the classical term. Ratzel, from whom Semple and others derived their concept of "influences," in fact maintained, both in principle and in practice, in much of his work, the character of geography as the science of areas.

In Germany and Austria, the chorological (or chorographical) view of geography is represented, among others, by Schlüter, Hettner, Passarge, and Maull; in Belgium, by Michotte. In France, where all university work is dominated by the Sorbonne, and geography in particular by the great master, Vidal de la Blache, there is more uniformity of viewpoint, and hence perhaps less discussion of it, than elsewhere. If Brunhes and other students of Vidal are classified with the chorologists, it is not so much on the basis of statements of definitions as of the character of their work.⁵⁶ The great contribution of Vidal is not his change of the word "determinism" to "possibilism," but rather that he focussed the attention of his students, and thereby of all French geography, on the detailed description and analysis of particular regions, rather than the pursuit of principles of relationships.⁵⁷ English geographers have apparently, like the French, been largely out of touch with developments in Germany in recent decades. Stimulated, no doubt, by the brilliant success of the French monographs on regions, and perhaps by the influence of the German-trained Herbertson,⁵⁸ a group of English geographers have recently studied regions in their country.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 121-132. See also Sauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-182.

⁵⁶ Jean Brunhes, *La géographie humaine* (Paris, 1910, trans. as *Human Geography*, Chicago, 1920), pp. 4, 13-27, 552 ff.; and his chapter in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, pp. 55, 71, 101-102.

⁵⁷ Similarly in Germany, Josef Partsch, both by precept and example. The precept is referred to in Brunhes, *Human Geography*, p. 35n; by example is meant not only his *Mitteleuropa* (*Central Europe* in the Mackinder series), but particularly his *Schlesien, eine Landeskunde für das deutsche Volk*, 2 vols. (Breslau, 1896). After detailed study in that region, I can agree thoroughly with Bowman's comment: "Still one of the best regional studies in the field of modern geography."

⁵⁸ Sauer classifies Herbertson simply as "an environmentalist" on the basis, apparently, of his *Man and His Work* (1899); but surely his later concept of "natural regions" is chorographic, and two of his students, using his notes, have prepared the

That American geographers have become more interested in the developments in Germany than have either their French or English colleagues is due largely to the vigorous efforts of Carl Sauer,⁶⁰ whose influence has been particularly marked among the younger workers.⁶¹

First in rank among the geographers who have concerned themselves with the epistemology of their subject is Alfred Hettner.⁶² For him geography is "the science of the earth surfaces, studied according to their local differences, of the continents, lands, regions (*Landschaften*), and localities."⁶³ In addition to the study of individual areas, he includes the general comparative study of areas (*Länderkunde*). In the general system of the sciences, geography is analogous to history; the latter is concerned with the arrangement of phenomena in relation to time, the former in relation to place. One may say that the guiding principle for history is chronology; for geography, it is chorology. Hettner tells us that the philosopher Kant had come to essentially the same conclusion in his analysis of the field of knowledge.⁶⁴

Sauer sums up the position in the statement: "The task of geography is to grasp the content, individuality, and relation of areas."⁶⁵ In further discussion of what is to be studied, he follows chiefly Schlüter and Brunhes in limiting the materials to "observational facts in the landscape," or "the visible, areally extensive and expressive features"⁶⁶—the "things perceptible to the

first chorographic text-book in English on Europe: Nora E. MacMunn and G. Coster, *Europe; A Regional Geography* (Oxford, 1924).

⁵⁹ Great Britain: *Essays in Regional Geography*, by 26 authors, edit. by Alan G. Ogilvie (Cambridge, 1930).

⁶⁰ Carl Sauer, "The Morphology of Landscape," *Univ. of Calif. Pub. in Geog.*, 1925, pp. 19-53; and the articles, previously cited, in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* and the *Encycl. of the Social Sciences*. As Sauer has noted in several places, Fenneman, in his presidential address in 1918, emphasized "the study of areas as the center of geography": Nevin M. Fenneman, "The Circumference of Geography," *Annals Assoc. Amer. Geog.*, 1919, pp. 3-11.

⁶¹ The current view of many of these is reflected by Preston James in "The Terminology of Regional Description," *Annals Assoc. Amer. Geog.*, July, 1934, pp. 78-86, in particular pp. 81-82.

⁶² Sölch, in review in *Geografiska Annaler*, 1923, p. 323; Sauer in *Encycl. Soc. Sciences*, Vol. 6, p. 621.

⁶³ *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁶⁴ Kant's *Werke* (pub. by Schubert and Rosenkranz), Bd. 2, pp. 425 ff. (after Hettner, *op. cit.*, p. 115).

⁶⁵ "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," *op. cit.*, p. 186.

senses" of Schlüter, or, as some of Sauer's followers in this country express it, "observable features." Hettner directs a sharp criticism against this limitation and points out the later failure of both Schlüter and Brunhes to observe it, as well as the general tendency to drag in by the back door whatever regional facts the qualification "observable" may have seemed to exclude.⁶⁷ Hettner's limitation of the facts to be studied is: "Facts of the earth surfaces which differ from place to place and whose local differences are significant, geographically efficacious, for other phenomena."⁶⁸

It must not be supposed that the chorographical concept of geography involves an abandonment of interest in relationships between "earth" and "man."⁶⁹ Hettner and Passarge, as well as Vidal de la Blache and Brunhes, all continue to speak in terms of relations between different landscape features, cultural as well as natural.⁷⁰ The difference involved in the new, or rather, resumed definition is essentially a difference in focus of attention, in the location of the central goal of the science. Geography is again fundamentally a science of places or areas rather than of supposed relations, but in its study of places it is concerned with the causal relations that may be found between the different elements that go to make up the landscape, or the "character," of the place or area. The study of the relationship then is subordinate to, and geographically significant only as a part of, the study of the area, as the quotation from Hettner indicates. On this basis, Vidal accepts "historical events, in so far as they reveal qualities or potentialities of the countries where they occur, which would otherwise remain latent."⁷¹

⁶⁶ Sauer, in *Encyc. Soc. Sciences*.

⁶⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130. This limitation protects Hettner from going so far afield as does Banse, who, starting from a definition that includes the spiritual character of the population of an area, is carried into a detailed discussion of what he calls "Seelengeographie des Krieges," in which the races and peoples of the world are divided into war-like and pacifistic, and nice distinctions are made between the fighting quality of troops from Upper and Lower Saxony. Ewald Banse, *Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg, Gedanken über eine nationale Wehrlehre* (Oldenburg, 1932). Banse's more recent work in *Wehrlehre* has been a matter of some international concern.

⁶⁹ Preston James recognizes this definitely, *loc. cit.*

⁷⁰ S. Passarge, "Wesen, Aufgaben, und Grenzen der Landschaftskunde," *Petermann's Mit., Ergänz. Heft.* 209, 1930, pp. 29-44; Vidal de la Blache, *Principes de géographie humaine* (Paris, 1922, trans. as *Principles of Human Geography*, New York, 1926), esp. pp. 3-24.

Apparently all of these students recognize as a part of geography the comparative study of any particular element of the landscape in its relations to the remainder of the landscape, as found in different regions of the world. Hettner⁷² indeed emphasizes the weakness of individual studies when the student has failed to study this "general geography," as the French and Germans call it, or "systematic geography," as most American geographers prefer to call it.

Political Geography According to the Chorographers. Applying Hettner's definition of the general field, the division, political geography, is the branch of systematic or general geography which concerns itself with those political phenomena of regions differing from place to place and bearing significant relations to other regional phenomena. For those who insist on the limitation to "observational facts," whatever that may mean, the field is rather narrowly restricted to include "the administrative centers, the boundaries (presumably thanks to the boundary-stones—surely a small ticket of admittance), and the defensive lines and positions."⁷³ However, we might well say with Maull that the state itself constitutes a fact in the cultural landscape as observable as humidity or temperature in the natural landscape, though by many Americans commonly overlooked because of not having observed the differences in another state. ("State" is used throughout in its original sense, as the independent political area, not as one of the United States, for example). Many German geographers have pointed to the effect of the state on a wide range of cultural landscape elements: farms, houses, roads, railroads, trade areas, etc. Conversely, as Maull and many other political geographers have pointed out, the states develop more or less in lands and land types, and constitute in fact "one of the most striking expressions of the effect of landscape (or region—'Landschaft') on the development of the earthly life."⁷⁴

Schlüter⁷⁵ objects to Maull's concept of the state as a space-

⁷² Vidal de la Blache, "Les caractères distinctifs de la géographie," *Annales de Geog.*, 1913, p. 299.

⁷³ *Op. cit.*, p. 218.

⁷⁴ Sauer, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁷⁵ Maull, *op. cit.*, p. 726. His final claim may be added: "The state is, in the final analysis, a form in the *Kulturlandschaft*, and its scientific treatment stands therefore at the focus of modern geography." See also Hettner, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

organism, on the ground that it is a form of human society that is invisible and spiritual. Consequently, political geography, in his view, while an important outlying field of geography, is not a part of geography proper. Brunhes' viewpoint appears on the whole to be similar, though his somewhat illusive discussions are difficult to interpret. The facts of political geography apparently lie "beyond the essential facts,"⁷⁶ but are included in the purpose of study of human geography;⁷⁷ on the other hand, "political geography is properly only a part of the geography of history," which as a whole belongs to history rather than to geography.⁷⁸

What then is the value in defining narrowly the "proper" field for geography, or its "essential facts," if one recognizes outlying areas of apparently indefinite extent? If geographers may "follow the influence of human geography into the very midst of history" with the sole provision that "they strive never to lose sight of those 'essential facts' which are the 'touchstones' of true geography,"⁷⁹ there would seem to be no corner of the whole realm of social science in which a somewhat far-sighted geographer might not feel free to work. Thus Brunhes explains why Germany, and Germany alone, wished the War, because of the Prussian tradition and "a geographic necessity" for expansion.⁸⁰ The critical historian or political scientist will hardly accept the author's own judgment that the treatise referred to presents "a study, vigorously and consistently geographical, of the problems presented by the existence, aspirations, and present ambitions of nations."⁸¹

Consequently we return to the conviction that a proper field for political geography should be found within the confines of geography. But a political geography of any major importance cannot accept the limitation of "observational features" narrowly interpreted to mean features directly and physically observable. The fundamental concept of *Landschaft*, as Passarge or Hettner under-

⁷⁶ In his review of Maull's *Politische Geographie*, *Geog. Anz.*, 1926, pp. 62-66. Maull replies in the same volume, pp. 245-253.

⁷⁷ *Human Geography*, pp. 543-568.

⁷⁸ Brunhes, in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 55.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 101 ff.

⁸⁰ Brunhes, *Human Geography*, p. 552.

⁸¹ Brunhes and Vallaux, *op. cit.*, p. 484. (For the individual responsibility for different chapters, see preface.) Note also Banse's "Seelengeographie des Krieges," footnote 66.

⁸² Brunhes, in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 73.

stand it (or "landscape" as James re-defines that word), justifies the following conclusions: political boundaries are a proper object of study by geographers regardless of whether marked by stones or not; and a division into states is one of the major cultural facts of an area (of its *Kulturlandschaften*), significantly related to many other facts of the cultural and also natural landscape, regardless of whether or not that division is physically observable.⁸²

Hettner defines political geography as the study of the space relations of states and their characters, in so far as those are related to other regional phenomena. Passarge similarly says it is the study of the reciprocal relations between space and political organizations.⁸³ Vogel's definition is essentially the same, except for the use of "earth" or "earth surfaces" instead of "space."⁸⁴ According to Maull, it is the study of "geographic nature (*Wesen*) and geographic forms of the state or the study of the state in its geographic association (*Gebundenheit*), in its dependence on the natural and cultural landscape."⁸⁵

Disregarding the minor differences between these definitions, we may arrive at a somewhat simpler formulation. If geography according to the "chorologists" is the science of areas, then *political geography is the science of political areas*, or more specifically, *the study of the state as a characteristic of areas in relation to the other characteristics of areas*. That such a study will approach, and contribute greatly to, political science, in somewhat the same relation as that of economic geography to economics, does not mean that it need pass the bounds of geography into those of that science. To avoid that, it is necessary to outline more definitely the scope of the field of political geography.

[To be concluded in the next number]

⁸² Hettner, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-132, 145-146, 251. Even Sauer half-recognizes the validity of such a field (more than is here intended), "possibly to be considered as the full regional expression of the political landscape, since it is essentially regional." *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

⁸³ S. Passarge, "Aufgaben und Methoden der Politische Geographie," in *Z. f. Politik*, 1931, p. 444.

⁸⁴ Vogel, *Politische Geographie*, pp. 6-7.

⁸⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

ROOSEVELT'S LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY

JOHN M. MATHEWS

University of Illinois

Although my subject is President Roosevelt's Latin-American policy (to March, 1935), I shall take the liberty of treating it in a broad way so as to include some developments prior to the advent of the Roosevelt Administration, in order to have a background for the better understanding of the more recent developments.

Although the subject, as stated, envisages merely foreign policy, it should be borne in mind that foreign policy and domestic policy cannot be kept entirely separate, as if they existed in water-tight compartments. A united front in foreign policy is sometimes urged, and it is argued that party politics, as the saying goes, should stop at the water's edge. This, however, is a specious argument intended to put into the position of being unpatriotic those who oppose the foreign policy of the Administration. A united front in respect to foreign relations is no more possible or to be expected than in domestic affairs, because foreign and domestic affairs are closely related.

For example, the economic depression and the efforts made by the Administration to promote domestic recovery have had an undoubted effect upon various phases of our foreign policy. To mention a specific example, in 1903 the United States entered into a treaty with the Republic of Panama whereby, in return for the cession of the canal zone, we agreed to make an annual payment to Panama of \$250,000 in "gold coin of the United States." During the past two years, however, when these annual payments fell due, the United States government, in view of domestic legislation taking this country off the gold standard and devaluing the dollar, tendered the fiscal agent of the Panama government a check for 250,000 of such depreciated dollars. That government promptly returned the checks and demanded gold, which we have thus far declined to pay. Eventually, however, our chickens come home to roost. The loss through our failure to pay in gold falls not on Panama but on the holders of Panama's bonds residing in the United States, since the annuity from our government is used to meet the service charges on these bonds.

The relations of the United States with the other countries of the world may be divided roughly into those with Europe, with Latin

America, and with the Far East. Of these, our relations with Latin America are not the least important. Our economic stake in Latin America is enormous. Our investments in that region amount, according to recent figures, to between five and six billions of dollars. In spite of the importance of our relations with Latin America, they attract comparatively little attention. The people of the United States, speaking generally, are surprisingly ignorant of conditions south of the Rio Grande. It would seem that some of our business men are ignorant even as to what language is spoken in Latin America. How else can one explain the sending to the Southern countries of business letters and catalogs in English, which, quite naturally, are promptly consigned to the waste-paper basket. This situation is illustrated also by a letter received some years ago by our Argentine legation from an American business man residing in Denver, Colorado, inquiring whether shop-keepers in Buenos Aires used glass in their windows. He was probably surprised to learn that in this great city, seven times the size of his own, shop-keepers no longer used oil-paper for that purpose.

In spite of the general ignorance regarding conditions in Latin America, everyone no doubt has heard of the principal policy of the United States with reference to Latin America, namely, the Monroe Doctrine. The American people have not only heard of it, but they regard it with veneration. It is as sacrosanct as the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence. Like the Ark of the Covenant, it must not be touched. Nevertheless, many of us have no very clear idea as to what it means. This is due in part to the fact that its meaning has changed from time to time.

When first promulgated, over a century ago, it was a notice to Europe to keep hands off the independent states of the Western Hemisphere. At that time, there was no thought that the United States itself would intervene in the affairs of Latin America. This particular development or extension of the Monroe Doctrine was brought about by President Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of the present century. It was the outgrowth of disturbed conditions in certain Latin-American countries which led to threats of European intervention for the maintenance of order and the collection of debts. If Latin-American countries allowed their affairs to fall into such a condition of chaos and disorder that they apparently could not be straightened out except through the intervention of some other power, the United States was faced

with three possible courses of action. We could stand idly by and permit European nations to intervene. But this did not seem to be a correct attitude for us to assume, because it would clearly constitute a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. In the second place, we could maintain the dog-in-the-manger attitude of not allowing European intervention and also not intervening ourselves. This course seemed to hold out no hope for a betterment of conditions. The third possible course was for the United States itself to intervene. This was the course which President Theodore Roosevelt adopted. In his annual message to Congress in 1904, he declared:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

President Theodore Roosevelt further stated that "it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse itself to take any such steps."

Thus was glossed over with fair words expressing a high moral purpose a policy which in its essence turned out to be one of imperialism, of what the Germans call *Machtpolitik*, or of what in this country is sometimes called the policy of the Big Stick.

In accordance with this so-called extension or corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, we required the government of the Dominican Republic to enter into an agreement with us whereby we established a customs receivership there, under an American fiscal officer named by the President of the United States and acting under the protection of the United States navy.

This positive interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was continued in force until the middle of the Hoover Administration and led to interventions by the United States in several Latin-American countries in the Caribbean region, the most conspicuous instances of which were those in Nicaragua and Haiti. The countries in that region came to be regarded as a game preserve set aside for exploitation by American business interests assisted by our government in accordance with the principles of "dollar diplomacy." With reference to our controversy over the Mexican land laws,

President Coolidge stated in 1927 that "the person and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the nation even when abroad." Although subject to different constructions, this statement may be interpreted as an assertion of the extraterritoriality of American investments in Mexico. This breathes the spirit of imperialism as embodied in concessions, protectorates, and spheres of influence and is antagonistic to the rising tide of nationalism in so-called backward countries. As late as 1928, at the Sixth Pan-American Conference at Havana, the United States insisted on maintaining the right of intervention.

About midway the Hoover administration, however, there was a change of heart on our part, due no doubt in large part to realization that the world-wide economic depression, instead of being a mere temporary set-back in the march of prosperity, had assumed the proportions of a major disaster. The famous Hoover moratorium of 1931 on intergovernmental debt payments was the event which signalized the end of the era of *Machtpolitik*. It was at about that time that President Hoover and Secretary Stimson were led to the conclusion that the United States should as rapidly as possible lighten the load of our commitments in Latin America. Among the incidents showing the adoption of a policy in this direction were: (1) When a revolution occurred in Panama in 1931, the United States did not intervene, in spite of our right to do so under the treaty of 1903. (2) When El Salvador defaulted on her bonds in 1932, the United States State Department acquiesced and made no move to assist the bankers by establishing a customs receivership. (3) In Nicaragua, the number of American marines was gradually reduced and finally, early in 1933, those remaining were withdrawn altogether. (4) In a memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine prepared in 1930 by J. Reuben Clark, under-secretary of state in the Hoover Administration, the Roosevelt corollary to the Doctrine was declared unwarranted and the Doctrine itself was characterized as a policy of the United States toward Europe and not toward Latin America.

In spite, however, of various steps taken by the Hoover Administration showing a more conciliatory spirit toward Latin America, one of the worst mistakes of the Hoover régime, namely, the Smoot-Hawley tariff act, still remained uncorrected at the end of the administration. This caused retaliation towards us throughout the world, including Latin America. Several countries

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seriously considered carrying on this economic warfare through the establishment of a South American customs union.

It is true that when President Franklin Roosevelt came into power in 1933, the high protective tariff was not lowered. He was not altogether uninfluenced by nationalistic considerations, and his primary interest was in domestic recovery. He clung to the high tariff, speaking generally, as a means of raising prices, which, in turn, was deemed to be a necessary means of overcoming the depression at home. But he supported the policy of Secretary Hull in lowering some rates through bilateral trade agreements on the basis of reciprocal tariff concessions.

Although some progress had been made under Hoover in the direction of a more conciliatory policy toward Latin America, President Roosevelt has carried out this policy more fully and, in his official utterances, has made it more clear-cut and explicit. In his inaugural address, he enunciated his policy of the good neighbor as follows:

In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. We now realize, as we have never realized before, our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take, but must give as well.

This is an elaboration of the statement made many years earlier by Secretary John Hay that American foreign policy may be summed up in "the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule." It indicates a desire of the United States to treat other nations as we should like to be treated if our respective positions were reversed.

In his address on Pan-American Day in April, 1933, President Roosevelt declared:

This celebration commemorates a movement based upon the policy of fraternal coöperation. Never has the significance of the words "good neighbor" been so manifest in international relations. Never have the need and benefit of neighborly coöperation in every form of human activity been so evident as they are today. The essential qualities of Pan-Americanism must be the same as those which constitute a good neighbor, namely, mutual understanding and, through such understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the other's point of view. It is only in this manner that we can hope to build up a system of which confidence, friendship, and good-will are the corner-stones."

In his appeal of May, 1933, to the nations of the world represented at the Disarmament Conference, the President called upon them to agree not to send an armed force of whatsoever nature across their frontiers.

The definite stand of the Roosevelt Administration against intervention in Latin America came in December of the same year. Secretary Hull, head of the American delegation at the Seventh Pan-American Conference at Montevideo, declared that "every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt Administration the United States government is as much opposed as any other to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations."

Finally, in his address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation at Washington on December 28, 1933, President Roosevelt declared explicitly:

The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention. The maintenance of constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and the orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its own borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors.

This statement represents a fundamental change in the application of the Monroe Doctrine as it had been understood since the time of Theodore Roosevelt. It adopts a continentalized interpretation of the Doctrine for the first time in an official presidential utterance. In this statement, President Franklin Roosevelt substituted the Soft Word for the Big Stick.

This suggestion that the Doctrine was now to be limited so that intervention, if it should take place, would be a coöperative and collective step brought a ready response from Latin America. Even Mexico, which, at the time it joined the League of Nations in 1931, refused to recognize the Monroe Doctrine, described in the Covenant as a regional understanding, has now approved the idea of making the Doctrine a joint policy of all the independent American states.

Since, however, actions speak louder than words, it is necessary to consider our actual policy toward certain of the Latin-American countries.

For this purpose, I shall first consider our relations with Cuba, which are most important because of (1) its geographical proximity; (2) the volume of commerce which we have with the island—greater than that with any other Latin-American country; (3) our investments in the island, which have been estimated at one and a half billion dollars—more than in any other foreign country except Canada; (4) the special part played by the United States in securing the independence of the island from Spain.

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Congress passed a self-denying ordinance, disclaiming any intention on our part to retain control over the island, but rather to leave control to the Cuban people. This was done; but there was a string tied to our relinquishment of control. This string was the Platt Amendment of 1901, attached as a rider to a Congressional appropriation act. Its most important provisions were:

(1) The government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty with any foreign power which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

(2) Said government shall not assume or contract any public debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking-fund provision for the discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of the government, shall be inadequate.

(3) The government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

(4) To enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

(5) By way of further assurance, the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.

Cuba was required also to embody the provisions of the Platt Amendment in her own constitution. There was considerable opposition in the island to the Amendment, but this was somewhat mollified by the Root interpretation to the effect that these requirements were intended to be helpful to Cuba.

The most important provision of the Platt Amendment was that

which gave us the right of intervention. We exercised this right of intervention and governed Cuba from 1906 to 1909. On several other occasions we have sent warships to Cuban waters and have threatened to intervene.

In the summer of 1933, in view of disorders in Cuba, President Roosevelt, after conferring with Latin-American diplomatic representatives in Washington, dispatched several warships to Cuban waters as a precautionary step. Strict orders were given, however, that no marines should be landed except in the gravest emergency, for the purpose of protecting American lives. The President announced that no intervention was intended under the Platt Amendment, nor any interference with the internal affairs of Cuba. In fact, no marines were landed.

Our desire was that Cuba should work out her own salvation without interference from us. This was indicated by Secretary Hull's statement of September 11, 1933, in which he declared:

The chief concern of the government of the United States is, as it has been, that Cuba solve her own political problems in accordance with the desires of the Cuban people themselves. The United States has no interest in behalf of, or prejudice against, any political group or independent organization which is today active in the political life of Cuba. In view of its deep and abiding interest in the welfare of the Cuban people, and the security of the republic of Cuba, our government is prepared to welcome any government representing the will of the people of the republic and capable of maintaining law and order throughout the island. Such a government would be competent to carry out the functions and obligations incumbent upon any stable government.

In view of the possible effect of the Cuban situation upon our relations to other Latin-American governments, President Roosevelt invited the diplomatic representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico to the White House and informed them that the United States had no desire to intervene in Cuba and was seeking every means to avoid intervention. He declared that the keynote of our policy was that the Cuban people should quickly obtain a government of their own choosing and one able to maintain order. The Argentine government expressed its gratification at the position of the United States and sent a note to Secretary Hull extending "its most cordial felicitations for his attitude regarding the reform of the Platt Amendment, which justifies the opinion which we formed at Montevideo that the policy of the government of President Roosevelt would mark a transcendental

era in the development of closer relations and in the moral prestige of the United States with the whole of America."

The Roosevelt Administration realized that Cuba's difficulties were partly political but mainly economic, due to low prices for sugar, its principal crop, and to heavy foreign debt charges. The Administration indicated that as soon as a stable government should be established in Cuba representing the will of the Cuban people, we would promptly recognize it, and that we should then be prepared to adopt two important measures: (1) the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, and (2) extension of aid to bring about Cuban economic rehabilitation.

Early in 1934, the United States recognized the Carlos Mendieta government in Cuba, and the time seemed ripe for carrying out the promised measures. In May of that year, a new treaty of relations between the United States and Cuba was signed and promptly ratified. It provided for the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, except that the United States retains the naval base at Guantánamo. We thus renounced the specific right of intervention given us by treaty. Since then we have no right of intervention except that in accordance with the rules of international law.

We recognize that the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, although a large step in advance, is not a panacea for Cuba's ills. Disorders are still likely to break out from time to time during the long process while Cuba is acquiring the difficult art of self-government. But the position of the United States government is clear. It will not intervene unless a condition of virtual anarchy or chaos develops.

The Roosevelt Administration next turned toward giving Cuba aid in working out her economic rehabilitation. In March, 1934, the Second Export-Import Bank was established in order to facilitate trade with Cuba and to extend credit to her. We realize that Cuba's economic welfare depends largely on her ability to sell sugar to the United States at a reasonable price. But under the Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930 a duty of two cents a pound was levied on Cuban sugar, with the result that Cuba was able to compete effectively neither with domestic producers in the United States nor with sugar produced in our insular possessions—Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines—which comes into the United States free of duty.

Therefore, on President Roosevelt's recommendation, Congress passed in May, 1934, the Jones-Costigan Act limiting the domestic production of sugar and limiting imports of sugar into the United States. Under the authority of this act, the Secretary of Agriculture assigned quotas to Cuba, to our domestic producers, and to the several insular possessions of the United States. The quota assigned to Cuba was 300,000 tons more than she had exported to the United States during 1933. At the same time, President Roosevelt, acting under the flexible provisions of the tariff act of 1930, reduced the import duty on Cuban sugar from two cents to one and a half cents a pound. Finally, under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act passed by Congress in June, 1934, our government negotiated a trade agreement with Cuba which reduced the import duty on Cuba's sugar still further to nine-tenths of a cent a pound.

These steps saved the Cuban sugar industry from ruin. In return, Cuba reduced her import duties on various American products, such as automobiles and lard. By means of these measures, the volume of trade between the United States and Cuba has been considerably increased.

The trade agreement with Cuba is one example or manifestation of a general policy being pursued by the Administration. Other examples are the recent reciprocal trade agreements with Brazil and Belgium. Although all members of the Administration are not fully agreed on the effectiveness of the policy, Secretary Hull, who is an economic internationalist, is giving it his hearty support. He has worked hard to bring about reciprocal trade agreements for the promotion of international trade, which he feels is necessary in order to overcome the world-wide depression. His program for reciprocal tariff agreements will doubtless help in promoting international trade, although probably nothing very extensive in this direction can be accomplished without stabilization of currencies and exchange rates. In view, however, of the present stage of the domestic recovery program, the Administration is not yet ready to agree to stabilization.

It is not possible here to speak in detail of our policy toward other individual Latin-American countries. In accordance with our good neighbor policy, we have refrained from intervention in Mexico. Recently, a meddlesome and provocative resolution was introduced by Senator Borah calling for an investigation of conditions in Mexico. This resolution has been noised abroad, but

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few of us have heard of a resolution introduced by a Mexican senator calling for an investigation of conditions in the United States. They have as much right to investigate us as we have to investigate them. No doubt there have been disturbed conditions in Mexico in connection with the struggle between church and state, but a resolution such as that of Senator Borah is naturally resented by the generality of the Mexican people, is likely to do more harm than good, and least of all to benefit any persecuted class of people in Mexico.

In the case of Haiti, our marines were finally withdrawn in 1934, and such control as we still retain over the finances of the republic has been reduced to a very tenuous thread of supervision through a fiscal representative. In regard to Panama, we have indicated our willingness to negotiate a new treaty in order to settle by agreement all outstanding causes of misunderstanding.

These are specific examples of the manner in which President Roosevelt has substituted the Soft Word for the Big Stick, as far as Latin America is concerned. The President is known as a big navy man, and the Administration also apparently favors an increase in the size of the army; but it is clear that these warlike preparations are not aimed at the countries of Latin America.

An important touchstone of our attitude toward these countries may be found in our recognition policy. From the time of Jefferson to that of Wilson, it was our policy to recognize *de facto* stable governments regardless of their revolutionary origin. President Wilson, however, introduced the policy of refusing to recognize governments set up by violence and not in accordance with constitutional methods. For example, he refused to recognize the Huerta government in Mexico in 1914 and the Tinoco government in Costa Rica in 1917. This policy was followed by succeeding Administrations, with the result that the Chamorro government in Nicaragua was refused recognition in 1926. This soon brought about its downfall. The purpose of the non-recognition policy was to discourage revolutions. In evaluating this policy, however, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of revolutions. Some are due merely to a personal struggle for power by rival leaders. These no doubt should be discouraged. But some revolutions represent the deep-seated aspirations of the mass of the people for a change of government. It sometimes happens that an unpopular régime can be overthrown only by violence, because the

existing government controls the elections by force, fraud, and intimidation. Since a change of government or party control cannot be brought about by ballots, this can ordinarily be done only by bullets. Our policy of non-recognition under these circumstances may prevent the people from exercising the right of any independent people to change their government. It is a form of negative intervention on our part, whereby we set up a standard of constitutionalism and require them to meet it before we will recognize them.

Nevertheless, this policy was adhered to by our government until 1930. By that date, the world-wide economic depression, with accompanying low prices, had unsettled conditions in Latin America to such an extent that revolutions occurred even in hitherto stable republics of South America, such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia. We then changed our policy and promptly recognized the new governments of those countries as soon as they appeared to be stable.

In 1931, Secretary Stimson formally announced the abandonment of the Wilsonian policy based on constitutionalism and a return to the previous policy, which was "to base the act of recognition not upon the question of the constitutional legitimacy of the new government, but upon its *de facto* capacity to fulfill its international obligations." Recognition was to be dependent also upon the control by the government of the administrative machinery and upon the general acquiescence of the people. This new Stimson policy was in harmony with the general principle of reducing the intervention of the United States in Latin-American affairs. But Secretary Stimson admitted that an important exception to this policy must be allowed in the case of the five Central American republics, because, by conventions adopted among themselves in 1907 and in 1923, they had agreed not to recognize revolutionary governments. The United States was not a party to these agreements, but it had sponsored them, and therefore announced that it would govern its policy accordingly.

It remained for the Roosevelt Administration finally to do away with even this exception. The Martinez government in El Salvador, although revolutionary in origin, maintained itself in power for about two years without our recognition. After it had been recognized by other Central American republics, the United States in January, 1934, also recognized it.

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In Cuba, we also now act upon the principle of recognizing de facto governments which appear to be stable, to be able to maintain law and order, and to represent the will of the Cuban people. Our recognition of Russia was in harmony with the same principle. In Latin America, European powers usually follow the example of the United States in the matter of recognition, but the reverse was true in the case of Russia.

The Roosevelt Administration still follows the Stimson policy of non-recognition of Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo, but that was a case, not of internal revolution, but of conquest by an outside power. A similar case would be that of the conquest of the Chaco by Paraguay or Bolivia, the fruits of which we have joined eighteen other American states in indicating we would not recognize.

The great *desideratum* in the relations between nations is the preservation of peace. For this purpose, two principal methods, either singly or in combination, have been followed: (1) the creation of an international organization, possessing force, if necessary, for the maintenance of peace, and (2) the cultivation of the spirit of good-will whereby mutual interests between nations may be promoted and opposing interests as far as possible reconciled. The United States, by failing thus far to join the League of Nations or the World Court, has indicated its intention of relying mainly on the second method. It is true that we have in the Western Hemisphere an international organization commonly called the Pan-American Union, of which the United States is the leading member, but its activities have hitherto been confined mainly to non-political matters.

The Latin-American states are not only members of the Pan-American Union but also, for the most part, members of the League of Nations. It was formerly supposed by many persons that this situation contained the seeds of conflict between two state systems—the world system with headquarters at Geneva and the Pan-American system with headquarters at Washington. Thus, a well-informed American scholar, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1924, declared that “there can be little doubt that the United States in its present mood will regard even the most peaceful interventions in American controversies by the League of Nations as contrary to the Monroe Doctrine.”

That the mood of the United States must have changed is indicated by developments in the Leticia and Chaco affairs. In the

case of the Leticia dispute between Peru and Colombia, the League of Nations took jurisdiction of the dispute and formulated a plan of settlement. The United States wholeheartedly supported this plan, as shown by the fact that when the League authorized the appointment of a commission of three members to administer the disputed territory, a colonel of the United States army, by agreement with our government, served as a member.

In reference to the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco, the United States seemed to prefer to effect a settlement, if possible, through the joint action of neutral American states. Their efforts, however, did not meet with success. After Paraguay declared war, the League of Nations intervened and proposed a plan of settlement. As a non-member of the League, the United States declined to be represented on the League advisory committee on the Chaco conflict. When, however, the League sounded the United States as to our willingness to join with League members in imposing an embargo on arms and munitions to the belligerents, our government took the lead in adopting such a measure. The President placed an embargo on the sale of arms to both Bolivia and Paraguay under authority of a Congressional resolution, the passage of which he had recommended. Subsequently, however, when the League of Nations determined that Paraguay was the aggressor in the conflict and called upon the arms-manufacturing nations to raise the embargo on Bolivia so as to leave it on Paraguay alone, the United States declined to do so. It is true that the Administration had previously indicated its willingness in general to adopt such a course, provided the judgment of our government coincided with that of the League as to who the aggressor was; but this was dependent upon obtaining authority from Congress to do so, which has not yet been given.

In the case of the Chaco affair, therefore, the United States has not coöperated as fully with the League as it did in the case of the Leticia affair. The United States may be, and has been, criticized for not coöperating with the League more fully. No doubt, full coöperation by the United States would have rendered League intervention in the Chaco affair more effective. But, in view of the previous history of our attitude toward the League, the remarkable feature of the case is not that the United States did not coöperate fully, but that it coöperated to the extent that it did.

One of the best examples of the policy of the United States in

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promoting international concord through the manifestation of the spirit of good-will occurred in 1933 in connection with our participation in the Seventh Pan-American Conference at Montevideo. The work of that conference exerted an important influence in cementing the friendly relations between the United States and the Latin-American countries. Among the tangible accomplishments of the conference was the adoption of a convention declaring that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." In supporting this convention, even with reservations, our delegation departed from the position which the United States government had maintained at the previous Pan-American conference in 1928.

This change in the position of our government, together with the friendly, sincere, and unassuming attitude of Secretary Hull, the head of our delegation, created a very favorable impression upon the delegates from the other states. It was largely due to Secretary Hull's efforts that no hostile *bloc* of Latin-American nations confronted the United States at the conference. Some persons have taken the position that international conferences are a delusion and a snare and that the United States should keep out of them. It is true that some conferences, such as the world economic and disarmament conferences, have seemed to be failures. Even the most pessimistic observer, however, must admit that the Montevideo Conference was a success.

Enough has now been said to show that, under the Roosevelt Administration, the attitude of the United States toward Latin America has undergone a fundamental change. This change is traceable to various causes, among the most important of which are: (1) the lack of danger of European intervention in Latin America; (2) the gradually increasing stability in Latin-American countries and their increasing ability on the whole to keep their own houses in order; (3) the effects of the economic depression in the United States and the need for this country to cultivate the good-will of Latin America as a stimulant to international trade; finally, and most important, (4) greater realization on the part of the United States of the right of Latin America to be allowed to work out its own destiny, without unnecessary interference by the United States.

With respect to our relations with Latin America, there are still a few parts of the old system of *Machtpolitik* which have not been

entirely scrapped. For example, we have not yet given up our right of intervention in Panama, and on account of the need for defending the Canal, it may not be found feasible to do so. Moreover, we have not carried out the good neighbor policy with perfect consistency toward all the countries of the world. But, at any rate, our policy toward Latin America has recently been animated by a new spirit of mutual sympathy and coöperation. We have made an earnest and sincere effort to reconcile opposing interests and to cultivate mutual interests—an effort which, if persisted in, will assure a successful New Deal in our Latin-American relations. The greater friendliness and cordiality of Latin America toward the United States which is already noticeable augurs well for future peace and mutual helpfulness between these two great parts of the Western Hemisphere. With respect to Latin America, at least the United States earnestly aspires to assume the rôle of leadership, not in the size of its army and navy, not in the imperialism and arrogance of its foreign policy, but rather in the far weightier matter of good-will and square-dealing among nations.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Fascism in America? Attention has been drawn recently to the possibility of a Fascist revolution in the United States—by the Dickstein Committee,¹ by journalistic and cinematic exposés of Fascist tendencies,² by the revival of the 1918–20 “Red-baiting” spirit and technique, and by the fervent and constant agitation of the League Against War and Fascism and related organizations. Little is said seriously in responsible circles of the possibility of a Communist revolution, that being so over-worked a thesis that all are aware of whatever drift in that direction there may be. Hence the present discussion of Fascist tendencies must not be taken to imply the impossibility of a swing to the left, but rather simply to denote an interest in a more novel movement to the right.

In the past, we have had spectacular demonstrations of Fascist agitation and propaganda. When, in 1929 and 1930, evidence of the existence in the United States of Italian Fascist organizations was uncovered,³ the State Department insisted on their dissolution, although apprehension that the organizations were directed against our own form of government was not general. Later, in 1932 and 1933, when Mr. Pelley’s Silver Legion and other Nazi-inspired organizations flourished, fear became more widespread. Even then, however, the danger was more apparent than real, chiefly because there was general confidence that in the event of a conflict between Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon concepts of governmental philosophy in the United States, the latter would overwhelm the former. This seemed to be the guarantee afforded by generations of political habit.

Conceiving of Fascism as a developed and rational philosophy of the State, of general application, our problem here is not to analyze the possibility of the introduction into this country of a foreign brand of Fascism. More immediately, the “danger” is of an indigenous American reactionary movement, disguised behind the façade of democratic ideology. But is this reactionary movement genuinely Fascist in character?

¹ *Hearings Before the Special Committee on un-American Activities in the United States*, House of Representatives, Washington, 1934–35.

² See, for example, a series of articles by Samuel Duff McCoy, “Hitlerism Invades America,” in *Today*, March 31, April 7, and April 14, 1934; also two articles by George Seldes, “Hitlerism Marches in America,” *ibid.*, March 9 and March 16, 1935. The motion picture, “The President Vanishes,” released late in 1934 by Paramount was, in spite of (or possibly because of) its imaginative character, highly effective in satirizing the Fascist tendency and in formulating public opinion directed against it. Production-lot rumor in Hollywood insinuated that important interests brought such pressure to bear that the release of the production was delayed several months after completion. The present writer previewed the production several months before it was released to the public. See also note 8 below.

³ M. Duffield, “Mussolini’s American Empire,” *Harper’s Mag.*, Vol. 159, pp. 661–672 (November, 1929), gave one of the most effective exposés.

A clue is to be found in the analysis of currents of thought, and not in the study of any particular set of institutions.

This inquiry is not rendered less difficult when we find that in those countries in which Fascist philosophies have come to prevail the forms have in all instances been somewhat different. Thus Italian Fascism,⁴ the progenitor of the "classic" form, differs in many respects from English or German Fascism. German Fascism, in the guise of National Socialism, observes many of the external forms of the Italian variety, yet in essence and spirit it differs fundamentally.⁵ Certainly, National Socialism does not find its identical counterpart in the rising French Fascist movement, which in its turn differs from the black-shirted brand dispensed by Sir Oswald Mosley.⁶ Estonian and Japanese Fascism differ from all of these.⁷ If there is so great a deviation from the normal type in foreign countries, the likelihood is all the greater that the American variety will develop under its own peculiar stimuli and with its own peculiar manifestations.⁸

No effort will be made to expound in detail the basic philosophy of Fascism. It will be more suitable to outline its important manifestations

⁴ The following have been especially useful in ascertaining the nature of the "classical" Fascism in its Italian origin: B. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," *International Conciliation*, No. 306 (January, 1935), translated from "Dottrina Politica e Sociale del Fascismo," published originally in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* (Rome, 1932); A. Rocco, "Political Doctrine of Fascism," *International Conciliation*, No. 223 (October, 1926); C. F. Child, "I caratteri dello Stato Fascista," *Giornale di Politica e di Letteratura*, Vol. 8, pp. 309-330 (September, 1932); G. Gentile, *Origine e Dottrina del Fascismo* (Rome, 1929); *Ibid.*, "Philosophic Basis of Fascism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6 (January, 1928); G. de Montemayor, *Lo Stato Fascista* (Palermo, 1928).

⁵ F. L. Schuman, "The Political Theory of German Fascism," in this REVIEW, Vol. 28, pp. 210-232 (April, 1934); A. Hitler, *My Battle* (American trans., Boston, 1933); G. Feder, *Das Programm der nationalsozialistischen deutschen Arbeiterpartei und seine weltanschaulichen Grundgedanken* (Berlin, 1933); K. Heiden, *History of National Socialism* (American trans., New York, 1934).

⁶ O. Mosley, *The Greater Britain* (London, 1932); J. Drennan, *B. U. F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism* (London, 1934); W. E. D. Allen, "The Fascist Idea in Britain," *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 261 (October, 1933).

⁷ The peculiar aspects of Japanese Fascism are developed in T. A. Bisson, "Rise of Fascism in Japan," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. 8, pp. 196-206 (October 26, 1932), and "Trend Toward Dictatorship in Japan," *ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 318-328 (February 13, 1935); M. Zapp, "Die nationalsozialistische Bewegung in Japan," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Vol. 232, pp. 193-199 (June, 1933).

⁸ Fascism in the United States has been the subject of many recent analyses, among which the best are probably: American Civil Liberties Union, *Shirts* (New York, 1934); C. Haider, *Do We Want Fascism?* (New York, 1934); J. Shaplen and D. Shub (eds.), *Socialism, Fascism, Communism* (New York, 1934), published for the American League for Democratic Socialism; N. Thomas, *The Choice Before Us* (New York, 1934); J. Strachey, *The Menace of Fascism* (New York, 1933). Numerous articles in the same vein have appeared in *Plain Talk*, *The New Masses*, *The New Republic*, and *The Nation*.

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where it actually appears. When *all* of these manifestations are present, we have genuine Fascism; when one or more are lacking, we have something similar, but not identical. Of these characteristics of Fascism, there are at least six manifestations: (1) the rejection of democracy; (2) a dictatorial technique; (3) repression of individual freedom; (4) repression of organized labor; (5) intense nationalism; and (6) a reactionary perspective. If we assume that an American Fascism will have its own peculiar features, it must nevertheless satisfy these minimum doctrinal standards. Hence, each of them deserves a separate word.

First, Fascism is the negation of democratic dogma, a repudiation of governments popularly controlled and operated in the public interest. In its intense glorification and idealization of the omnipotent State,⁹ the individual loses his significance and identity, while whatever rights he may have possessed are transmuted into thoroughgoing restraints upon individual action and superior obligations of a predominating nature. This certainly is true of Italian Fascism; it is present in National Socialism, although obscured by emphasis on race theory.¹⁰ In the United States, critics of democracy have not been lacking, but their criticism has been directed chiefly toward the inefficient operation of the democratic scheme rather than toward its repudiation. That we, too, have had our advocates of racial superiority is impressed upon us as we read Madison Grant's *The Conquest of a Continent*.¹¹ The Know-Nothing party, the Ku Klux Klan, and the national origins quota system testify to the existence of this point of view over a long period of our national history. When we inquire into the so-called Fascist movement in the United States, we find that while Mr. Lawrence Dennis¹² rejects the democratic ideology, the more prominent reactionary leaders maintain with dignity and insistence that they seek to reestablish genuine democracy in the form of unrestrained individualism. The limits of an American movement based upon race theory seem to have been reached by the Know-Nothings and the Ku Kluxers.

The notion of the omnipotent and omnipresent State is not novel in the

⁹ This thought is succinctly expressed in Article I of the Italian Labor Charter: "The Italian nation is an organism whose aim, life, and means of action are superior to those of the single individuals occupying and forming it. It is a moral, political, and economic unity, which finds complete expression in the Fascist State." *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, No. 100 (April 30, 1927); *Bollettino Parlamentare*, Vol. 1, pp. 104-110 (May, 1927).

¹⁰ A. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1930); H. S. Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1899); Feder, *op. cit.*; Heiden, *op. cit.* Perhaps the best refutation of the Nazi racial interpretation is P. Radin, *The Racial Myth* (New York, 1934).

¹¹ New York, 1933.

¹² *Is Capitalism Doomed?* (New York, 1932).

United States, where Austinian and monistic concepts of sovereignty became firmly established as the foundations of our prevailing juridical philosophy. Nowhere has the doctrine of State infallibility been so literally adopted as in the United States, even though most of the formal philosophizing was done by English writers.¹³ The theory of totalitarianism¹⁴—that there is no limit to the legitimate objects and subjects of eventual public jurisdiction—is a logical consequence of juridical monism. Against the expansion of the public authority to this extreme, copious and repetitious limitations have been imposed in public constitutions and charters, so that government has been enabled to act only in a greatly restricted sphere. To extend the public authority to the wider field of economic and social regulation has been suggested in many quarters in the United States, but rather on the left than on the right. Totalitarianism is the life-blood of Fascism, and Fascism cannot be imagined without it. What is called American Fascism represents an antipathy to totalitarianism and all that it implies. Herein is probably the fundamental distinction.

Second among the manifestations of Fascism is a peculiar technique which operates under dictatorial forms. But clearly the Communist dictatorship in Soviet Russia demonstrates that not all dictatorships are necessarily along reactionary lines, so that dictatorial techniques are not always fascistic. Nevertheless, where we find Fascism we find dictatorship—a dictatorship characterized by the unified direction of state policy. Decisions on questions of public interest become matters of high policy; the decision must always be made in the interests of the dictatorship as it sees fit to define them; and the enforcement of policy must be in the hands of efficient and expert bureaucrats whose judgment and execution are to be questioned by none other than the guiding authority of the State. Certainly, the legislative body, if it is allowed to remain to perform functions which are strictly formal, may have no veto. Hence we may characterize the Fascist style of dictatorship as the highly efficient and centralized bureaucratic administration of policy under the exclusive

¹³ B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (London, 1899); F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (London, 1876); T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Oxford, 1883). A different aspect of the same concept, traced through Bodin and Hobbes, is illustrated in the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, as in *Kawananakoa v. Polyblank*, 205 U.S. 349.

¹⁴ C. Schmitt, *Die Diktatur* (Munich, 1928); "Der Begriff des Politischen," in *Heidelberger Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik* (1927); E. Jünger, "Die Totale Mobilmachung," in *Krieg und Krieger* (Berlin, 1930). W. Gurian, *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice* (English trans., New York, 1932), p. 368, gives Schmitt credit for introducing the Fascist theory of totalitarianism as a philosophical concept into German political thought, hence affording a point of liaison between Italian Fascism and German National Socialism.

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control of the head of the government. Administrative legislation entirely replaces representative legislation. Mussolini and Hitler took the first steps in this direction—Mussolini with his law of January 31, 1926,¹⁵ Hitler with his enabling act of March 23, 1933.¹⁶ Others have followed their example. In the United States, the need of increased efficiency is admitted, but the Liberty League¹⁷ decries growing bureaucracy and regimentation and, feeling that the expert may be too well informed to suit its program, seeks to abolish "brain trusts" in spite of the fact that for a generation American presidents have found recourse to this body of available technical knowledge indispensable to their task. Fascist dictatorial technique is designed to restrain individual initiative and freedom of action and to obtain the more efficient performance of the governmental function in a much wider sphere of action. The American "Fascist," such as he is, never ceases to oppose this tendency. To him, efficiency implies the elimination and restriction of the governmental function with a view to tax reduction and property protection.

Not only does Fascism develop its administrative technique upon dictatorial lines, but it also imposes extensive limitations upon the individual right of self-expression and criticism. This program of limitation and restraint may seem inseparable from the dictatorial technique, since it is designed to facilitate unhampered administration. But what concerns us now is not a matter of technique, but of fundamental spirit and philosophy. For our purposes, this may be taken as the third manifestation of the Fascist tendency. Fascist and Communist dictatorships differ fundamentally in their objectives; hence the spirit and philosophy underlying the restraint have little in common. Where the Communist's chief interest is to protect, through repression, the interest of the proletariat from the damage of divided counsels and bourgeois counter-revolution, the Fascist justifies his action by the superior need of the State as he conceives it. A prevailing difference in social concepts underlies this distinction, and the criteria of criticism of individual actions vary widely. Murder in Russia may be condoned if the victim of the crime was a bourgeois who brought the result upon himself by the display of his earthly possessions.¹⁸ Murder in Italy is readily justifiable if the victim

¹⁵ *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, No. 25 (February 1, 1926).

¹⁶ *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, I, 141; text and explanation in F. A. Medicus, *Program der Reichsregierung und Ermächtigungsgesetz* (Berlin, 1933).

¹⁷ J. Shouse, *You Are the Government* (Boston, 1934), develops the thesis of the Liberty League. For the Committee for the Nation, a similar point of view is summarized in W. A. Wirt, *America Must Lose* (New York, 1934). Other "right-wing" expressions of this protest include H. C. Hoover, *The Challenge to Liberty* (New York 1934), and O. L. Mills, *What of Tomorrow?* (New York, 1935).

¹⁸ Walter Duranty's amusing collection of anecdotes, *The Curious Lottery and*

happened to be a labor agitator whose enterprise seemed to endanger the interest and need of the corporative state. Murder in Germany is not only condoned but glorified if directed by an alert Nordic against a "non-Aryan."¹⁹ The revision of political and criminal codes on the basis of peculiar social philosophies exemplifies the difference in perspective.

Hence, the Liparian Islands and the concentration camps become the abodes for indefinite periods of time of those who rashly presume to criticize, by word or deed, the policies of the government in power, and for those who seem too much interested in the organization, through political parties or otherwise, of opposition. Tendencies to move in this direction are not unknown in the United States. One of the best illustrations is afforded by proposals introduced during the recent session of the California legislature which sought not only to deny the Communist party the privilege of the ballot, but to define as felonious any participation in a movement designed to overthrow government by violence, and to regard it as a criminal offense for anyone to attend a meeting in which such sentiments might be expressed, or to have in his possession any materials bearing the "insignia or emblems" of any movement known to advocate such overthrow, or to permit his property to be used for the meeting-place where such a point of view might be expressed.²⁰ Summary procedures and presumptions were also set up. Such un-American meth-

Other Tales of Russian Justice (New York, 1929), revolves around this theme, of which the present illustration may be an exaggeration.

¹⁹ K. Heiden, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-201, provides an adequate explanation of the official Nazi attitude toward the Potempa murder case in 1932-33.

²⁰ A. B. 107 is probably the most interesting in the series. It provides in part: "39 (b) Any person who:

"(1) Advocates the overthrow of government; or

"(2) Publishes, issues, gives away, sells, distributes, or possesses for distribution any book, paper, document, or other printed or written material which advocates the overthrow of government; or

"(3) Knowingly organizes, or aids in the organization of, or knowingly becomes or remains a member of, any society, association, or organization which has as its object or as one of its objects the overthrow of government or the advocacy of the overthrow of government; or

"(4) With knowledge of the purpose of the meeting or assembly, attends any meeting or assembly at which the overthrow of government is advocated; or

"(5) Owns, possesses, or controls the use of a room, building, or other structure or place, and knowingly permits the same to be used as a meeting place of persons who advocate the overthrow of government, or as the headquarters of any society, association, or organization which has as its object, or one of its objects, the overthrow of government; or

"(6) Teaches or advocates in any public or private school or educational institution in this state any scheme, plan, or system which contemplates the overthrow of government;

"Is guilty of a felony and is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one year nor more than fourteen years."

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ods, introduced under the guise of protecting "American ideas and institutions," are not peculiar to California; and, wherever suggested, they attest to the weakness of the social organization which needs to resort to them to protect itself. Nevertheless, Fascist restraints have usually and characteristically had their origins in diseased societies. From this point of view, if the structure of our own society does not reinforce itself in time by constructive improvement, the reactionary movement directed against it may prove genuinely Fascist. In any event, Communism prevents freedom of expression in order to safeguard a social revolution, Fascism to avoid it.

In the fourth place, Fascism, wherever found, is accompanied by the imposition of restraints upon the right of the proletariat to organize and to prosecute its complaints against the *entrepreneur*. Mr. John Strachey's *Menace of Fascism* rather overdoes the economic interpretation of Fascism as the vehicle of the capitalist class in whose interest it is contrived. As one examines more closely the Fascist programs in Italy and Germany, he may continue to be impressed by the apparent advantage that capital derives from the arrangement, but he cannot conclude that the position and status of the worker are the only ones to be degraded. Wherever it has appeared—whether in Italy, Germany, Spain, Estonia, France, or England—the Fascist movement has been directed primarily against the real or fancied danger of Communism. Yet if we inquire into the Socialist or proletarian backgrounds of the Mussolinis, Hitlers, and Mosleys and exhaust the possibilities of the implications of their broad social programs, we must conclude that they do not involve a return to the pure *laissez-faire* philosophy so ardently espoused by the American industrialist. We may inquire also whether, in view of the well known attitude of Catholic and non-Fascist parties of the Right, the Fascists may claim a monopoly of the privilege of Red-baiting.

Be this as it may, such danger as we may face from the Fascist tendencies of the Hearsts, the Butlers, and the MacArthurs, the Liberty League, the Committee of the Nation, the chambers of commerce, the merchants' and manufacturers' associations, and the "better America" federations has its origin in the potential adaptation of the Fascist technique to the repression of labor organization and the right to strike. On a larger scale, the same technique has its application for all who by reason of their critical disposition may have a fondness for proposing thoroughgoing alterations in the social order. In almost all cases where Fascist thought prevails, questions of political and social reorganization become inextricably tangled. That which attacks or criticizes the economic order impeaches, in the same breath, the political system of the nation. Hence, the advocacy of social reconstruction is rendered tantamount to treasonable criticism of the state, and the only regret of the dyed-in-the-wool

Fascist is that the gallows, guillotine, and garrote cannot operate with sufficient speed. This is an especially acute problem in the United States by reason of the judicial elaboration of the "due process" clause, which has so identified economics and politics as to render them indistinguishable and to make impossible economic change without altering judicial doctrine. Section 7(a) becomes anathema.

But as has been suggested, more than a simple desire to restrain the rights of labor in order to protect vested interests is necessary before pure Fascist thought exists. When restraint of this character is advocated, at the same time that the democratic thesis is unimpeached in principle, we have not Fascism but mere economic conservatism. Economic conservatism may take a different form for its expression than it took a century ago, but its fundamental nature remains unchanged.

The vigorous chauvinism which we may designate as the fifth among the canons of Fascism is somewhat more difficult to evaluate in the case of the United States. Nationalism is almost everywhere the companion of conservatism. In the United States, the parallel is not so apparent. Many of those senators who belong to the "progressive" wing have been aggressive leaders in what to them is the necessary and desirable struggle to maintain unimpaired the national sovereignty of the nation. No group is more skilful than this in seeking the political and economic bases upon which to defeat measures looking to increased international coöperation or imposing limitations upon our freedom to choose national policies. They have little in common with those more "conservative" gentlemen who are reputed to inhabit Wall Street and whose interest in "internationalism" takes the form of advocating increased measures of international collaboration involving practical limitations on national sovereignty, with the possible objective of making more secure and stable the world conditions upon which their investments depend.²¹ The industrialist whose interest in nationalism and imperialism is associated with practical commercial motives rather than with theoretical predilections is a reasonable and variable creature whose views on the tariff depend upon his own special interest and not upon broad philosophical principles. "Freedom of the seas" is a slogan well adapted to the tastes of the steel and munitions manufacturer. The only genuine and thoroughgoing nationalists in the United States are to be found among those professionals to whom militarism and aggression are the very blood of life, or among those "journalists" and politicians who find the stimulation of national consciousness highly profitable.

Possibly the explanation for this is to be found in the relative economic independence of the United States and in its less acute need for larger national frontiers. "National destiny" has run most of its course. How

²¹ C. A. Beard, *The Open Door at Home* (New York, 1934), pp. 112-134.

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thoroughly different is this situation from that prevailing in those countries where Fascism flourishes! These are countries woefully handicapped by the economic endowment of Nature; their aggressiveness can be explained by a desire to supplement the national resources for strategic purposes. These are countries that look to ancient glories which they hope to revive, and this requires the acquisition of territory formerly in the national possession but for some reason denied them today. German and Italian nationalism did not come with Fascist dictatorships; the dictators found it a convenient ideology for their purposes and developed devious channels for its exploitation. An American Fascist dictator would find the theory useful. But in the United States it is more difficult to single out imperialistic and nationalistic objectives, and the conditions under which the virulent chauvinism of European Fascism developed its particular form are not to be duplicated here. Hence, while an American Fascist leader might seek to exploit nationalistic tendencies, the circumstances, techniques, and results would likely be peculiarly American.

The last of the characteristics of Fascism is its native reaction, its desire to "put the clock back." Were this the only count in the indictment, the existence on a large scale of Fascism in the United States could not be denied. The state of mind is not easily analyzed or defined. The Italian Fascist seeks to redeem the glories of Roman *imperium*, the German Nazi finds inspiration in the paganism of the barbarian Teutonic forest and in the exploits of Frederick Barbarossa. The *recherche du temps perdu* has its romantic fascination. There are Americans whose sense of economic and historical perception is so blunted that they imagine it possible to return to the glorious economic and political anarchy of 1776, and whose encomiums anent the Fathers of the Republic would doubtless prove distasteful to those gentlemen. This glorification of our own historic tradition, however, is no new development of American politics, and the conservative who subscribes to it is not for that reason a Fascist.

Present conditions illustrate the danger of using such labels as "liberal," "conservative," and "reactionary." Those who before the advent of the New Deal had been "liberals" have, in many instances, now become "conservatives" seeking to protect those changes in the social process which they have introduced.²² Those "conservatives" who adhered to the Old Deal have now, by reason of the necessity imposed upon them of destroying the new to restore the old, become "reactionary." A newer type of "liberalism" is therefore in order to redress the balance.

²² Simple defense of the New Deal is not, of course, the sole purpose of such as the following: F. D. Roosevelt, *On Our Way*; H. L. Ickes, *The New Democracy*; R. G. Tugwell, *The Battle for Democracy*; A. A. Berle, J. Dickinson, and others, *America's Recovery Program*; H. A. Wallace, *America Must Choose* and *New Frontiers* (all, New York, 1934).

In seeking to return to the past and to view with abhorrence all "liberal" tendencies, the reactionary gentlemen seem to be shooting wide of the mark. Revolutions, it would appear, are by their nature in constant progress. The legislative or political change needed for the institutional adaptation to the new condition is in reality a mere confirmation of the *fait accompli*. Refusal to concur in the institutional adjustment does not, and cannot, invalidate the revolution or change already consummated. To resist the course of adjustment serves merely to emphasize its urgency and to precipitate recourse to violence, should no other method be open.²²

At the outset, the purpose of an inquiry in this spirit was explained. Certainly the existence of a quasi-Fascist philosophy cannot be denied, since several of the manifestations of Fascism are present. But if the simultaneous presence of all of its characteristics is necessary for the existence of a genuine Fascist thought, we find no formal Fascism in America today. Tendencies in this direction, but falling short of the essential requirements of totalitarianism, will probably evolve in more complete and logical form than they thus far have done. But so long as the extreme form of "classical" Fascism is not attained, we shall have little more than an ebullient justification of economic reaction, to the fanfare of much waving of the flag and playing of the Star Spangled Banner.

H. ARTHUR STEINER.

University of California at Los Angeles.

The "Patent" Way to Balance the National Budget. In these times, when governmental costs are mounting and to many it seems impossible to balance the national budget, all sorts of bizarre proposals are being made to raise additional revenue. They run the gamut from a national governmental lottery, through various modes of inflation, via the printing-press route and all points rightward, to excessive forms of graduated taxes, which may kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. The importance of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Constitution of the United States as an untapped source of untold revenue has been overlooked. The constitutional provision reads: "The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."

It has been said that "necessity is the mother of invention, but the patent law is its guardian." Indeed, this has been the sole historic rôle of the patent power since the formation of the government. It is our thesis that in these extraordinary times, when governmental activities are piling

²² C. Malaparte, *Technique du coup d'état* (Paris); G. Soule, *The Coming American Revolution* (New York, 1934).

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up, day by day, an unprecedented debt, it is imperative that legislative invention shall be utilized to cope with the budgetary necessity. Congress should recognize the dormant but potential implications in the patent clause. Here is a grant of power, which if properly exercised not only would be in truth the "guardian of invention," but also would bring vast revenue into the federal coffers. In short, the American people must become conscious of the "patent" way to balance the national budget.

To understand the proposal herein advocated, the following legal principles, by way of background, should be carefully noted: (1) At common law, an inventor has a right separate from and independent of any patent grant to make, use, and vend his invention, and to deprive the public of the benefits of his invention by keeping it a secret. But the making of an invention or discovery does not of itself confer upon the inventor or discoverer any exclusive right with respect to the production, use, or sale of his invention. Such rights can be acquired only by grant of a sovereign authority. Subject to the right of the inventor to be protected against disclosure or use by one who obtained knowledge through fraud or breach of faith, the public has a right at common law to make, use, and sell anything of which it has sufficient knowledge, and the exclusive right of an inventor in his invention is not recognized.¹ (2) The power conferred on Congress by the Constitution is discretionary; Congress may exercise the power or refrain from so doing.² (3) The right granted is only a negative right of exclusion.³ (4) The courts have regarded the patent as a contract between the government and the inventor,⁴ giving to the patentee a property right.⁵ (5) The power is subject to but one limitation: that the grant of the exclusive privilege secured by the issuance of the patent shall be for a limited time only.⁶ There is a maximum, but no minimum, time limit on the monopolistic grant. While Congress does not have the constitutional power to make the grant perpetual, it does have an absolute discretion as to the minimum number of years for which the grant shall be made. (6) Congress, under Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, has the power to pass "all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."

The present patent law is highly favorable to the patentee. It provides for a monopolistic grant for 17 years. Since 1861, in 15 exceptional cases, Congress by special legislation has extended for a period of seven⁷ years the 17-year grant. Further, the patentee, in order to retain the rights

¹ 48 Corpus Juris 15.

² *Bird v. Elaborating Roofing Company*, 256 Fed. 366, 167 C.C.A. 536, certiorari dismissed, 250 U.S. 647.

³ *Minnesota v. Barber*, 136 U.S. 313; 34 L. Ed. 455.

⁴ *White Company v. Converse*, 20 Fed. (2d) 311.

⁵ *Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co.*, 235 U.S. 641; 59 L. Ed. 398.

⁶ *Patterson v. Kentucky*, 97 U.S. 501, 24 L. Ed. 1115 (1878).

granted him, is not compelled to make use of these rights. The Supreme Court has declared that under the present patent law, a patentee, "if he sees fit, may reserve to himself the exclusive use of his invention or discovery. If he will neither use his device nor permit others to use it, he has but suppressed his own . . . his title is exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional provisions in respect to private property that he is neither bound to use his discovery himself nor permit others to use it."⁸ In almost every other important country with the exception of France, the patentee is in the position of a quasi-trustee for the public, and a non-user of a patent constitutes a forfeiture.

It is interesting to note that there was no debate in the Constitutional Convention and no minute of the committee devoted to the patent and copyright provision.⁹ The framers of the Constitution, who feared the "excesses of democracy," and who believed with Madison that "the first object of government is the protection of the diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originated," tried with all the genius at their command to protect property interests. To put it mildly, they were very careless in writing into the tentative draft of the Constitution Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, in its present form and allowing it to become a part of the finished document without comment or debate. They have, in effect, conferred upon a temporary Congressional majority a discretionary power, devastating in its content, by means of which Congress can not only extend the scope of government ownership, but also bring an untold flow of revenue into the federal coffers.

Suppose Congress should amend the present patent and copyright laws so as to curtail the period of the exclusive grant in the future, make no provisions for renewals, and specifically provide that upon the expiration of the period of the grant, the property rights in the patent or copyright should vest in the government of the United States. On the patent side alone, the possibility of highly profitable, revolutionary inventions cannot be predicted, even approximately. We have no right to assume that the great inventions have already been made. An eminent scientist has declared: "The larger the sphere of the known, the greater the contact with the unknown." But even if it were conceded that the great inventions have already been made, the fact should not be overlooked that every "improvement" on a patent or invention, if it possesses the necessary requirements, is patentable.¹⁰ Consider the development of the radio in

⁷ H. C. Lane, "Extension of Patents," *Journal of the Patent Office Society* (1926), p. 537.

⁸ *E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co.*, 186 U.S. 70.

⁹ Curtis, *Constitutional History*, 340; 2 *Watson on the Constitution* (1910), 660; 17 *Geo. L. Rev.*, 109, 114.

¹⁰ *Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Co.*, 220 U.S. 438 (1921).

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the last five years from the standpoint of range, selectivity, tone quality, and elimination of static. The radio of 1930 cannot compete in the market with the radio of 1935. Have we any right to assume that the radio of today can compete successfully with that of five years hence? It will thus be seen that the present high development in the field of inventions will but serve as a broad base for further valuable improvements.

The period of the grant could be shortened considerably. The only limitation is a practical one. The grant would have to be sufficiently attractive so that inventors and their financial underwriters would voluntarily take advantage of the law. If that practical limitation is complied with, no one can say that the law does not "promote the progress of science and the useful arts." The fact that the law also contains revenue possibilities will not militate against the tenor of the constitutional grant. This is not the first time in our constitutional development that a grant of power has been used for a dual purpose. Consider the taxing grant; its pristine purpose was clearly to delegate to the federal government the power to raise revenue, but this grant has been utilized to regulate and to prohibit¹¹ the carrying on of certain businesses in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of any revenue. Under the patent clause, Congress has a choice of means in promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, and, faced with an unprecedented debt, it lies within the discretion of our national legislature to tap this potential source of revenue.

In 1858, Mr. Justice Daniel,¹² speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said: "It is undeniably true that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing that monopoly." We do not claim that Mr. Justice Daniel, in the above statement, anticipated the revenue possibilities in the patent clause, but he did recognize the paramount interests of the public over the patentee. "Considerations of individual emolument can never be permitted to operate to the injury of the rights and welfare of the community." So the details of our proposal must be worked out by balancing the interests of the patentee so as not unduly to discourage incentive against the interests of the public.

At this point, we desire to discuss the possible utilization of "expired" patents and "government" patents. Unfortunately, the Patent Office does not maintain an adequate system of statistics. However, it is known that approximately two million patents have been granted since the establishment of the Patent Office and that about 730,000 are "live" and have not expired. Further, it is recognized that the patent curve in recent

¹¹ *Veazie Bank v. Fenno*, 8 Wallace 533; *McCray v. United States*, 195 U.S. 27.

¹² *Kendall v. Windsor*, 21 Howard 322, 328, 16 L. Ed. 165.

years is a rising one. Under the present law, a patent, when it expires, permits a reversion to the common law status which allows the public generally to make, use, and sell anything of which it has sufficient knowledge. We suggest an amendment to the patent law providing that upon or prior to the expiration of a patent the government shall offer to the patentee for his immediate acceptance or rejection the option of a renewal of the exclusive privilege upon the payment of an annual royalty to the government. In the case of the more profitable patented articles, the patentee will voluntarily accept the alternative rather than permit competitors to enter the field under the common law set-up. This amendment should bring considerable revenue into the federal treasury.

The files of the Patent Office list a great number of "government" patents which relate to potentially valuable inventions that have been made by scientists and inventors working for the government upon materials that have been furnished by the government for that purpose. The applicant for such governmental patent stipulates in his application that his invention, if patented, may be manufactured and used by or for the government without payment to him of any royalty thereon.¹³ As part of the unemployment relief program of the federal government, we suggest that an immediate study of these government patents be made, and that the more profitable ones be developed and utilized. Many of these devices are of such a nature that they would not be strictly competitive with private business. With millions unemployed, this vast reservoir lies fallow. Here is a rich field to be exploited for the benefit of the public and for the relief of unemployment. This development could be quite profitably made a part of the Homestead Subsistence Project. Utilized in this manner, the "government" patent idea would considerably curtail the expenditure of federal funds for direct relief. After a careful study of the matter, it may be found advisable in part for the government to farm out some of these patents to private businesses upon the payment of a royalty under a system of competitive bidding. Either method will contribute toward a balancing of the national budget.

In conclusion, we must anticipate two stock arguments against the proposal. First, it will discourage individual effort and incentive. The answer to this contention is as follows. If Congress had never passed any legislation under the patent clause of the Constitution, then the inventor would have been confronted with a situation that would have been deadly to individual incentive, for the very good reason that at common law no inventor is protected in his invention from piratical competitors. The critics of our proposal assume naïvely that Congress from the beginning has been under a legal obligation to create special privileges of a monopolistic character under the patent grant. They like to believe that special

¹³ Act of April 30, 1928, amending act of March 3, 1863 (U.S.C., title 35, sec. 45).

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privilege is an inherent and an inalienable part of our legal order. But such is not the case, and the Supreme Court has declared unequivocally that the power conferred on Congress by the patent clause is discretionary. Congress may exercise the power or refrain from doing so.¹⁴

But Congress has acted under the patent clause, and it is by virtue of this legislation that the inventor has secured his present monopolistic privilege. The critics of our proposal again assume naïvely that there is something sacrosanct about the present patent laws. Our proposal is to amend the patent laws in such a manner (1) that the patentee and his financial backers shall be treated so favorably in respect to the period of the grant that they could not afford to put a valuable device on the market without government protection, and (2) that after the patentee and his financial underwriters have had a liberal period of monopolistic privilege, property rights in the patent and the appurtenant right to royalties therefrom shall vest in the government of the United States.

The critics of this proposal seem to appreciate only the contribution that the inventor has made through his imagination, initiative, and skill in offering to the public a beneficial article of use. They forget the contribution that the government has made under the present legal set-up, i.e., the granting of a valuable monopolistic privilege. It is this contribution by the government that fosters individual initiative and makes it effective. The present patent set-up has many of the features of a partnership arrangement between the government and the inventor. We propose, under a balancing of interests doctrine, to make it more nearly a partnership by continuing the monopolistic privilege and granting to the patentee and his financial underwriters a liberal period within which they shall have the exclusive right to royalties, and then, after this period has expired, to permit the public to share in the monopolistic privilege that the government has helped to create. It should be stressed that this proposal does not contemplate the government operation of industries in which patents are indispensable, but rather a sharing of royalties in those industries with continued private operation of business. The period of the grant must be worked out by recognizing the mutual interests of the patentee and the government. Both have made contributions in a common venture, and it is submitted that there is nothing inherently unreasonable in a plan that will permit both to share in the profits. Let us by all means protect the incentive of prospective inventors, so as to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. But in a period of unprecedented public debt, let us not overlook the governmental revenue possibilities in the patent clause.

The other stock argument against the plan that must be anticipated is that it is "socialistic" and "has a decided Russian ring." Let it be said

¹⁴ Bird v. Elaborating Roofing Co., *supra*, note 2.

that this is an illustration of the time-worn device of substituting an epithet (distasteful to many people) for argument. In the halcyon days of William McKinley, the charge that an idea was "socialistic" was fatal to the adoption of the idea. But for the last three decades our two major parties, while paying lip-service to the ideal of rugged individualism, have been borrowing, constantly and surreptitiously, instruments of policy from the Socialist armory. President Hoover, the classic exponent of individualism, poured millions of government money into banks and railroads through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Are the critics of our proposal aware of the fact that some of these loans to railroads are hopelessly in default and that when the government forecloses—which is the only practical alternative—we will be confronted with the terrible bogey of government ownership of these roads?

In 1932, the Democratic party came into power, solemnly pledging itself to the relief of the "forgotten man." The impartial reader realizes that the present unprecedented expenditure by the national government has been incurred in an honest effort to carry out that platform pledge. By pressure of circumstances, our government has undertaken many costly enterprises, e.g., slum-clearance, government guaranty of bank deposits, the Tennessee Valley development, benefit payments for crop reductions, the Farm Credit Administration, the Civil Works Administration, reemployment projects, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, reforestation, the Federal Housing Administration, and an unparalleled program of public works. Does it seem so unreasonable that since governmental costs have mounted because of socialistic endeavors, the government should utilize a socialistic device to help pay part of these costs?

In short, we are confronted by a condition and not a theory. Through no fault of its own, the present Administration has had foisted upon it the herculean tasks of relief, recovery, and the establishment of social security, and it has met the challenge with statesmanlike vision and courage. But due to this emergency program, the public debt of the United States has risen considerably in excess of that at the close of the World War. Critics of the Administration insist that President Roosevelt has no moral right to pass the problem of a balanced budget to future administrations, but there is a dearth of suggestions from the critics' camp as to a practical *modus operandi*.

The constructive proposal outlined above is a candid attempt in extraordinary times to meet a vital problem that our government cannot afford to postpone. The interest charges alone make immediate action imperative. The proposal, if enacted into law, would within a generation raise billions of revenue and go a long way toward establishing a balanced budget. If we are to escape the Scylla of outright repudiation and the

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Charybdis of the printing press, and if we are to accept at its face value the opinion of tax experts as expressed in current periodicals, it would appear that there must be some supplement to any and all known forms of taxation, if the national budget is to be balanced. The proposal here made is in accord with the Jeffersonian tradition, and should appeal to the present Administration. The existing patent law creates a monopolistic privilege and at the expiration of the 17-year period permits this valuable property interest to be appropriated by competitors of the patentee. The only benefit percolating to the public is the intangible one that the system "promotes the progress of science and the useful arts." Under the plan here presented, not only is individual initiative safeguarded, but also the public directly shares in the property interest which its government in the first instance created and which the public patronage made valuable.

It is difficult in formulating a "paper plan" for raising revenue to convince the skeptical reader. In order that such a person may realize the revenue possibilities inherent in the proposal, assume that Congress had passed such a law during the panic of 1873. Within the decade following that depression, the following important patents were granted: Bell's telephone (1876), Edison's phonograph (1878), Hyath's reinforced concrete (1878), and Edison's electric lamp (1880). Even if it be conceded that the great days of revolutionary patents are over, we repeat that since an "improvement" on a patent, if it possesses the necessary requirements, is patentable, it follows that the present high development in the field of inventions would serve as a broad base for further valuable improvements. The reader is entitled to disagree with this proposal; but it is insisted that if he does so, and desires to be intellectually honest, he is obligated to furnish a substitute plan that will yield the government "more feathers with fewer squawks."

FORREST R. BLACK.

Washington, D. C.

The Contributions of Samuel J. Randall to the Rules of the National House of Representatives. Students of government and well-informed public citizens usually point to Thomas B. Reed of Maine as the first Speaker of the House of Representatives to use the prerogative of his office and the rules of the House to force the passage of legislation demanded by the leaders of the majority party. Likewise "Uncle Joe" Cannon of Illinois is usually held up as the undesirable product of this concept of legislative procedure. Little attention has been centered on earlier Speakers such as James G. Blaine of Maine and Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania, who laid the foundations of such a tradition. Blaine contributed to this theory of dictatorial leadership by his committee

selections, his partisan decisions, his personal attractiveness, and his expansion of the Speaker's prerogative in situations which allowed him to exercise his discretion. Randall, as Speaker, followed the course laid down by Blaine, but went a step further by actually seeking to add to his powers by changes in the rules. This effort produced important modifications which cleared out the underbrush of tangled rules, thus preparing the way for the later timber-felling reforms of "Czar Reed."

As one of the minority leaders during the days when Blaine ruled the House, Randall showed his detailed knowledge of the rules by his successful filibusters against the Civil Rights and Force Bills in January and February, 1875.¹ When the Democrats took over control of the House during the next Congress, Randall, as chairman of Appropriations and member of the Rules Committee, was instrumental in having the House add a new clause to Rule 120 (later known as the Holman Amendment) which provided that any amendment to an appropriation bill would be in order provided that its effect would be to lessen expenditure. In a recent session of the Seventy-fourth Congress, this rule was invoked to prevent the immediate restoration of the five per cent pay cut by an amendment to the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill.²

Randall was elected Speaker in December, 1876, upon the death of Michael Kerr of Indiana. The hectic session which followed was occupied largely with the Electoral Count, yet Randall stamped his powerful personality on the House and the country by his course of action during the last few days of the session, when he forced the completion of the count over the protests of the filibusterers of his own party.³ However, his ruling of dilatory motions out of order during this session was not based on the rules of the House or on his own conception of the prerogative of his office, but on the mandatory provisions of the Electoral Act which had become law,⁴ largely through the efforts of Randall's own party.

Randall was responsible for one substantial contribution to the Speaker's prerogative, i.e., the Speaker's right of recognition. Previous to his ruling on the subject, appeals from the recognition practice of the Speaker had been referred to the House on six occasions. Since Randall's definitive ruling, however, no such appeals have been referred.⁵ He refused to refer to the House any appeals on this subject, with the following ruling: "There is no power in the House itself to appeal from the recog-

¹ *Congressional Record*, January 27-30, 1875; *N.Y. Times*, January 28, 30, 31, 1875.

² *Congressional Record*, January 11, 1935.

³ *Congressional Record*, February 24-March 1, 1877; *N.Y. World*, February 26-March 3, 1877; *N.Y. Times*, February 26-March 3, 1877.

⁴ *Congressional Record*, February 24, 1877.

⁵ Asher C. Hinds, *Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States* (Washington, 1907), II, 920.

dition of the chair. The right of recognition is just as absolute in the chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law."⁶ Randall also ruled that it was not compulsory for the Speaker to recognize the motion to suspend the rules,⁷ and, further, introduced the practice of recognizing committee chairmen in preference to other individuals.⁸ By the days of Czar Reed and the Fifty-first Congress, Randall's recognition practice was so generally accepted by the House that Reed could make valuable use of Randall's precedents.

Under Randall's guidance, the rules of the House were completely revised in 1879-80. In August, 1879, the Rules Committee, composed of Randall, Blackburn of Kentucky, Stephens of Georgia, Hale of Maine, and Garfield of Ohio, met at Long Branch, New Jersey, for the purpose of making a complete revision and condensation of the tangled mass of rules which had grown up since the days of Jefferson's *Manual*. All politics was laid aside while this capable group worked rapidly and in good humor at the task of overhauling the existing 166 rules,⁹ 63 of which had been adopted prior to 1800 and 30 of which were obsolete. The committee submitted its report on December 19, 1879, when the revised code was made a special order for committee of the whole on January 6, 1880. The number of rules was brought down to 45, the first 24 being concerned with the main functions of the House.¹⁰ Twelve rules were retained intact; 132 of the others were condensed into 33 new ones. All were subdivided into clauses and arranged with logical relation to main subject-headings.¹¹ No mention was made of such questionable tactics as "riders" on appropriation bills and the "disappearing quorum," but the result was a much more orderly scheme of legislative procedure.¹²

The proposed rules were adopted practically as presented, although only after strenuous opposition from some of the acquisitive elements which objected to the dictatorial power given the Appropriations Committee. At crucial moments, Randall left the chair to bring his sharp, high-pitched voice to bear on the struggle.¹³ The so-called "Holman Amendment" appeared as Rule 21, clause 3, thereby providing for "economy" riders on appropriation bills. The Appropriations Committee

⁶ *Congressional Record*, February 28, 1881.

⁷ Hinds, *op. cit.*, II, 920.

⁸ *Congressional Record*, February 16, 1880.

⁹ *Garfield Mss.*, Randall to Garfield, August 3, 1879; *Jeremiah Black Mss.*, Randall to C. F. Black, August 13, 1879.

¹⁰ *House Reports*, 46th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Report 24, Vol. I.

¹¹ *Idem.*

¹² D. S. Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (Boston, 1916), 195.

¹³ *Congressional Record*, January 8, 1880.

was thus to become a privileged committee on all general legislation resulting in retrenchment; and this same committee was to have the sole right to report bills contemplating appropriations. As finally adopted, this exceptional power was somewhat curbed, since the Commerce Committee gained the right to report the log-rolling rivers and harbors bill. The Agricultural Committee, also, was given a special privilege of the sort.

In the Forty-eighth Congress, Randall, again chairman of Appropriations, used the new rules to make himself dictator of financial and general legislation in the House, and a revolt against his activities broke out on both sides. Reed himself led the opposition in a series of parliamentary duels with Randall, who, however, was sustained.¹⁴ The *Washington Post* voiced general sentiment in the remark that "Congress has too long consisted of the Senate and Sam Randall."¹⁵ Unable at last to stem the tide of opposition which poured in from all sides, Randall, in a masterly minority report of the Rules Committee, warned the House against the fatal step of again giving the more important committees the power to report their own appropriations.¹⁶ Holman of Indiana also told the House that "it will not require a prophet to foretell that you yourselves will in the end admit that a great and vital mistake has been made."¹⁷ It is interesting to notice that when, on June 1, 1920, the House was considering the Budget Act then under discussion, it revised its committee system so as to handle properly the annual budget when presented by the President. The new rule then adopted called for a single Appropriations Committee to have entire jurisdiction in respect to appropriation proposals.¹⁸ Such a proposal was a return to the rules of 1880 and a vindication of Randall's position in 1885.

However, the most valuable tool which Randall fashioned for Reed's use was a powerful Rules Committee. Previous to 1876, that committee met in the first few days of each new Congress, made a report which possibly included a few recommendations for changes, and then usually met no more during the sessions of that Congress. In the spring of 1876, Randall asked and received permission for the Rules Committee (of which he was a member) to report during the closing days of the session upon questions relating to the currency. As a part of the rules revision of 1880, the Rules Committee was made a standing committee. This would not have been very important except for the fact that "Speaker Randall added greatly to its prestige, by holding that all propositions to change

¹⁴ *House Journal*, February 8, 1884.

¹⁵ December 1, 1885.

¹⁶ *Congressional Record*, December 15, 1885.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, December 14, 1885.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1920.

the rules in order to be agreed to by a majority vote must be referred to it, and that it might report at any time upon matters relating to the rules."¹⁹ In February, 1883, Reed used this new-found power to push through the atrocious conference report on the Kelly Tariff, thus giving Randall a grim lesson in the "legitimate" manipulation of this blossoming instrument of majority oppression.²⁰ Students of Congressional history of the 80's and 90's cannot fail to appreciate the importance of the power to "report at any time." This was the weapon used by Reed to facilitate his own procedural reforms in 1890. The importance of the Rules Committee was destined to grow from the moment when Randall accorded it this privilege of reporting at will.

ALBERT V. HOUSE, JR.

Wilson Teachers College
Washington, D. C.

¹⁹ D. S. Alexander, *op. cit.*, 196.

²⁰ *Congressional Record*, February 24, 1883; *House Journal*, February 27, 1883.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Development of National Administration in the United States, 1932-35. *Growth of Administrative Services.* Any one returning to Washington after an absence of several years must be struck at once by the physical changes which have taken place in the political nerve center of the nation. These changes are largely the result of the erection of new government buildings and the clearing away of old structures to make way for others yet to come. In May, 1932, the Washington telephone directory listed 663 office telephones under the heading "United States Government." In June, 1935, it listed 892, or a gain of nearly 35 per cent for the three-year period. This expansion of physical equipment may be said to symbolize the growth of the administrative organization of the national government. One sees on every hand new departmental edifices, and whole buildings now occupied by bureaus or commissions which were formerly tucked away in departmental buildings, or by new independent agencies which were non-existent until a year or two ago.

Since 1789, the administrative branch of the national government has undergone an almost phenomenal expansion. In normal times, its growth was of a relatively steady character, roughly commensurate with the growth of the territory, wealth, and population of the United States. In times of great stress, such as war, its growth has been very considerably accelerated. The passing of each crisis has been followed by a contraction of the administrative services, but never have they shrunk again to their previous level. That is to say, what purports to be a purely temporary expansion in order to meet a sudden emergency has always given rise to some permanent increase in organization and personnel of the government service.

The crisis produced by the present economic depression has frequently been likened to that produced by war, particularly in the justification of increased expenditure of public funds and in the exercise of emergency powers by the national government. A similar comparison might be made with respect to the expansion of the government services. From June 30, 1932, to June 30, 1935, the personnel of the executive civil service grew from 578,231¹ to 717,712,² showing an increase of 24.12 per cent for the three-year period. But even this does not indicate the full extent of the growth of employment in the national service, for these figures do not include the temporary employees in the Post Office Department outside of Washington, the 31,203 "special" employees in the Department of Agriculture, the 11,670 "intermittent" employees in conservation work, the 357,855 young men enrolled in the Civilian Conservation

¹ U. S. Civil Service Commission, *51st Annual Report*.

² U. S. Civil Service Commission, *Monthly Summary*, June, 1935.

Corps,³ or the millions of persons employed full- or part-time on relief work projects. For example, the Civil Works Administration, now discontinued, reached its peak of 4,100,000 employees in January, 1934.⁴ There is nothing in the previous peace-time history of the United States to compare with this.

If we turn to a consideration of the multiplication of governmental agencies and establishments, even the World War period pales into insignificance when compared with the one here discussed. It is difficult to give with any degree of assurance the exact number of "alphabetical combinations" in existence today. Estimates by supposedly competent Washington observers range from 40 to 100. This uncertainty represents something more than carelessness on the part of the observers. It is indicative of a real difficulty, both in enumeration and in classification.

New agencies have been created with bewildering rapidity, both by statute and by executive order of the President under general statutory authority. Many of the new agencies were created for a specific purpose or for a limited period of time. Some of these, like the National Longshoremen's Labor Board and the National Recovery Review Board, have been allowed to lapse, while others, like the National Recovery Administration, have been renewed or extended. At least one new establishment, the Railroad Retirement Board, has been discontinued as a result of a decision of the Supreme Court,⁵ and the status and future of several others were left uncertain.⁶ Some new agencies have been succeeded by newer ones. For example, the National Planning Board was superseded by the National Resources Board, and the National Labor Board was superseded by the National Labor Relations Board. Still others represent preëxisting organizations with new names and functions. Such is the case with the Federal Communications Commission, which replaced the old Federal Radio Commission, and with the Farm Credit Administration, which absorbed a number of preëxisting agricultural loan, credit, and banking establishments.

The difficulty in classification arises from the fact that it is not always entirely clear whether a particular agency is a separate entity or merely a subdivision of a larger agency. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration was placed within the Department of Agriculture and is generally regarded as an integral part of that department, but the Civil Service Commission lists its personnel separately, though under a sub-heading.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *United States News*, Jan. 28, 1935.

⁵ *R.R. Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co.*, in *U.S. Law Week*, May, 7, 1935, p. 10.

⁶ See *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*, *Advance Ops. U.S. Sup. Ct.*, October term 1934, No. 135, and *Schechter v. U.S.*, *U.S. Law Week*, May 28, 1935, p. 14.

The Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation and the National Resources Board are regarded as sub-agencies of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, and are not shown separately. The Federal Civil Works Administration and the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation are sub-agencies of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. The Electric Home and Farm Authority and the Tennessee Valley Associated Coöperatives are under the Tennessee Valley Authority, while the National Archives Council and the National Historical Publications Commission are divisions of the National Archives Establishment.

The difficulty in fixing definitely the number of new administrative establishments will be readily apparent. L. F. Schmeckebier enumerates no less than 68 which were created between January 22, 1932, and June 30, 1934.⁷ This, however, includes more than a score of sub-agencies, and some that have since been discontinued. The United States Information Service lists 39 new establishments, as of June 30, 1935,⁸ but the list is subject to some correction. Such minor organizations as the Alley Dwelling Authority and the American Battle Monuments Commission are omitted, while some of the more important sub-agencies are listed apart from the major units within which they are included. Perhaps the most reliable information available at present is that supplied by the United States Civil Service Commission. The monthly summary of employees for June, 1935, lists 35 independent offices and establishments, excluding the sub-agencies, which can be identified as new ones.⁹ These 35 establishments, together with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, in the Department of Agriculture, employed a total of 113,579 persons.

Naturally, the growth of the administrative service is most apparent at the seat of the government. The field organization, however, has grown apace. On April 29, 1935, the *United States News* listed, by states, 3,195 new branch or field offices (not including some 1,500 Civilian Conservation Corps camps) established since 1932 by 25 of the new emergency agencies. The National Reemployment Service led the list with 1,712 branches, and the Federal Transient Bureau was second, with 565. While the offices of the latter agency are technically under the control of the states, all the funds are supplied by the national government. That the personnel of the field organization has grown in proportion to that in Washington is shown by the fact that of the 717,712 members of the executive civil service, 614,259 were employed outside the District of Columbia.¹⁰

⁷ *New Federal Organizations: An Outline of their Structure and Functions* (1934), p. 2.

⁸ *Emergency and Other New Government Agencies*. (Mimeographed.)

⁹ *Monthly Summary*, June, 1935. (Mimeographed.) ¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Organization of the New Agencies. It is not easy to discover any consistent administrative theory or practice in the organization of the new establishments. The Soil Erosion Service, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads,¹¹ and the Petroleum Administration were located in the Department of the Interior; the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, in the Department of Agriculture; and the United States Employment Service, in the Department of Labor. The remaining 35 major units were created as independent establishments, reporting directly to the President.¹² Among these independent establishments, at least three types of administrative organization may be distinguished, i.e., corporate, bureau or single executive, and board or commission type. Perhaps we should distinguish a fourth type, which seems to be a hybrid of the last two.

1. *Corporate.* Nine of the major units referred to are *bona fide* corporations, chartered under the laws of particular states or of the District of Columbia. They are: the Commodity Credit Corporation, the two Export-Import Banks of Washington, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. In addition, there are nearly a score of subsidiary corporations, such as the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporations, and the Production Credit Corporations, operating under the Farm Credit Administration. Some of these corporations are owned solely by the United States government, while the stock in others is held in varying amounts by the government, the federal reserve banks, members of the federal reserve system, and other institutions of credit participating in their functions and activities. On March 1, 1935, the Treasury Department reported the assets of corporations owned entirely by the government as \$3,727,000,000 and the government's equity in the partly owned corporations as \$1,090,000,000.¹³ Thus, the government has a total corporate investment of \$4,817,000,000, which makes something more than a mere figure of speech of the popular assertion that the United States government is the largest business enterprise in the world.

The form of management used by these corporations is the one characteristic of private corporations. In every case, there is a board of directors, or trustees as they are sometimes called, to formulate the policies of the institution. Administration of these policies is entrusted to a presi-

¹¹ Recently transferred to the Resettlement Administration.

¹² Schmeckebier, *op. cit.*

¹³ *United States News*, April 8, 1935, p. 21.

dent or general manager, who is responsible to the board for his acts. Of course, in a general way, the policies of government-owned corporations are fixed by the acts of Congress which authorize their creation or the allotment of funds to them, but a great deal is left to the discretion of the boards, the members of which are chosen in various ways. In the case of the institutions which are wholly government-owned, the boards are composed entirely of government officials, some serving ex-officio, while others are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The corporations which are owned in part by the government usually have mixed boards, the government representatives being either ex-officio or appointive, and the others being designated by the remaining stockholders.

2. *Bureau.* Though none of the new establishments is styled a bureau—a term which usually signifies a subdivision of a department—several of them use the bureau, or single executive, type of administration. This, in effect, makes of each independent agency a miniature department, headed by a single individual, who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Leading examples of this type of administration are the Farm Credit Administration, the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Federal Alcohol Control Administration, and the Office of the Federal Coördinator of Transportation. In most cases, the head of the establishment is called the “administrator,” though the Farm Credit Administration is presided over by a “governor,” and the head of the Office of the Federal Coördinator of Transportation is appropriately styled the “coördinator.”

3. *Board or Commission.* Under this type of administration, we have classified all of the agencies other than corporations, the governing authority of which is vested in a plural body—three or more persons—whether that body be styled a “board,” “commission,” “committee,” or “council.”¹⁴ Examples are to be found in the National Labor Relations Board, the National Mediation Board, the National Steel Labor Relations Board, the Committee on Economic Security, the Committee on National Land Problems, the National Emergency Council, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Securities Exchange Commission. These bodies, like the boards of directors of the corporations, are composed of members both ex-officio and appointive.

Mention has been made of a fourth, or hybrid, type of administrative organization. Technically, the ones thus classified are all of the board or commission type, but are placed in this doubtful category because the

¹⁴ There is, of course, a technical distinction between these terms, but it does not seem to have been followed very carefully in the naming of the several establishments.

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relationship existing between the board and the active director of the service seems vague or ill-defined. To illustrate, the authority of the National Recovery Administration is supposedly vested in a board, but certainly during General Johnson's tenure as administrator, and apparently during Mr. Richberg's ascendancy, the board's authority was largely nominal. Again, the National Emergency Council has 34 members, but is headed by an executive director who seems to exercise the principal administrative authority.

Some Criticisms. The multiplication of administrative agencies has given rise to a great deal of criticism, most of it political in nature. Many of the new organizations represent striking changes in our concept of the proper functions of government. They indicate at least three main lines of "drift" in our governmental development. These changes are in the direction of (1) collectivism, or paternalism; (2) centralization, or the enhancement of the powers of the national government at the expense of the states; and (3) bureaucracy, or a shift in emphasis from the legislative to the administrative branch of government. All three of these tendencies were apparent long before the advent of the New Deal, but unquestionably they have been considerably accelerated during the past three years. Most of the criticism of the new "alphabetical combinations" has arisen from objections to the functions which they perform. This is to confuse the means of government with the ends. The growth of administrative machinery should be regarded as a result, rather than a principal cause, of the new rôle which the national government has assumed.

There is, of course, some criticism of bureaucracy *per se*. In this connection, the term is always used in an invidious rather than a technical sense. The mere growth of administrative machinery is assumed to mean bureaucracy, with all the evils usually associated with it, such as red tape, delay, and general inefficiency in the performance of services, and indifference, arrogance, and petty tyranny on the part of administrative officials. It is believed that this criticism has not as yet been justified. Probably there has been some loss in efficiency, due to sudden expansion, but certainly there has been no general break-down. It is possible that the other evils may appear in time, unless ample safeguards are developed, but they are not now apparent. The writer, in quest for information, visited nearly a hundred government offices during the summer of 1935, and, almost without exception, met with unfailing courtesy and helpfulness.

Even though the worst features of bureaucracy have not appeared, there are some things in connection with the recent expansion of the government service that are disturbing to students of public administration. One of the commonly accepted tenets of writers on the subject is

that the entire administrative organization should be integrated and centralized, with the lines of authority as simple and direct as possible. Any one of the new agencies, if viewed alone, may seem to satisfy these requirements, but when all of them are viewed together, as parts of an administrative system, the impression is that of an amazingly complicated arrangement. It is true that all lines of authority finally converge in the President; but in attempting to trace them, one becomes lost in a veritable maze.

Most of the new establishments, it has been shown, are independent. That is, they are independent of the several executive departments and of each other. Nevertheless, there is an intricate network of connecting lines, which may be illustrated by a few concrete examples. The Secretary of Commerce participates in the administration of at least six of these "independent" agencies. He is a trustee of the Export and Import Bank of Washington, and of the Second Export and Import Bank of Washington. He is a member of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, of the National Recovery Administration Board, of the National Emergency Council, and of the Executive Council. The duties of the Secretary of the Interior are quite as numerous. He is Petroleum Administrator, chairman of the Board of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, treasurer of the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, and a member of the National Recovery Administration Board, the National Emergency Council, and the Executive Council. All of the departments heads are members of the Executive Council, and most of them are directly connected with one or more of the other agencies, either in an ex-officio capacity, or because they have been designated by the President.

It is not unusual to find cabinet officers, their own departmental subordinates, and non-departmental officials sitting together as colleagues and equals on some of the boards. For example, the National Emergency Council includes the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Interior, Commerce, Labor, the Attorney-General, the Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (a subordinate of the Secretary of Agriculture), the Federal Emergency Relief Administrator, the Chairman of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration, a representative of the Consumers' Council, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (nominally within the Treasury Department), and the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.

Under the present system, it would not be surprising to find two cabinet officers serving as colleagues on the board of one establishment, one of them serving as the other's subordinate in a second organization, and their relationship reversed in a third. Consider two actual cases. The Board of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works is composed of the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney-General, the Secretary of

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War, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, a Rear Admiral of the Navy, and the Deputy Administrator of Public Works. Mr. Harold L. Ickes, as Secretary of the Interior, is ex-officio chairman of the Board. At the same time, by presidential appointment, he is the Administrator of the unit. In the second case, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Federal Emergency Relief Administrator, is president of the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, while two cabinet officers, theoretically ranking above Mr. Hopkins in the administrative hierarchy, hold subordinate positions in the Corporation, the Secretary of Agriculture serving as vice-president, and the Secretary of the Interior as treasurer.

Enough has been said to indicate the tangled and crossed lines of authority. It is little wonder that we hear stories of rivalry and conflict within the Administration. Something of this internal situation is revealed in a press release announcing a "treaty of peace" between Harry L. Hopkins as Works Progress Administrator, Secretary Ickes as Public Works Administrator, and Frank C. Walker as Executive Director of the National Emergency Council, which supposedly ended a "feud" of long standing between Messrs. Hopkins and Ickes over the question of their respective authority.¹⁵ The marvel is not that there has been so much friction, but rather that there has been so little. In fact, so far as the writer is able to judge, the various agencies, or most of them, have functioned reasonably well. This, no doubt, is to be explained by the fact that they have practically grown under President Roosevelt's own hand, on which account a modicum of direct supervision has been possible, and by the fact that he has been able to secure the services of some very capable and devoted assistants.

It must be recognized that the system of interlocking directorates which we have described has some very definite advantages, particularly in bringing about a proper liaison between the several agencies and in correlating their work. It is inevitable, however, that some confusion should result from it. This confusion would be more pronounced with a change of chief executives. It is doubtful whether any new president, not having guided these multifarious organizations from the time of their creation, could pick up all the reins of administration and direct them successfully without a complete overhauling.

Another dogma of students of public administration is that administrative organization should be based upon the unifunctional principle. That is, so far as possible, all like functions should be concentrated in a single agency, while no wholly dissimilar functions should be grouped together. A casual reading of a list of the new agencies and their activities will reveal that many separate establishments are engaged in the per-

¹⁵ *Washington Post*, July 4, 1935, p. 1.

formance of similar, if not identical, functions. The Export and Import Banks of Washington are two distinct government corporations, but the only difference in their functions is that one was created to promote trade with Russia and the other to promote trade with Cuba. In the case of the National Labor Relations Board, the National Mediation Board (to facilitate the settlement of railroad labor disputes), and the National Steel Labor Relations Board, the very titles indicate the similarity of their purposes. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration of Public Works, the Federal Emergency Conservation Work Administration, and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration obviously perform similar services. Among the major lending agencies, we find the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Farm Credit Administration, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, not to mention a dozen or so subsidiary credit establishments, all performing functions that are more or less related.

Thus it would seem, even to one who is in accord with most of the President's political philosophy, and who does not fear bureaucracy *per se*, that there has been a needless multiplication of governmental units. There are now no less than 78 independent offices and establishments, old and new, in addition to the 10 executive departments.¹⁶ If the practice of creating *ad hoc* agencies continues, the national administrative organization is in danger of becoming as unwieldy as that of some of the states which are held up as horrible examples by the text-book writers. There is, of course, the difference that nowhere is administrative power concentrated in the hands of the governor to the extent that it is in the hands of the President, but if the national administrative system continues to grow in complexity, the President's power of direction may become largely ineffective, through the sheer unwieldiness of the administrative machinery. It is then that the worst evils of bureaucracy are likely to appear.

Another phase of the recent development which is regrettable from the point of view of expert administration is that related to personnel policy. Of the 578,231 employees in the executive civil service on June 30, 1932, 467,161, or 80.79 per cent, were in the classified, or competitive, service. Of the 661,094 in the service on June 30, 1934, 461,587, or only 69.82 per cent, were classified.¹⁷ Figures are not available to show what proportion of the entire service was classified on June 30, 1935, but as the greatest increases in personnel took place in the temporary or emergency establishments, in which most of the positions are specifically exempted from the application of the civil service laws, it is reasonable to suppose that the situation, so far as the classified service is concerned, has not been materially improved.

¹⁶ Enumerated in the *Congressional Directory* for 1935.

¹⁷ U.S. Civil Service Commission, *51st Annual Report*.

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There has not been a general relaxation of the civil service rules as applied to the old services. The apparent losses have resulted from the exemptions of the new agencies. This, of course, was done on the theory that the positions would be temporary, but it has already become evident that many of them will become permanent. Accordingly, it is felt that all of them might profitably be transferred to the classified service. This, in fact, has been recommended by the United States Civil Service Commission.¹⁸ Even if these positions are later abolished, the holders might be placed on a reserve list, from which future recruits might be drawn.

It is not intended to suggest that the 109,299 employees classed as "temporary"¹⁹ have all been appointed wholly on the basis of patronage or spoils. Far from it. So far as possible, appointments have been made on the basis of merit, though without formal examination.²⁰ The writer is personally acquainted with more than a score of these employees, and in every case there seems to have been an attempt to select persons fitted by previous experience for the work which they were to undertake, regardless of party affiliation or lack of it. Nevertheless, "connections" cannot be entirely discounted. So long as these positions remain on the unclassified list, they will constitute a definite danger-spot in the government service. Without the protection of the civil service laws, they would provide a strong temptation to each incoming administration, and it is highly probable that most of them would eventually become mere patronage positions.

Conclusions. There is nothing as yet to indicate that the national service has reached its maximum growth. Its personnel increased by 56,614 during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1935, 5,600 of this increase taking place during the last month of the year. There is evidence, however, that the rate of growth is declining. The increase for the last fiscal year was slightly less than half that of the previous year. Thus, we may reasonably expect that the service will soon become relatively static again—at least for a short time. Clearly, there is a waxing opposition, both within Congress and without, to further expansion. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, in striking a blow at the delegation of powers to administrative agencies, struck indirectly at the creation of these agencies. If anything like normal economic conditions are restored in the near future, we may expect some diminution of the functions of the national government, with a corresponding contraction of the administrative service. If, however, we may judge by previous experience, the service will never again be constricted to its former size. Indeed, any decrease which may be

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Monthly Summary of Employees for June, 1935.*

²⁰ Schmeckebier, *op. cit.*

effected is apt to be short-lived, since the tendency seems to be inevitably toward still further growth.

Apparently, we must accept bureaucracy—using the term in a technical rather than an invidious sense—as a permanent feature of our government. If this is true, it is clear that we should now concentrate upon preventing the growth of the evils commonly associated with bureaucracy. It is not the purpose of this paper to propose detailed remedies or safeguards, but some conclusions seem to follow from the propositions already set forth.

In the first place, the entire administrative organization should be rearranged, using the unifunctional principle as a guide. This would involve removing the non-military functions from the War Department, the non-naval functions from the Navy Department, the non-fiscal functions from the Treasury Department, and so on. The organizations which now perform these functions, together with all of the independent establishments with purely administrative duties, should then be distributed among the appropriate departments. Perhaps it would be necessary to create one or two additional departments. The agencies which perform quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions should remain independent, but the number of these could be reduced by combining those which serve related purposes. The government-owned corporations should retain their present form of management,²¹ but there is no essential reason for their remaining independent. Audit, inspection, and general supervision could readily be conducted through the regular executive departments which embrace the purposes for which the several corporations were created. These changes would be in the interest of simplification, both of organization and of procedure.

In the second place, the merit system should be extended to include all members of the service, with the exception of casual and unskilled laborers, and a negligible number of political officers at the top of the service. Each department should be provided with a permanent under-secretary, to be drawn from the ranks of trained officials within the department. More attention should be given to the training of public employees, both before and after they have entered the service. This training should not only emphasize technical efficiency, but strive to develop an *esprit de corps*, a high standard of professional ethics, and a sense of responsibility to, and consideration for, the general public.

Finally, some better means should be devised for adjudicating conflicts between the individual and the government. No amount of training for

²¹ There is some controversy over the propriety of using corporations for the performance of government services. For the affirmative, see W. F. Willoughby, *Government Organization in War Time and After*, pp. 354-357; for the negative, James M. Beck, *Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy*, Chap. X.

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courtesy and efficiency will prevent a certain amount of friction from arising between administrative agents and the public. At present, when such disputes arise, the aggrieved person has recourse to the regularly established courts of law, the issue to be determined according to the ordinary laws in force. This, it is felt, is inadequate, and will become progressively more so, as more and more of the burden of government falls upon the "administrative." Thus it may become necessary to develop a system of administrative law, to be interpreted and applied by special administrative tribunals.

Any criticism of recent developments in the national administrative service should be tempered by recognition of the magnitude of the problems which have confronted the national government during the past three years. It was forced to undertake many things for which no adequate organization existed. New machinery had to be created as it was needed. Some of it had to be constructed so hastily that there was little possibility of building upon a permanent, well-planned basis. The task may be compared with that of converting a horde of untrained civilians into an effective army in time of war. Inevitably there were mistakes. It would be unreasonable to expect any government to maintain perfect proportion and equilibrium in its administrative service through such a sudden expansion. Nevertheless, our sympathetic understanding should not make us too complacent. The need for reorganization has been recognized by students and public officials for more than a decade, but it has become well-nigh imperative now.

ROGER V. SHUMATE.

University of Pittsburgh.

Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the United States: Changes between July 5 and August 12, 1935. In the December, 1933, issue of the *REVIEW*, pp. 942-955, appeared a tabular review of the changes in major units of the national government between March 4 and November 1, 1933. Supplementary lists have appeared in the following issues: April, 1934, changes between November 1, 1933, and March 15, 1934; October, 1934, changes between March 15 and June 30, 1934; February, 1935, changes between June 30 and December 15, 1934; August, 1935, changes between December 15, 1934, and July 5, 1935. The present list indicates the reorganizations effected and new units created between July 5 and August 12, 1935. As in previous lists, mention is made of units only specifically authorized by law or established by the President under general authority vested in him.

Central Statistical Board and Central Statistical Committee. Created by Public Act No. 219, 74th Congress, approved July 25, 1935. The duties of the board are "to plan and promote the improvement, development,

and coördination of, and the elimination of duplication in, statistical services carried on by or subject to the supervision of the Federal Government, and, so far as may be practicable, of other statistical services in the United States." The board consists of a chairman appointed by the President and not to exceed 13 additional members to be "selected in such manner as the President shall prescribe," but not less than 10 members shall be persons already in the service of the United States. The old board of the same name created by Executive Order No. 6225 of July 27, 1933, will be succeeded by the new board when the Central Statistical Committee declares that seven members of the new board have qualified for membership. The Central Statistical Committee consists of the secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor Departments. The committee has broad supervisory power over the board, and may authorize and direct it to make investigations. The board and the committee will cease to exist on July 25, 1940.

Consumers' Division, National Recovery Administration. Created by Executive Order No. 7120 of July 30, 1935. Its functions are "to stimulate interest in the problems of the consumer, to review public policy in so far as it relates to the consumer, and in general to suggest ways and means to promote larger and more economical production of useful goods and facilitate the maintenance and betterment of the American standard of living." Section 2 of the order provides that the Director of the Division shall supervise its activities subject to the approval of the Administrator of the National Recovery Administration, but Section 5 states that the Director shall serve under the direction of the President.

The order transfers to the new division the Consumers' Advisory Board of the National Recovery Administration, the Consumers' Division of the National Emergency Council, and the Cabinet Committee on Price Policy. None of these had been created by executive order; the board and the division had been established by the units to which they were subordinate. The committee was apparently constituted informally in order to study the effects of codes on prices.

Electric Home and Farm Authority. A new corporation, the Electric Home and Farm Authority, was organized under the laws of the District of Columbia on August 1, 1935, and was designated by Executive Order 7139 of August 12, 1935, as an agency of the United States to carry on the business of the Electric Home and Farm Authority Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware. The Delaware corporation was organized under authority of Executive Order No. 6514 of December 19, 1933. It was a subsidiary of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and it advanced funds for the purchase of electric appliances by householders in the Tennessee Valley. The new corporation has the same general purpose, but it appears that its fields of activity will be broadened

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in order to promote the sale of appliances in other areas, and particularly in regions where electric current will be made available through the operations of the Rural Electrification Administration.

Federal Register Division in Archives Establishment and Administrative Committee on Federal Register. Created by Public Act No. 220, 74th Congress, approved July 26, 1935. The Federal Register Division has charge of the publication of the Federal Register, in which is to be printed presidential proclamations, executive orders, and regulations, etc., which are promulgated by any executive agency, and which have general applicability and legal effect. The functions of the Administrative Committee are to prescribe, subject to the approval of the President, regulations for the printing and distribution of the Federal Register. The committee consists of the Archivist or Acting Archivist, an officer of the Department of Justice designated by the Attorney-General, and the Public Printer or Acting Public Printer.

National Labor Relations Board. Old board continued until September 1, 1935, by Executive Order No. 7121 of July 31, 1935. New Board created by Public Act No. 198, 74th Congress, approved July 5, 1935, had not been appointed on July 31.

National Park Trust Fund Board. Created by Public Act No. 201, 74th Congress, approved July 10, 1935. Duties are to administer gifts or bequests of personal property for the benefit of the National Park Service. The board consists of three ex-officio members and two persons serving without compensation appointed by the President.

Northwest Territory Celebration Commission. Created by Public Resolution No. 41, 74th Congress, to prepare a "plan for the observance and celebration of the Ordinance of 1787 and the settlement of the Northwest Territory." The Commission consists of the President, two members of the Senate, two members of the House of Representatives, the regent of the state chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution for each of the six states formed from the Northwest Territory, and three other persons. The Commission will cease to exist within six months after the date of expiration of the celebration.

Office of Adviser on Consumers' Problems. Re-created by Executive Order No. 7120 of July 30, 1935, and Adviser made a member of National Emergency Council. The duties of the Adviser on Consumers' Problems are not defined. Walton H. Hamilton is designated as Adviser and also as Director of the Consumers' Division of the National Recovery Administration described above. The former office of the same name had been created by the National Emergency Council and not by the President.

Railroad Retirement Board. Re-established for the period ending September 30, 1935, by Public Act No. 260, 74th Congress, approved August

12, 1935. The reestablishment is for the purpose of liquidating the affairs of the board and the preparation of a report.

Science Advisory Board. Continued until December 1, 1935, by Executive Order No. 7100 of July 15, 1935.

United States Texas Centennial Commission and Office of United States Commissioner-General for the Texas Centennial Exposition. Created by Public Resolution No. 37, 74th Congress, approved June 28, 1935. The Commission shall prescribe the duties of the Commissioner-General and delegate to him powers and functions to provide for an exhibit by the government of the United States at the Texas Centennial Exposition to be held in 1935 and 1936. The Commission consists of the President, and the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, and Commerce.

L. F. SCHMECKEBIER.

Brookings Institution.

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FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS

The Five Hundredth Anniversary of the Swedish Riksdag. This year, Sweden is celebrating the five hundredth anniversary of the Riksdag, or national parliament. Appropriate ceremonies were observed in January at the opening of the annual session in Stockholm, and near the end of May the entire Riksdag and the royal family journeyed to the little town of Arboga, in central Sweden, where the first meeting of the parliament was held in 1435. There an impressive celebration was held, culminating in the unveiling of a statue to Engelbrekt, the first, and one of the greatest, in a long line of remarkable leaders in the cause of the common people of Sweden. It was Engelbrekt who led the revolt against the union with Denmark-Norway in 1434, and who, on January 13, 1435, convened at Arboga an assembly representative not only of the nobles and the clergy but also of the commons—the citizens of the towns and the farmers of the countryside.

Just as in 1265 England had her first representative parliament, so Sweden formed its Riksdag embracing all classes in the kingdom. This first Riksdag had the character of a revolutionary assembly—an expansion of the old diet of the upper two estates made necessary by the political situation—in which the voice of the people could make itself heard even at important deliberations. Besides being an expression of the idea that all subjects in the land had a right as well as a duty to uphold law and order, it was of revolutionary character in that its members undertook jointly to carry out the decisions reached regarding the government of the country.

It has been said of the English parliament that "no man made it, for it grew." The same holds good of the Swedish Riksdag. It did not spring up ready-made in 1435. Even the term "Riksdag" was not used to describe this and subsequent popular assemblies until over a century later.¹ Though Engelbrekt can hardly be said to have created the Riksdag, he gave the impulse, and established the principles that were to underlie it.² During 1435 and 1436, there were four such meetings, and before the Kalmar Union was broken up, at least nine more, at all of which representatives from the different classes of the population participated.

The democratic representation which thus saw its beginning became an important element in the awakening of nationalism and the re-establishment of independence. The extent to which the Riksdag became an accepted institution in the life of the state is demonstrated by the fact

¹ It was imported from Germany at the middle of the sixteenth century, together with much of the Swedish governmental terminology during the later days of Gustavus Vasa.

² The system of four estates, for example, continued until the introduction of bicameralism in 1865-66.

that when Christian II arrived in Sweden in the spring of 1520 one of his first acts was to summon a Riksdag in Stockholm. At the break from Denmark and the birth of modern Sweden under Gustavus Vasa, the Swedish parliament, although not yet possessing any definite forms of procedure or legal standing, furnished a recognized means of consultation between king and people.³

In 1925—ten years before the five hundredth anniversary was to be commemorated—a plan to make the event particularly significant was advanced. In the Riksdag of that year, the late Värner Rydén, a member of the lower house, introduced a motion that a comprehensive study of the Swedish Riksdag be prepared for publication. Mr. Rydén pointed out the great interest which the long and indigenous development of the Riksdag offered to "the historian and political scientist as well as the politician and statesman." He maintained that although certain phases of that development had been revealed by scholarly inquiries and many learned investigations concerning its contemporary working had been undertaken, much information remained to be unearthed by more extensive research. Besides, the existing literature was so diversified and scattered that a complete and scientific treatment of the subject was desirable. Hence the preparation of a standard account, covering both the Riksdag's history and its present organization, not only was justifiable, but would constitute a worthy memorial of the pending anniversary.

Rydén's proposal was well received, and a committee was appointed to formulate the details of the plan. The 1926 Riksdag approved the undertaking, and an editorial committee was selected to supervise the work, which was to be subsidized by funds from the national treasury. Two years later, contracts had been signed with invited authors and a gigantic program of research was in progress.

As announced by the board of editors, the project was to consist of fourteen volumes averaging four hundred pages each. To this was to be added a bibliography of all printed materials concerning the Riksdag. The first seven volumes were to be historical, tracing the origin of the parliament and its development to the introduction of bicameralism in 1866. The seven volumes of the second part were to deal with the Riksdag since that time. As the work took definite form, the plan was expanded somewhat and, as completed, it includes seventeen volumes and the bibliography. A limited number of illustrations are incorporated.

³ Some scholars have held that the origin of the Riksdag is to be traced to the assemblies of freemen of the Things to choose the kings during the Viking period. These meetings undoubtedly had a large indirect influence, as did the frequent convocations of nobles and bishops (*herredag*—somewhat similar to the English *wite-nagemot*; cf. the German *Herrentag*.); but the latest research supports the explanation here given. See Sven Tunberg, *Sveriges Riksdag*, I (1931), 31 *passim*, 216-217. The present anniversary officially corroborates this.

Altogether, twenty-three authors have collaborated in the writing of the series. Included among them is every mature political scientist of note in Sweden, several of the outstanding historians, and a number of other prominent scholars. The volumes have been published upon completion, the first appearing in 1931, but several not until this year. In its final form, the set represents a magnificent monument to Swedish scholarship and a most fitting memorial to the event it was intended to signalize.

In Volume I, the origin of the Riksdag and its development until the end of the Middle Ages is discussed by Sven Tunberg, professor of history and present *rektor* of the University of Stockholm. Although some literature is available on this period of Swedish history, there has been no previous comprehensive account of the genesis and early growth of the parliament. Based as it is almost wholly upon primary source material, most of which is extremely difficult to handle, Professor Tunberg's contribution is of great value.

Volume II deals with the Riksdag from 1521 to 1592, and was written by the archivist Tor Berg. This is the period of Gustavus Vasa and his sons. Although now the monarchy became hereditary instead of elective, and one of the chief reasons for assembling the Estates passed, the founder of the Vasa dynasty continued to call meetings of the representatives of the people whenever important questions arose. Altogether, there were eight meetings of the Riksdag during his reign. As yet it had no legal basis, but was called by the king when he considered it expedient to convoke it. Toward the end of the century, the Estates were assuming a new position of power. Between 1590 and 1600, they met no less than twelve times. The frequency with which these assemblies were convoked, as well as the importance of the matters considered by them, gave the Riksdag a new importance in Swedish constitutional life. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Estates had become a normal institution in the governmental system.

In Volume III, the prominent historian, Professor Nils Ahnlund, traces the story of the Riksdag to 1672. Under Gustavus Adolphus, the Estates were given a definite status by law. In 1617 appeared the earliest regulations for parliamentary procedure in Sweden, regular forms being established for the activities of the Riksdag. In 1626 appeared the regulations for the House of Nobles, by which it was constituted a separate Estate with its own organization and functions in the Riksdag clearly determined. The entire governmental system was further crystallized in the constitution (*regeringsform*) of 1634. This organic law, drafted by Oxenstierna and approved by Gustavus Adolphus before his death, was the first constitution of Sweden and one of the earliest examples of a written constitution in the modern usage of that term.⁴

The period between the death of Gustavus Adolphus and the introduction of absolutism in 1680 was marked by a continuation and increase in the power of the aristocracy and an effort to introduce a limited monarchy. The checks then imposed were not strong enough to hold the Carolinians, whose actual rule began in 1672. The fate of the Riksdag during this period is outlined by *Rektor* Sven Grauers in Volume IV.

During the later years of Charles XII, the opposition to his autocratic rule made preparations for a possible change in the governmental system, and in 1719 there was a political revolution. It was considered now that the best way to establish security against any form of usurpation of power would be to invest all real power in the Riksdag, the natural champion of the imperilled Swedish society. In the constitution of 1719 and the amendments to the same in 1720, this was done. Henceforth the Estates were to meet every three years and to be empowered to pass laws and to vote taxes on their own authority. The crown was radically circumscribed. The king was to be little more than president of the council of ministers. The Riksdag encroached severely in the entire executive field. A foundation was established for parliamentary government the counterpart of which was to be found only in England.

The rise of the all-powerful Riksdag during the so-called Age of Freedom, 1719-1772, is depicted in Volumes VI-VII by Fredrik Lagerroth, assisted by J. E. Nilsson and Ragnar Olsson. Lagerroth is professor of political science at Lund University and the outstanding authority on this period of Swedish history.⁵

Appraisals of the governmental system during this epoch have varied greatly. Some have seen therein an aristocratic republic of the Polish type, others a bureaucracy, and still others a democracy. The constitution and government had marked resemblances to all three. To the writer, the republican, democratic, and parliamentary tendencies were of a decidedly modern type. Certainly the principles of parliamentarism were clearly evident. The king was placed in a position where he "could do no wrong." For the first time in Sweden, there was a sharp distinction between king and crown in the present-day sense. The council became a ministry, a party government dependent upon the confidence of parliament. Parliament itself was omnipotent, bound by nothing but the con-

⁴ Charles Borgeaud, the Swiss authority on constitutions, admits that "it is earlier than the English and American documents, but it cannot be ascribed the same importance." This point, as well as the relationship of the crown, council, and Riksdag in general, is discussed in detail in the writer's doctoral dissertation, *The Development of Parliamentary Government in Sweden* (University of California, 1932).

⁵ See his *Frihetstidens författning* (1915). A good discussion of political development during this period is found in Svanström and Palmstierna, *A Short History of Sweden* (Oxford University Press, 1934), 189-253.

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stitution, which it was free to interpret and alter. To be sure, the methods of exacting ministerial responsibility were cumbersome, and there were other peculiarities which might seem strange to the student of parliamentarism today. But undoubtedly there remains justification for maintaining that during the Age of Freedom Sweden advanced politically to a stage surpassed by no other nation.

Contemporary European philosophers and jurists gave ample testimony to this. According to Lagerroth,⁶ Rousseau, in an answer to a request from a Swede to see his draft of a constitution for Corsica, refused on the ground that the Swedes in their own constitution had an example of such great perfection that they would be unable to find anything new in his plan, which was founded upon identical principles. Voltaire stated that "*cette Suède . . . est devenue de nos jours le royaume de la terre le plus libre, et celui où les rois sont le plus dépendants.*"⁷ Bonnot de Mably had the same opinion and spoke of the Swedish constitution of the Age of Freedom as "the masterpiece of modern legislation."⁸ He called the people of Sweden "*le plus libre de l'Europe,*"⁹ and praised them for having been "*assez courageux pour rompre sa chaîne et se rendre libre.*"¹⁰ As here indicated, he preferred the government of Sweden to that of England: "*Le gouvernement de Suède me paroît préférable . . . nous avons parfaitement distingué et séparé la puissance législative de la puissance exécutrice . . . L'ambition de nos magistrats ne nous cause aucune inquiétude; ils nous gouvernent mais de la manière nous voulons être gouvernés; et s'ils trahissent nos espérances, nous le punissons. Bien n'arrête et ne suspend l'action de notre diète, et l'activité de votre parlement [England's] est suspendue par le pouvoir du roi.*"¹¹

Admiration for the Swedish constitution was not merely platonic. Under Peter the Great, the Russians, who, since the days of Rurik and the later Novgorod the Great, had seen in the Swedes the great organizers, took the Swedish administrative code as the pattern for their administration, and during the Age of Freedom the opposition element in the tsarist empire adopted the Swedish constitution of 1720 as the embodi-

⁶ Citing *Våra grundlagars försvar i brev till Rousseau* (1771).

⁷ *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1754), *Œuvres de Voltaire* (Beuchot edition), XVIII, 397.

⁸ *De l'étude de l'histoire*, Volume XII of *Collection complète des Œuvres de l'Abbé de Mably*, Pt. 2, Chap. 6. This chapter (241-273) deals with "*Du gouvernement de Suède.*"

⁹ *De la Législation, ou Principes des Lois* (1776), IX of *Collection complète des Œuvres*, 283. Mably's understanding of the Swedish constitution of the time is considerably deeper than that of his biographer, E. A. Whitfield. See his *Gabriel Bonnot de Mably* (London, 1930), with introduction by Laski.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 237-238.

ment of their ideals.¹² The Girondists of France and the nationalists of Norway also lent their ears to propaganda in favor of a system similar to that of the Swedes.¹³

Altogether, the Age of Freedom must be considered as the beginning of the really modern Sweden. Events have shown that this is the ground upon which the Swedes must build even today. The era here considered antedated, and in many respects represented, the ideals subsequently expressed in the French Revolution. The triumph which the ideas of nationalism and constitutionalism enjoyed with the breakdown of the *ancien régime* constitutes the most eloquent justification for the Age of Freedom in Sweden. If the Swedes, as has been deplored, refused to be pulled along in that maelström of new thought, it was only because they had already tasted most of what it had to offer and had used up their enthusiasm in the struggles which had preceded it.

Toward the end of the period, party strife was so prevalent and dissension among the Estates so pronounced that the whole activity of the Riksdag was threatened with paralysis. The lawlessness of party rule stood revealed in all its nakedness, and both the domestic and foreign situation was precarious. Under these circumstances, Gustavus III came to the throne and a new constitution went into effect. The position of the Riksdag during the Gustavian era, 1772-1809, is covered in Volume VII, by *Docent* Georg Landberg, an historian who has specialized in this period.

The constitution of August 21, 1772, was the first Swedish organic law to be built up definitely on a basis of separation of powers. The two extremes of Carolinian absolutism and the succeeding absolutism of the Riksdag were both abandoned and a distribution of power among the different organs of government established. The new arrangement was based upon the fundamental laws preceding 1680, and was the outcome of the political experience of the Swedish people itself, although in good accord with the doctrines of Montesquieu.

A poet at the court was asked by the king as to his opinion of the new constitution, and he answered that Gustavus had succeeded in bringing liberty to the point where the devil himself could not be suppressed nor God become too absolute.¹⁴ The balance of power between crown and parliament was not nearly so perfect. Carlyle's statement regarding Gustavus that "we are something of a king again"¹⁵ needs emphasis upon the "something," as the position of the monarch was far stronger than that

¹² H. Hjärne, *Hist. Tidskr.* (1884) 189-272; *Ur det förflutna*, 144.

¹³ F. Lagerroth, *Frihetstidens författning*, 735, citing Wallenberg, *Min son på galejan*, 91 ff.

¹⁴ P. O. Gränström, *Adresser och adressdebatter i den svenska parlamentarism*, 21.

¹⁵ *Collected Works* (1871), XXX, 83-84.

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of the Riksdag. The field of competence marked out for the two organs of government lacked clarity, and all benefit of doubt was on the side of the king. Even so, the principle of separation of powers was established in 1772, and for a century it was to dominate Swedish constitutional development. The balance was to shift from one side to the other repeatedly, but the division of competence remained the basic factor, and this principle was upheld by a majority, which considered a strong crown and a representative parliament as the necessary bases of sound government.

During the Napoleonic wars, the foreign policy of Sweden led to disastrous results. In the face of a Russian invasion, the son of Gustavus III was deposed and a regency established. This government called the Estates together on May 1, 1809. The Riksdag of 1809-10 may be considered a national assembly or constitutional convention, inasmuch as it emerged from the revolution with constituent powers. Although it was a meeting of the Estates as usual, it had no hesitancy as to its competence as a constitution-making body, and proceeded to draft a constitution which, with amendments, remains the organic law of Sweden today—the oldest written constitution still in force except that of the United States.

In the constitution of 1809, the Riksdag became once more a definite factor in political life through a provision that it should meet regularly. Its power of initiative was increased, and it was established that taxation should be regulated by the Riksdag. The crown was to remain powerful, but the ruler was limited by the stipulation that he must always consult with the council; and this body of ministers was made answerable not only for the advice it actually gave, but also for its silence in cases where it ought to have spoken. The question of the reorganization of four-estate representation, which no longer really corresponded to the actual development of society, had, however, to be laid aside, this somewhat antiquated form of parliament remaining until 1866. The Riksdag during this last phase of the Estates, 1809-1866, is investigated in the final historical volume by Erik Fahlbeck, *docent* in political science at the University of Stockholm.

The volumes of the second part deal with the Swedish parliament in its modern form, as it functions today. In Volume IX, Georg Andrén, professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg, discusses the composition of the Riksdag, the electoral laws, and elections. Volume X is written by C. A. Reuterskiöld, professor of constitutional law at Uppsala and long a distinguished member of Parliament. He explains Riksdag procedure, its opening, adjournment, and dissolution. Part of the book was prepared by the bureau chief, E. J. Thulin. In Volume XI, Herbert Tingsten, *docent* in political science at Uppsala, describes the committee system. Tingsten has studied parliamentary procedure in sev-

eral countries, including the United States, and has at various times served as secretary to Riksdag committees. The financial powers of Parliament are treated by Professor Nils Herlitz in Volume XII. Herlitz is professor of political science and public administration at Stockholm University. Professor Arthur Montgomery and the statistician of the Bank of Sweden, K. G. Simonsson, outline the relationship between parliament and that bank in Volume XIII, in which there is also a part dealing with the National Debt Office, written by Dr. Karl Hildebrand.

Volume XIV depicts the Riksdag and legislation. It is written by Robert Malmgren, professor of constitutional law at Lund and one of the editors of the Swedish *Political Science Review*.¹⁶ The Riksdag's control over foreign policy, ministerial responsibility, and interpellation are covered in Volume XV by Professor Axel Brusewitz. Brusewitz is Sweden's outstanding political scientist today. He occupies the chair in political science founded by Axel Oxenstierna at Uppsala three hundred years ago, the most coveted professorship in this field in Sweden. In Volume XVI, Justice Nils Alexanderson discusses the solicitor-general, the committee on the freedom of the press, and other Riksdag organs of control. Volume XVII outlines the political parties of the Riksdag. It is written by *Docent* Edvard Therman of Lund. During the past few years, this political scientist, who has studied in both England and Germany, has performed a real service through his studies of political parties in Sweden. Prior to his works in this field, very little had been published on the subject.

Space does not permit giving a picture of the Riksdag as it operates today. During the nineteenth century, the dualism or balance of power between crown and parliament established in the constitution of 1809 was gradually broken down. With the introduction of parliamentarism thirty years ago, this process was completed. The Riksdag increased in authority and the crown became weaker and weaker, until now the former appears as the overwhelmingly dominant part of the governmental system. In some quarters, this is deplored. Doubts are expressed even as to whether or not real parliamentarism exists in Sweden.

Of its existence, there is no question. In essence, parliamentary government means simply that the ministry must, in some way or other, come out of the legislative body and be responsible to it. It does not have to be majority government or cabinet government. The ministry does not have to control the parliament with a whip in its hand; the constitutional chief of state does not have to be a complete figure-head; nor is ministerial solidarity an absolute prerequisite. The government must stand for a certain political point of view which has the approval, or at least does not meet with the disapproval, of the parliament. It must in its composi-

¹⁶ *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, a scholarly periodical issued five times a year.

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tion show a certain degree of political homogeneity. That is about all that can be demanded. These conditions are present in Sweden, and parliamentarism prevails, although not by any means according to the classic pattern of Victorian England.

To expect any immediate change in this situation is futile. As well demonstrated by several authors of the work here being considered, the authority of the Riksdag is firmly entrenched. Furthermore, the Swedish temperament is also too conservative, the administration too permanent and proud of many decades of achievement, and the whole system too firmly supported by high traditions of hoary age, to permit the adoption of hasty panaceas for institutions which work, even though not in the same way that theory and practice elsewhere may designate.

This being the case, even the volumes of *Sveriges Riksdag* which describe the status today may be considered as definitive. This is certainly true of most of the material embraced in the earlier volumes. Altogether, there is presented in this memorial to the five hundredth anniversary of the Swedish parliament the most exhaustive study of a legislative body yet completed.¹⁷ It is unfortunate that its contents cannot be made available to students of government outside of the small number familiar with the Swedish language. Even a one- or two-volume condensation of the entire work in English or German would be greeted with interest, since publications dealing with the governmental institutions of this country, whose political life is of very ancient vintage and springs from almost wholly native roots, are exceedingly scarce.¹⁸ No little attention is now being accorded the social legislation and financial administration of Sweden, and there are good reasons why such should be the case. The political development and governmental system present an equally fruitful field for research and observation.

ERIC CYRIL BELLQUIST.

Los Angeles Junior College.

¹⁷ The only comparable work familiar to the writer is the projected English *History of Parliament*, the plans for which are now well under way. This monumental series is to comprise some 34-40 volumes. See the *Interim Report of the Committee on House of Commons Personnel and Politics* (London, 1932), and *The Sunday Times*, July 29, 1934.

¹⁸ The writer is now preparing an extended study on *Constitutionalism and Parliamentarism in Sweden*, which, it is hoped, will bring a better picture of Swedish government and politics to the attention of students of comparative government.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Is the International Labor Organization Autonomous? When the United States last year became a member of the International Labor Organization, many people deplored the decision as being the first covert step toward full membership in the League of Nations. Those whose outlook was more sympathetic to international coöperation replied, in defense, that the Labor Organization is independent of the League, having its own buildings, its own separate organs, its own secretariat, and so on; that its membership is not identical with that of the League; and that therefore a state, by becoming a member of the Labor Organization assumed no connection whatever with the League.

As a matter of fact, however, there is one very important connection between the League and the Labor Organization, the potential effects of which have not generally been recognized. This is the financial connection. Article 399, Part XIII, of the Treaty of Versailles (dealing with the Labor Organization) reads as follows: "Each of the members will pay the travelling and subsistence expenses of its delegates and their advisers and of its representatives attending the meetings of the Conference or of the Governing Body, as the case may be. All the other expenses of the International Labor Office and of the meetings of the Conference or Governing Body shall be paid to the Director by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations out of the general funds of the League. The Director shall be responsible to the Secretary-General for the proper expenditure of all moneys paid to him in pursuance of this Article."

Read in connection with the original fifth paragraph of Article 6 of the Covenant, this article apparently establishes no connection whatever between the International Labor Organization and any organ of the League. Article 6, Paragraph 5, of the Covenant as originally adopted provides: "The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union." As amended in 1924, this paragraph provides that the expenses of the League shall be borne by the members in the proportion decided by the Assembly. In any case, judging solely on the basis of constitutional requirements, either before or since 1924, one could quite reasonably conclude that the independence of the International Labor Organization was to remain complete. Apparently the procedure would be somewhat along these lines: the Director of the Labor Office would draw up the budget for his organization and present it to the Secretary-General, who would pay to the Director the amount specified out of the funds acquired by the League in accordance with the method set up in Article 6 of the Covenant. Such a procedure would have met all the constitutional requirements. But, in

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point of fact, it was never the procedure employed. The First Assembly saw to that when, without any explicit authorization from the Covenant, it assumed complete and final control of the disposition of all League funds, however acquired.¹

This financial control of the Assembly meant, in connection with the Labor Organization, that no League funds could be paid over to the Organization without Assembly approval. To put it another way, the budget of the Labor Organization would have to run the gauntlet of examination and possible criticism by the Assembly. This gave rise to the further question: Should the examination of the budget of the International Labor Organization in the Fourth Committee and in the plenary Assembly be merely a formal, summary proceeding, the budget being hurried through and approved precisely as presented by the Director to the Secretary-General, or did the Assembly have real power, and full right, to examine the budget of the International Labor Organization in detail, and to strike out or reduce items which it regarded as undesirable or as too high?

M. Albert Thomas, the first Director of the Labor Office, made a valiant attempt to have this question answered to his satisfaction. His effort took the form of presenting merely a lump-sum budget of seven million gold francs, with no detailed subdivisions, for approval by the First Assembly. But the plan proved a complete failure. A storm of criticism, some of it not very polite, met him in the Fourth Committee, where he appeared to defend his budget, and a multitude of questions were hurled at him by suspicious delegates. The result was that the Director promised to draw up his budget in future in the form "most satisfactory" to the Assembly and the Fourth Committee. In doing so, he warned the delegates that "the doctrine of control by the Assembly should not be pushed too far, since it might lead to great inconvenience."² This warning also fell upon deaf ears. In the report of the Fourth Committee, which was adopted by the Assembly without question, there appeared this clause: "According to Article 399 of the Treaty of Versailles, and similar stipulations in the other treaties of peace, the expenses of the Labor Organization which are not borne by the states members of the League (*sic*) are to be paid from the general funds of the League. It follows that the Assembly, which passes the budget of the League, is thereby called upon to decide the total amount to be allocated to the Labor Organization."³ Further, among the thirteen provisional rules for financial regulation adopted by the Assembly on recommendation of its

¹ For an account of how the Assembly accomplished this, see *Records, First Assembly, Meetings of Fourth Committee*.

² *Records, First Assembly, Minutes of Fourth Committee*, pp. 23-30.

³ *Records, First Assembly, Plenary Meetings*, p. 700.

Fourth Committee, Rule 4 reads as follows: "The budget of the International Labor Organization should be drawn up in gold francs, and should be submitted to the Secretary-General in time to enable it to be incorporated in the general draft budget of the League. Also, it should be accompanied by detailed explanations."⁴ Quite evidently, the Assembly had won its point.

The potential significance of this determined action on the part of the First Assembly, in relation to the autonomy of the International Labor Organization, is obvious. Unquestionably, the Assembly has the power to reduce or strike out items in the budget as presented by the Director of the Labor Office; and by means of this power, it could to a very great extent control the character of the activities of the entire Labor Organization. To take a case which might conceivably arise: if the Labor Office wished to set up a new commission to investigate a specific problem in connection with labor, and the Assembly disapproved, it could prevent the prosecution of the work by simply refusing to vote the necessary credits for establishing the commission. In the same way, it could control and influence the work of the Labor Organization in all other directions. Truly, control of the purse-strings may mean control of practically everything else; and that the Assembly controls almost *in toto* the purse-strings of the Labor Organization is not open to question. What then becomes of the autonomy of the Labor Organization?

Of course, it may be objected that, even admitting the final financial control of the Assembly, the delegates who compose that organ of the League are, speaking generally, representatives of the same states as are members of the International Labor Organization; and those states can hardly be so inconsistent as to follow one policy in the Assembly and another in the Labor Organization. The conclusion would seem to be that any expenditures contained in the budget of the latter will be approved without question by the Assembly. But, admitting the truth of the objection, the conclusion does not follow. There is a qualifying circumstance. The budget drawn up for the International Labor Organization is not presented at all to the General Conference of that organization. It is drawn up by the Director, and examined and approved only by the Governing Body, before being given to the Secretary-General for incorporation in the general League Budget. Hence, for a great number of the member states, the only opportunity for examining the budget of the Labor Organization is in the Fourth Committee of the Assembly. For this reason, it is well within the bounds of possibility that the members of the Fourth Committee will not always see eye to eye with the Director and the Governing Body as to the financial needs of the International Labor Organization.⁵

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Minutes of Fourth Committee*, pp. 48-63.

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In actual experience, things went smoothly from 1920 until 1928. The Director of the Labor Office carried out the requirements laid down by the Assembly in the matter of giving very detailed explanations with his budget, and the Fourth Committee, although it subjected the estimates to very close inspection, passed them as they were, or with only minor changes to which M. Thomas agreed. But in 1928 a serious controversy arose. The Director proposed in his estimates a considerable increase in the item of salaries, to provide for several new posts which he considered necessary for carrying out certain of the functions of his organization. Several members of the Fourth Committee of the Assembly, however, suspected, and voiced their suspicions, that these new posts were being created merely to conciliate certain states which were dissatisfied with their representation in the Labor Office. To say that the discussion was heated would be putting it mildly. At any rate, three votes were finally taken: first, for the total suppression of the credit for new posts; second, for reduction of this credit by 150,000 francs; third, for its reduction by 38,500 francs. None of these votes carried, however; so that when the item "salaries" as a whole was put to a vote, it was adopted without amendment.⁶ But the debate, and the fact that the motions for suppression or reduction of the credit won at least a fair minority of votes, indicates the tendency in the Fourth Committee to make its control over the Labor Organization real rather than formal. Moreover, since the advent of the depression, this same Assembly committee has increased its vigilance, and has in fact, in the interest of "economy," cut down the Labor Office budget several times.

At all events, the Assembly, through its power of financial control, is in a position, potentially at least, of complete supremacy over the Labor Organization. The fact that there has been relatively little controversy between the Assembly and the Labor Office does not mean that the Assembly has neglected to use its power. Rather does it indicate that the Labor Organization has been so efficiently administered that the Assembly has been unable to find any serious fault. Undoubtedly, the potential power of the Assembly has itself been at least partially responsible for this efficiency. The foreknowledge of the Labor Office that its budgetary estimates will be submitted to an extremely close scrutiny in the Assembly's Fourth Committee in and of itself has the effect of making the Labor Office more careful and more efficient lest it be subjected to undesirable criticism. Of course, the extent of Assembly influence in this direction is not subject to accurate measurement. Nor is it to be inferred that this Assembly influence is in any way harmful. Quite to the contrary,

⁶ What, also, of those states members of the I.L.O., who are not members of the League, and also have no representation on the Governing Body?

⁶ *Official Journal, Special Supplement 67*, pp. 17-25, 76-82.

the evidence indicates that it has had an entirely wholesome effect, making for greater efficiency in the character of the Labor Organization's work. But the point is that the existence of Assembly control is beyond question, and hence that to insist, for whatever motive, on the complete autonomy of the Labor Organization is simply to ignore the facts. In the long run, such insistence can have none but undesirable effects.

PAUL G. STEINBICKER.

St. Louis University.

Appointment of American Delegates to the International Labor Organization. In 1934, Congress passed a joint resolution providing for American membership in the International Labor Organization which stated: "The President is hereby authorized to accept membership for the government of the United States in the International Labor Organization, which through its general conference of representatives of its members and through its International Labor Office, collects information concerning labor throughout the world and prepares conventions for the consideration of member governments with a view to improving conditions of labor."¹

This joint resolution contained no provision for the method of appointment of the delegates who were to represent the United States. The State Department interpreted this to mean that the Congress intended to give the President a free hand in making the appointments, and that there was to be no confirmation by the Senate. The President appointed the American delegation according to this interpretation. The United States is entitled to one member of the International Labor Office. This appointment was made by the President without referring the name of the representative to the Senate for its advice and consent. The two official delegates to the General Conference were likewise appointed by this method.²

The constitution of the International Labor Organization provides that the representatives of the employers and of the workers are to be appointed by their national government "in agreement with the industrial organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most representative of employers and working people."³ In the selection of these delegates, the President adopted the following method: "After conversations between Mr. Butler, the Director of the International Labor Office, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, Miss Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labor, and other persons, it was tentatively agreed that the industrial organization most representative of employers in the United

¹ *Statutes at Large*, Chap. 676, June 14, 1934.

² Letter from the Office of the Secretary of State to the writer.

³ Art. 3.

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States was the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the industrial organization most representative of the work-people in the United States was the American Federation of Labor. It is understood that these tentative decisions will be ratified, at least *sub silentio*, by the General Conference. In view of the decision reached by the representatives of the International Labor Organization and the United States, the employer delegate who will be selected for the Nineteenth Conference will be nominated in agreement with the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the worker delegate will be nominated in agreement with the American Federation of Labor."⁴

The method adopted in the selection of these delegates was an informal one of wide consultation to choose the persons best qualified to send as representatives. The United States Chamber of Commerce did not make a specific recommendation. Instead, there were consultations between representatives of the Labor Department, the State Department, the Chamber of Commerce, and other interested groups. A nomination was mutually agreed upon and the name was submitted to the President.⁵ The American Federation of Labor did make a specific nomination to the Department of Labor. The president of this organization, with the approval of the executive council of the Federation, recommended a person as the delegate to represent the workers.⁶ After the names of the delegates were agreed upon by the nominating agencies, they were submitted to and approved by the President.

The United States is represented in the Nineteenth Session of the General Conference of the International Labor Organization by 18 persons. Only four have the privilege of voting; the others are technical and expert advisers. The expenses of the delegation, in the amount of \$27,300, have been provided for in the Second Deficiency Bill, now before Congress.⁷ The American share of the expenses of the International Labor Organization has already been appropriated by Congress. Public Act No. 22, 74th Congress, provided for the payment by the United States of \$174,630 as its quota for the calendar year, January to December, 1935.

JAMES A. GATHINGS.

Bucknell University.

⁴ Letter from Office of Solicitor, Department of Labor, to the writer.

⁵ Letter from Secretary of U. S. Chamber of Commerce to the writer.

⁶ Letter from president of the A. F. of L. to the writer.

⁷ August, 1935.

NEWS AND NOTES

PERSONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Compiled by the Managing Editor

Members of the American Political Science Association who plan to attend the Atlanta meeting in December and who also wish to go to Knoxville to view the work of the Tennessee Valley Authority are requested to inform Professor Cullen B. Gosnell, of Emory University, Georgia, well in advance. Special arrangements for the trip are to be made in accordance with the number of persons to be accommodated. It is planned to go to Knoxville for Sunday, December 29, and then to Chattanooga for the Monday following for joint meetings with the American Historical Association. Professor James Hart, chairman of the committee on program, reports additions and changes as follows (see August issue of this REVIEW, pp. 664-665): (1) additional round tables—"Government and Social Security," Thomas H. Eliot, Committee on Social Security, Washington, D. C.; "The Future of the Party System," Russell M. Story, Pomona College; "The Future of American Federalism," Claudius O. Johnson, Washington State College; (2) substitutions of round table titles—for "Is a Constitutional Convention Needed?", "Methods of Constitutional Reform" (W. Y. Elliott, leader); for "The Depression and State and Local Government," "The Depression and State and Local Finance" (J. Alton Burdine, leader); (3) Lawrence Preuss, University of Michigan, will be leader of the round table on "America and the Next War," instead of Frederick S. Dunn; (4) at a general session on the evening of December 28, Dr. Charles A. Beard will speak on "Domestic Planning and Economic Foreign Policy." Professor Clarence A. Berdahl, of the University of Illinois, has been appointed chairman of the committee to nominate officers of the Association for 1936.

Professor James W. Garner, of the University of Illinois, went to Europe in early July and will visit France, Germany, and other Continental countries before returning at the middle of the academic year.

Professor Lloyd M. Short, of the University of Missouri, has accepted a professorship at the University of Minnesota and will offer courses in public administration, legislation, and American government. Professor William Anderson has resumed the chairmanship of the department of political science at Minnesota.

Dr. John Dickinson, formerly assistant secretary of commerce, has become assistant to the attorney-general and is in charge of the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice.

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Dr. Charles West, formerly professor of political science at Denison University, and more recently liaison officer between the White House and Congress, was during the summer appointed to the newly created post of under-secretary of the Interior Department.

Mr. Lawrence W. Cramer, formerly instructor in government at Columbia University, and more recently lieutenant-governor of the Virgin Islands, has succeeded Mr. Paul N. Pearson as governor.

Dr. Herbert von Beckerath, professor of political science at the University of Bonn, will lecture at the University of North Carolina and at Duke University during the present academic year.

Professor H. Arthur Steiner, of the University of California at Los Angeles, is engaged in research in the French Foreign Office and the National Library of Archives, and will later carry on his work at Geneva, The Hague, Rome, and London.

During the period August 16-30, Professor Clarence A. Berdahl, of the University of Illinois, delivered four lectures on current problems of American foreign policy in connection with an Alumnae Institute held at Hollins College, Roanoke, Va.

Dr. Carroll H. Woody, formerly assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago and during the past four years engaged in adult education work in Des Moines, Iowa, died in Chicago on August 16. Earlier in the summer, he had accepted an associate professorship at Williams College.

Dr. Emery E. Olson, formerly dean of the school of government at the University of Southern California, has been appointed professor of public administration at the American University, Washington, D. C., and director of the "in-service" training division of the School of Public Affairs established by the University early this year with the aid of a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Dr. Thomas H. Healy, for many years assistant dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, has been appointed to the deanship. He will continue as professor of the foreign relations of the United States.

At the University of California at Los Angeles, Dr. Charles H. Titus has been promoted from assistant professor to associate professor of political science. Professor Frank M. Stewart has been appointed chairman of the department.

Professor J. A. C. Grant, of the University of California at Los Angeles, will teach at Stanford University during the winter and spring quarters.

Professor O. Garfield Jones, of the University of Toledo, is an elected member of the Lucas county charter commission which during the summer completed and unanimously adopted a county manager charter. The actual drafting of this charter—which will be voted on by the people in November—was in the hands of Mr. Donovan F. Emch, research secretary for the commission and instructor in municipal administration in the University. Professor Jones had a leading rôle in the adoption of Toledo's city manager, proportional representation amendment a year ago.

Dr. Lent D. Upson has been appointed professor of political science and director of a newly established school of public affairs at Wayne University, Detroit. He will continue as director of the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research.

The University of Texas announces the establishment of a new program of training leading to the degree of master of arts in public administration. The new degree will rest largely upon work offered by the government, economics, and sociology departments.

A school for peace officers of six counties surrounding Geneva, New York, is being conducted by Hobart College during a two-month period starting October 1. A broad program of courses will center on the training of police, but will also include subjects important for justices of the peace, judges, district attorneys, sheriffs, and others.

An Institute of Human Relations, devoted to the consideration of methods of promoting better relationships among the various social, racial, and religious groups in the United States and Canada, was held at Williams College during a period of six days beginning August 25.

The latest addition to the lengthening list of organizations maintaining headquarters at 850 East 58th Street, Chicago, is the National Association of Attorneys-General, which, it was announced in July, will maintain a secretariat of its own in conjunction with the Council of State Governments.

The next annual meeting of the National Municipal League is announced for November 25-26 at Providence, Rhode Island. In conjunction with the National Civil Service Reform League, the Municipal League has set up a committee to draft a model state personnel law, with Charles P. Taft, of Cincinnati, as chairman, and Professors A. W. Macmahon of Columbia, M. B. Lambie of Harvard, and Wallace Sayre of New York University among the dozen members.

The regents of the University of Hawaii announce the establishment of an Oriental Institute, under the direction of Professor Gregg M. Sinclair,

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which aims, by means of exchange professorships, research fellowships, publication of books and papers, and in other ways, to make better known the cultures and civilizations of Japan, China, India, and other Asiatic countries.

The American Planning and Civic Association and the American Society of Planning Officials are coöperating with the Committee on Civic Education by Radio and the National Municipal League in sponsoring the twelfth series of "You and Your Government" talks over a NBC-WEAF nation-wide network. The talks are given on Tuesdays at 7:45-8:00 Eastern standard time, and the speakers continue to be introduced by Dr. Thomas H. Reed, chairman of the Committee on Civic Education by Radio. The program from October 15 is as follows:

- Oct. 15: "The Best Use of the Land"
M. L. Wilson, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture
- Oct. 22: "The Economic Value of American Scenery"
Horace M. Albright, former Director, National Park Service;
Vice-President, American Planning and Civic Association
- Oct. 29: "Head Waters and Other Little Waters"
Morris Llewellyn Cooke, Administrator, Rural Electrification
Administration
- Nov. 5: "A National System of Transportation"
Thomas H. MacDonald, Chief, United States Bureau of
Public Roads
- Nov. 12: "Who Owns Our Roads?"
Harlean James, Executive Secretary, American Planning
and Civic Association
- Nov. 19: "Regional Planning"—The T.V.A. An Example
Arthur E. Morgan, Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority
- Nov. 26: "Is Local Government Doomed?"
Harold W. Dodds, President, Princeton University; President,
National Municipal League
- Dec. 3: "Planning as a Municipal Function"
George McAneny, President, Regional Plan Association
- Dec. 10: "Planning as a State Function"
Alfred Bettman, President, American Society of Planning
Officials
- Dec. 17: "Re-locating the Isolated Settler"
Walter A. Rowlands, Specialist in Land Economics, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin
- Dec. 24: "Making Plans Come True"
Chester H. Rowell, Editor, *San Francisco Chronicle*
- Dec. 31: "The Law of the Roadside"
Flavel Shurtleff, Counsel, American Planning and Civic
Association
- Jan. 7: "Better Housing Through Better Zoning"
Robert D. Kohn, former Director of Housing, P.W.A.; former
President, American Institute of Architects

Jan. 14: "Public Recreation"

Robert Moses, Commissioner of Parks, New York City; President, Long Island State Park Commission; Chairman, New York State Council of Parks

Jan. 21: "Possibilities in Tax Title Lands"

Frank Moore, Counsel, Association of Towns of the State of New York

Jan. 28: "From Acres to Lots"

Gordon Whitnall, Member California State Planning Board

The Social Science Research Council's Committee on Public Administration. Political scientists will be interested in developments in the program of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council announced recently by Robert T. Crane, executive director of the Council. The present chairman of the Committee is Louis D. Brownlow, director of the Public Administration Clearing House. A committee staff has been appointed, consisting of Charles S. Ascher as secretary and Joseph P. Harris as research director. Mr. Ascher is a graduate of the Law School of Columbia University, formerly counsel of the City Housing Corporation, and more recently the assistant director of the Public Administration Clearing House. Among his activities in the last-mentioned post was the organization of several of the new professional associations of public servants, including the National Association of Housing Officials and the National Association of Planning Officials. Mr. Harris received his doctorate at the University of Chicago, subsequently taught at the University of Wisconsin and the University of Washington, and during the past year served as assistant director of the cabinet committee on economic security which formulated the social insurance program of the Roosevelt Administration.

The appointment of a continuing staff for the Committee has much significance. The members will assist the Committee in the preparation and execution of a program of research in public administration as developed by the Committee in coöperation with scholars and administrators interested in problems of public administration, and more immediately implement the decision of the Committee to "capture, record, and lay the basis for the appraisal of measures instituted in the United States for grappling with the consequences of the world-wide social and technological changes that have been coming to a climax in the post-war period." The object, continues the announcement of the Committee, "is, if possible, to get fixed points of guidance—to add to the store of principles of administration so that, as government faces new problems and expands still further its activities, its regulatory functions, and its economic enterprises, those who must make the administrative decisions may profit by recent and current experience. The report of this experience must be obtained in large measure from those who are or have been actors in the drama when the events are still fresh in their minds; and . . . the

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study should not be one merely of minutes and executive orders, but of the forces which led to the event, the various possibilities which were canvassed, and the reasons for the decision made."

Students of public administration will be grateful for this positive effort to preserve a more intimate and pungent account of recent and current developments in public administration—a project already undertaken by the Committee through Dr. Arthur W. Macmahon of Columbia University. The new federal programs and agencies are so varied and extensive that the individual worker in this field has been overwhelmed in obtaining even the most superficial information and the more obvious published materials. The kind of record which the Committee is concerned to preserve will be literally invaluable to those who may attempt a more considered appraisal of events and a more mature inquiry into interpretations and deductions.

The larger policy of the Committee which is indicated by the establishment of a staff, and more particularly by the appointment of a secretary and research director with so intimate yet comprehensive knowledge of the field of public administration in this country, is equally important for students of public administration, who may properly feel, indeed, that the committee will be increasingly of direct service to them. Many have felt for some time that fresh and original research in public administration would not be discouraged, but would indeed be supplemented and aided, if several workers in different institutions and regions could relate their individual projects to a common program. Frequently an individual student would greatly welcome an opportunity to make his own contribution count more effectively through sharing with others in a common attack upon a problem too large for a single person to encompass. Many important problems in public administration, too, require extensive cooperation and material support for adequate analysis and study. The studies that have been under way for some years in the field of forest taxation illustrate the advantage of drawing upon the research resources of several institutions in different parts of the country, while many problems of state and local government require comparative treatment after careful preliminary planning with field study in many places.

All such enterprises offer many difficult problems of organization and procedure, but the Committee is aware of the difficulties and faces them with frankness. Thus it may frame some major studies, and if no appropriate agencies are available to undertake them, it may feel that they are so important that it will seek support to have them undertaken under its own sponsorship. But its major opportunity for service will be rather to discover the studies being undertaken in various institutions and by various individuals or those which are contemplated, and to "bring the individuals engaged upon these studies into acquaintance," with the hope of enhancing, without additional effort, their value. The Committee sug-

gests that such a program "offers opportunities for comparative and complementary studies of great value that otherwise might never be possible. The proposal does not require or invite central domination or direction, but rather it gives to scattered, and sometimes isolated, scholars assurance that research which they may undertake in some local aspects of the new administrative problems, planned in coöperation with similar studies elsewhere, will illumine problems of wider scope." This point is particularly relevant to the fostering of coöperation between scholars in political science departments of the universities and research workers in the governmental research bureaus, the agricultural experiment stations, schools of social work, government departments, professional societies, and other institutions concerned in some part with administrative problems.

It should be added that the Committee is interested not only in studies of the federal government, but equally in state and local government and the shifting relations among all three. An aspect of particular interest and growing importance is that of regional consciousness of common governmental problems reflected in regional administrative organization. Here the services of the Committee and its staff may have a special value in encouraging several individuals or institutions in a given region to undertake joint studies.

There has been some discussion among social scientists concerning the value and place of "coöperative" research, undertaken by large staffs or by scattered individuals working at some single project. The experience of the Committee should give us useful data as to the way in which individual efforts may be made more effective and more widely useful. Certainly in the conduct of graduate studies in the universities it should be possible to make the doctoral thesis, for example, more genuinely rewarding to the student and of real value to other students of the subject if individual projects were planned in relationship to other projects. There is an increasing awareness by many professional groups—for example, among engineers, foresters, and agricultural economists—of the importance of the public administrative aspects of their professional problems. Indeed it is probable that political scientists generally are not as aware as they should be of the contributions being made by many of them to the body of knowledge important to them. Certainly an opportunity is now being presented through the Committee for making use of the Committee and its staff for encouraging and assisting the individual engaged upon research in public administration.

The office of the secretary and the research director is at 850 East 58th St., Chicago, Illinois.

JOHN M. GAUS.

University of Wisconsin.

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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

The Need for Constitutional Reform; A Program for National Security.

BY WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT. (New York: Whittlesey House. 1935. Pp. x, 286.)

Professor Elliott's program is based upon two premises which no one will be inclined to dispute. These are: that, for the future, the national government of the United States will find it necessary to exert a wide control over the economic life of the American people; and, second, that if this task is to be performed with any degree of efficiency, it is imperative that this government should be organized for the purpose. Whether this means that constitutional powers which the national government does not now possess must be granted to it, or that the Supreme Court can be trusted to construe its present powers with a liberality sufficient to enable it to perform the tasks imperatively laid upon it, is a matter with regard to which there is a difference of opinion. Professor Elliott enrolls himself strongly among those who hold the first view. Or, to speak more accurately, he argues not so much the necessity of vesting increased constitutional powers in the national government as the need to make radical changes in its general set-up; for, in fact, he has practically nothing to say, specifically, as to what controlling authority should be vested in the new government structure which he advocates.

Some of the governmental changes, or reforms, which he proposes are so clearly desirable that no one will deny them. Among these are a permanent trained civil service freed from political influence or control, and better administrative methods. Whether, as Professor Elliott holds, it is desirable that there should be created a system of administrative courts similar to those found in many European countries, is a proposition open to argument. All, however, will agree that there is imperative and immediate need that our present multitude of local governing units be simplified and integrated. Most people also will agree with Professor Elliott that the tasks to be thrown upon the national government make it important that the President, as head of the national administrative system, be able to act with energy, and, in most cases, with controlling authority. But whether it will be desirable, as Professor Elliott contends, that he be enabled to exercise decisive political control over Congress is by no means so clear. However, Professor Elliott seems to feel strongly upon this last point; indeed, he goes so far as to propose that, the terms of members of the House of Representatives having been made four years, the President should have the right, once at least during his own term of office, to dissolve the House and order a new election. He also would give to the President the right to veto separate items of measures that have received the approval of Congress. Professor Elliott complains strongly

that, at present, the only real means which the President has of influencing the legislative will is through the dispensation of patronage in the matter of appointments to administrative and judicial positions.

Among other radical—one might call them almost revolutionary—changes which Professor Elliott urges as desirable is the relegation of the states of the Union to the status of mere administrative agencies, and the creation of new political, regional, federal units, for which he suggests the name "commonwealths." The powers of the Senate as compared with those of the House of Representatives he would reduce, and he would have senators elected by the legislatures of the new regional units. The election of the President he would make dependent upon securing an absolute majority in the nation at large.

The foregoing proposals do not exhaust the recommendations of Professor Elliott. Some of them seem, to the reviewer at least, so extreme and so little likely to secure the approval of the American people as to place them outside the realm of practical political discussion. One may therefore question the wisdom of proposing them in a volume which has obviously a practical purpose.

Whatever the merits of proposals made, the reviewer must express his disappointment that in few, if any, instances does Professor Elliott attempt to demonstrate the desirability of these proposals by careful expositions of what the results—indirect as well as direct—of their adoption might be expected to be. This is notably true of the proposal that the states be reduced to a status similar to that of the counties in England, and that new regional "commonwealths" be created. As for lesser changes—such, for example, as that the President should have the right to veto items in legislative enactments—he is content merely to assert their desirability, although every political scientist knows that there is much to be said upon both sides as to the merits of such a proposal as that mentioned. As a result of this lack of careful and sustained argument, it is believed that the book will be of interest to the general reader rather than to specialists in the study of governmental problems. Probably, indeed, this was Professor Elliott's intent.

More than half of the book is in the nature of an introduction to the discussion of "The Need for Constitutional Reform." The last chapter, which constitutes Part IV of the volume, and which is entitled "International Politics and the New Deal," has almost no relation to the rest of the book, and its observations are of so general and obvious a character that one wonders why it was added to the chapters which had gone before.

W. W. WILLOUGHBY.

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The National Recovery Administration. BY LEVERETT S. LYON AND A COMMITTEE OF THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1935. Pp. xxii, 947.)

It would indeed be fortunate if all of our government programs could be subjected to some such analysis as is offered in this survey. A highly competent committee of the Institute of Economics of the Brookings Institution, consisting of Leverett S. Lyon, chairman, Paul T. Homan, George Terborgh, Lewis L. Lorwin, Charles Dearing, and several assistants, have given a scientific survey-report of the high type which one associates with that Institution. Most of the committee members had been officially connected with N.R.A., a fact which lends force to their conclusions.

The volume is offered as an appraisal of the effects of N.R.A. on recovery; it also contains material of great value on reform. The appraisal runs along two main lines, trade practices and employment relations, with a supplementary estimate of the administrative methods employed. The appraisals of trade practices and administrative methods are the more valuable parts. The present report has recently been followed by an analysis of A.A.A. In view of the present trend towards public regulation, the value of the report is not affected by the decision in *Schechter v. U. S.* The entire survey may well serve as a monumental guide-post on the road.

Taking up first the Act and its administration, the authors point out that an extensive accumulation of data on trade practices and on employment conditions has been made in N.R.A. offices, and that this information should prove of much future value in determining what is and what is not feasible in the regulation of these fields by government. The N.R.A. also aided in reviving confidence and in creating the feeling that something was being done. Over against these results, the authors find certain liabilities in the law's administration. Working at high speed, with little guidance from the Act itself, the N.R.A. created a huge mass of new legal rules; it did this by a process of bargaining between conflicting interests, wherein the public advantage was often lost to view.

Administratively considered, both the codes and their enforcement agencies were defective. Code provisions often lacked precise meaning, and enforcement agencies were neither effective nor impartial. The highest administrative officers could not cope with all of the important questions which pressed upon them, nor was there a satisfactory supervision of the code agencies themselves.

The section of the report dealing with trade practices deserves the highest rank as a scientific document in the relations of government to business. The regulation of competitive practices, after six centuries of

effort, is now more difficult and complex than ever. N.R.A. has confirmed this fact. Over one thousand different trade acts have been regulated by the codes, in the fields of prices, production control, competitive methods, and the maintenance of competition. The general trend of these regulations has been to transfer the decision as to policies from the manager of the individual enterprise to the industrial group. On each set of regulations the authors offer their analysis and estimate, both of which are based on well-founded economic reasoning. A good illustration is seen in the important problem of indirect pricing. The manufacturer wants a stable national price structure for his products. But he also wants to introduce some flexibility in order to meet new market conditions. He does this by maintaining the retail price but offering to the distributors and retailers certain combinations and supplementary transactions (e.g., does this by maintaining the retail price but offering to the distributors advertising allowances) which in effect lower the price to them. This is indirect pricing. N.R.A. met this by prohibiting a long list of such acts. This general prohibition the authors condemn and suggest that in its place the government should insist on publicity of certain prices, or even on separate prices for separate transactions, in order to protect the purchaser from deception or confusion. They sum up N.R.A. results in this general field by concluding that the code authorities have been able to aid their members in ascertaining costs, in drawing plans for open prices to eliminate secrecy, and in promoting informative labeling and standardization. Beyond this, the trade practice provisions of the codes have apparently been a hindrance to recovery and "have achieved very little that may be regarded as socially useful."

The section dealing with employment relations, while containing valuable material, leaves much to be desired. It is clearly pointed out that a basic problem of N.I.R.A. and all similar legislative attempts is the question, Shall the government make trade unions the exclusive instrumentalities of collective bargaining? The authors emphatically state that unions possessing quasi-official powers and status must inevitably submit to much governmental supervision and regulation which they now violently oppose. Shall they have power without responsibility? The report declares that government is far from being equipped to exercise adequate control and that even if it were, the American conception of democracy opposes the type of control which would be necessary (presumably fascism.) One naturally infers that government should not make unregulated unions the exclusive instruments of collective bargaining.

It is hard to reconcile this reasoning with the discussion of the Labor Relations Board, Section 7(a), and the Wagner Bill. This discussion, while ostensibly analytical and critical, leaves out of sight almost completely the very considerations of democratic ideals above mentioned.

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The authors do not point out, for example, the revival of the injunction in labor disputes, for use against the employer exclusively; they do not mention that the government's policy throughout N.R.A. has been to avoid taking positive action against labor unions; nor do they note the attitude of the Labor Relations Board in holding, perhaps legally, that grievances of workers against unions were not within its jurisdiction; nor again do they analyze those peculiar features of the Wagner measure which set all the machinery of government in motion to crush opposition by the employer while expressly preserving the union's most effective method of opposition, viz., the strike. The employer must not oppose government action, the union may.

In the report as a whole, one finds occasional profound queries as to the fundamental theories upon which N.R.A. was based. Can prosperity be lured back by freezing the price and wage structure? Emphatically the authors say, No. Such action hinders the stabilization of business at a level of full employment, a stabilization which is the real object to be achieved.

Will the much advocated 30 hour week with 40 hours pay solve the unemployment problem? Again the answer is, No. Rather it would produce an increase in the cost of living which would further widen the disparity between the income of the country and the prices to be paid.

Should the government aim at higher nominal wages per day or per week? Again, No. The objective is the aggregate real wage level. This is in danger of being lowered by setting up or freezing high nominal wages. The N.R.A. planned to promote recovery by enlarging the purchasing power of labor through wage advances *preceding* the rise of prices. Actually, prices rose ahead of wages, and when the final balance was reached, price rises counteracted wage increases. On the whole, N.R.A. retarded recovery.

JAMES T. YOUNG.

University of Pennsylvania.

Public Welfare Organization. BY ARTHUR C. MILLSPAUGH. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1935. Pp. xxv, 700.)

Since administrative structure is highly sensitive to the social forces that condition the governing process, organization in the field of public welfare must be considered not only as a component part of the entire structure of public administration, but in its organic relationship to these underlying forces as well. This concept forms the basis of Dr. Millspaugh's approach to his subject and subsequent analysis in this well written book. Assuming at the outset "a dynamic, rather than a static, conception of administrative organization" which necessitates a wide view of the evolution of the conditions, needs, and ideas influencing organization, the au-

thor, in Part I, entitled "Basic Considerations," scans the economic, social, and political development of the United States, emphasizing the changing nature of social problems and of methods employed by those who seek to solve them.

In Part II, "Organization As It Is," the general characteristics of state and local welfare organization are canvassed, and this is followed by a description of existing organization for the administration of each of the principal welfare functions. These functions, classified according to the nature of the groups receiving special treatment, comprise the care of the adult delinquent, the mentally handicapped, the dependent (including the unemployed, for which there is a separate chapter), the physically handicapped, and the child. The remainder of this section contains two chapters on the problems of overhead control and the coördination of welfare services.

In Part III, "Reorganization," the author reviews critically the effects of the state reorganization movements upon state welfare organization, and considers the future implications of centralizing tendencies in local government. A word of caution is given to the advocates of the county manager plan who would place welfare services under the control of an official "selected in most cases for his qualifications as a highway engineer, and accountant, or a business man." In an excellent chapter dealing with available techniques for appraising administrative structure, the writer demonstrates the existing limitations of the statistical method and reaches the conclusion that present evaluation of public welfare organization simmers down to the judgment of capable observers—a challenging statement in this day of "scientific" testing of administrative organization.

Because of its broad scope, this study is necessarily subject to certain limitations, the existence of which Dr. Millspaugh himself would be the first to admit. He presents skillfully a comprehensive picture of welfare structure resting upon a background of social forces, but depicts less clearly the interplay of organizational tendencies and social forces. The detailed analysis of the multitudinous state and local welfare agencies in all their bewildering complexity is necessarily tedious, and one may question, moreover, the practical value of descriptions of this omnibus nature. The omission of welfare organization in the cities will be disappointing to students primarily interested in municipal administration.

Public welfare has long since become a major, and is at present the largest, function of government, yet it has been singularly neglected by political scientists. Heretofore, the field has been occupied almost exclusively, if not deliberately preëmpted, by sociologists and professional social workers turned scholars. The present book represents the first comprehensive treatment of the subject from the political scientist's

point of view. The timeliness of its appearance is hardly less significant than the fact that it was written by one eminently qualified for the task.

PAUL T. STAFFORD.

Princeton University.

Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics. BY JOHN T. SALTER. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1935. Pp. ix, 270.)

For more than a generation, a legalistic and philosophical approach to the study of politics has been giving way to a realistic approach. The newest demand has been that our study of politics be scientific. Professor Salter has approached the study of the local political leader with the dispassionate enthusiasm and curiosity of a naturalist. He has gone into the field to study these strange creatures in their native habitat, the hundreds of tiny neighborhoods which make up the modern metropolis. He has bagged many specimens, but for the present exhibit he offers nine, carefully stuffed and mounted in fictitious names. Not content with minute and precise description, he has sought to analyze these specimens. Dr. Salter's method has the simplicity of genius. Curious about the kind of people who run our elections, he went, notebook in hand, to the corner saloon or cigar store to talk to them and observe them at their work.

Professor Salter is impressed with the fact that these political leaders, the division leaders of Philadelphia, render real service to their people. They are the interpreters of far off, complex government; they humanize its routine and red tape; they temper justice with mercy or special privilege. In return, they ask merely that the recipients of these favors endorse their franchise over to a division leader. With these endorsements, the party organizations are able to elect aldermen and magistrates, even mayors, and so render more favors to win more votes and so on, until even presidents are involved.

This service costs money. Dr. Salter does not attempt to compute its cost, but he does observe that most of four hundred leaders whom he visited had public jobs. He queries, without pressing the point, whether this covert subsidy might not better be converted into an avowed subvention. This is a suggestion worthy of more discussion than he gives it. Here are four hundred servants of the people giving most of their waking hours to the appeals, legitimate and illegitimate, of neighbors, paid from the public treasury as clerks, inspectors, bailiffs, tipstaves, or what not, or rewarded more deviously. Surely the existing situation is anomalous, but it would be preposterous to have paid neighborhood officers helping offenders to arrange bail for offenders and aiding them to "beat the rap." There are numerous services in the nature of guidance which the people ought, perhaps, to receive as a matter not of favor but of right; but, as

Salter's study abundantly reveals, the people will not stop at this. They want favoritism. If paid party officers were, or could be, restricted to proper guidance and harmless intervention, another set would spring up overnight to render the improper and border-line service. And what of the division leaders of the opposition and minor parties?

Dr. Salter is right in stressing the simple nature of these public servants and their honesty according to their own lights. "Most of them," he says, "are conscious of no wrong-doing. . . . As for honesty, the division leaders are usually as honest as their respective constituencies." He ignores the tangible compensation which many expect and some demand for service rendered and leaves the reader to assume that their *quid pro quo* is principally votes. Although he calls his volume *Boss Rule*, he gives no adequate discussion of the relation of his division leaders to the ward "boss," or to the latter's war chest and how he fills it. He does give a series of vignettes of some typical fellows who become exceedingly real under his vivid pen. One is impressed with their individuality. They range from grammar school through university education, from hard-boiled cynicism to religious fervor, from ambitious youth to resigned maturity, from conviviality to asceticism, from breezy cordiality to shyness; and the best man of the lot is a woman. They have but one common denominator, an interest in their fellow-men that makes them ready to answer any call at any time, that makes them want to help.

Without adventuring very far into the significance or probable future of these absorbing American phenomena, Dr. Salter has provided a provocative exhibit, one to challenge not only the political scientist and the political reformer but all thoughtful Americans. If, minimizing the influence of the press and the radio, Salter is correct in asserting that "the size of this political community is too great to permit public opinion to be formed without the help of organization," it may be time to reexamine our attitude toward parties and party bosses.

JOSEPH D. MCGOLDRICK.

Columbia University.

Home Rule For Metropolitan Chicago. BY ALBERT LEPAWSKY. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1935. Pp. xxi, 210.)

This excellent monograph is one of the series of social science studies of community problems of metropolitan Chicago. It is the natural corollary of *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago*, with an excellent diagnosis and wide yet specific treatment of the problems of any rapidly growing community. The study is rich in illustrations of the legal importance of the most populous region of the state. The anecdotal method is especially pleasing and raises hope that more writers will present similar studies of other metropolitan areas.

Lepawsky examines the literature on municipal home rule by Goodnow, McBain, and McGoldrick, but enlarges the legal approach to include administrative and political practices of the metropolitan region in its relationships with the federal government and the numerous subordinate political units within its somewhat indefinite boundaries. Chicago is the fourth ranking government in the United States, yet it is legally an infant under the careful nursing of the remainder of the state. The region has fifty-eight per cent of the population of the state and has increased on an average of twenty-eight per cent while the entire state was gaining only five per cent. Over seventy per cent of the economic activity of the state is within this region. It has 85,000 public employees, while the remainder of the state has only 27,000. In fact, the area under examination spends twice as much for its governmental activities as the combined expenditures of the states of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana.

Downstate Illinois has been successful in keeping the populous area under-represented in the legislature, in Congress, and in the state supreme court. The state places serious restrictions upon the police, health, planning and public works, and social welfare powers of local governments. It dominates all policies respecting transportation and utilities, finance, governmental organization, and legal activities. Eight of the ten chapters of the study are devoted to the details of this down-state control, or legal strait-jacket, resulting in political paralysis for the metropolitan region. The whole result is that local governments do not have powers commensurate with their responsibilities.

An excellent nine-page summary of findings and alternative recommendations opens the study. The author suggests that there may be an enlargement of city powers by statute, an adjustment by the city without changes in the laws, increased state activity and supervision, federal services and supervision, separate statehood, or constitutional home rule. Some of these suggestions are relatively new and broaden the discussion of his theme of constitutional home rule for the metropolitan area. His concluding chapter, expanding these proposals, is in excellent detail and will be found applicable to any metropolitan area. He does not overlook the shortcomings of municipal home rule in other states. However, he has a solution to overcome the narrow judicial interpretations of restrictive principles governing municipal corporations by the creation of a quasi-judicial local government commission which will not be bound by the rigid rules of judicial interpretation. In this manner, modern municipal standards might be applied to newer municipal problems and the legal fetters of the past loosened or cast off. The clear and concise presentation of these conditions in the metropolitan area of Chicago leads one to believe that we are about to enter upon similar studies elsewhere. We must, in the end, clarify our narrow political thinking and bring

adequate solutions to the multiplication of local political units and their inadequate and intricate control by so-called superior governments.

EDWIN A. COTTRELL.

Stanford University.

Civil Service Abroad: Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany. BY LEONARD D. WHITE, CHARLES H. BLAND, WALTER R. SHARP, AND FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1935. Pp. 275.)

Training Public Employees in Great Britain. BY HARVEY WALKER. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1935. Pp. xi, 213.)

These two volumes, published under the auspices of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, deal with the public services of selected foreign countries. The volume by Professor Walker is an intensive study of the training aspects of the British service, while the other volume contains brief accounts of the services of Great Britain, Canada, France, and Germany.

The monographs by Commissioner White and Professor Walker, dealing with England, differ in that the former presents a general, comprehensive discussion of the main characteristics and principles of personnel practice in England, while the latter deals particularly with training problems and practices. It is only natural that the general survey should emphasize the place of the administrative class in the British service, because American interest in the British service attaches particularly to that class. Commissioner White's account brings out the importance of this class, but also makes clear that the administrative class is not the whole of the service, a point sometimes forgotten by American students. The discussion of the relationship of the technically and professionally trained members of the service to the administrative class makes clear the difficulty of applying class characteristics to American conditions, and makes clear also the problems arising in modern England from the exclusion from that class, to a great extent, of the large and able group of technically trained scientists. The English emphasis upon public scholarships is nicely brought out in the treatment of recruitment, and the closely integrated relation of service and educational systems, so unlike anything in America, is also properly stressed. A brief account of the organization and political position of public servants, including the Whitley Councils and Industrial Court, with a discussion of the general problem of neutrality and civic rights, concludes the survey. The materials in this monograph doubtless will prove very useful to teachers who wish to give something more than text-book readings on the English service. The treatment is general, however, and it may not be easy for the lay reader to fill in the

details sufficiently to make the generalizations as useful to him as they are to the reader who already is familiar with the service.

Professor Walker's monograph deals with all aspects of British training work, but particularly emphasizes in-service training. A description of the general features of the British service is followed by a detailed account of training methods, institutions, and problems in each of the major branches. Much of Professor Walker's material has been gained by personal interview, and his monograph contributes substantially to the available information on English training practice. The monograph is full of keen appraisals and numerous suggestions for the improvement of the training program or programs of the service, and throughout one feels that the British service has been dealt with in a critical though appreciative mood. This is a good thing for the American reader, because most materials available to Americans on the British service are likely to be too laudatory. Nevertheless, one cannot but wonder how the British service manages to maintain itself if it is as defective as one might conclude from Professor Walker's treatment. The explanation, perhaps, is to be found in the fact that Professor Walker was dealing with suggested improvements upon an already good service, rather than pointing out serious defects in an existing service. The English reader may profit somewhat from the application of the standards of a modern American personnel student to the historically evolved British system, saved as it is by service and social tradition rather than by modern personnel practice.

Professor Sharp has written an excellent summary of his larger work on the French service, and in it he presents interestingly and clearly the intimate relationship existing between French culture and the French service. The place of a civil service code in the legal system of public personnel management is emphasized, and the French method of accomplishing by administration that which either cannot be accomplished or can be accomplished only with great difficulty by legislation is nicely brought out in this connection. The lack of any general legal framework for the whole of the French system, the duplication, and in many instances inefficient practices, are also pointed out. Particular attention is given by Professor Sharp to the position of the civil servant in political and civic life, and the seriousness of this problem for America in the future can be appreciated by a thoughtful reading of this phase of Professor Sharp's discussion. In the French system, one encounters the Continental emphasis upon law, not only in the service, but as a training for the service. The French recruitment policies, while confused, are keyed in with the educational program of the country. In-service training has received little attention in the French service, but preliminary training has been excellent. Professor Sharp's account is compact, clear, sufficiently full of detail to be concrete, and is admirably done. It bears evidence of long familiarity

with and reflection upon the problems of the French service, and the discussion should be particularly helpful to American students of personnel problems.

The rise, and one might say the fall, of the German service is covered by Professor Marx, and in a genuine spirit of enthusiasm the history and personnel practices of the German, particularly the Prussian, service are presented to the American reader. It may be that Professor Marx realized that American readers had long known of the efficiency of the Prussian system, and he may have known, too, that the World War still visits upon that service an adverse American judgment, because it is still conceived of as a class, a military, service.

But few can read this interesting account of the German service and its problems without realizing not only that the service was an excellent one, but that it met a real need in German life and culture, and that that need was a legitimate one. Americans can ponder with profit the German emphasis upon the service as a part of national life, as also is true of the French, and can ponder well also the German emphasis, in common with the French, upon the place of law in the training program and as the basis of the personnel system itself. Not only is law used to protect the servant, but it is used to make him accountable to both government and the public.

Professor Marx has performed a real service in presenting the main characteristics and practices of the German system to the American reader. To study the German system now is particularly interesting, first because the legal element in it is something useful for us, and second, because it presents the problem of one-party government in its relationship to the public service of a country.

The Canadian service is outlined by Commissioner Bland, and each of the major subjects, such as recruitment, pensions, promotion, etc., is briefly and somewhat formally discussed.

One understands, after reading these monographs, that the fundamental problems of a public service are much the same everywhere. One understands also that the future American service will be American, but that it must incorporate some of the features of several of the foreign services. Some features must be American inventions. The Commission has rendered a public service in making these monographs available.

OLIVER P. FIELD.

University of Minnesota.

Essays in Constitutional Law. BY W. P. M. KENNEDY. (London and New York: Oxford University Press. 1934. Pp. xv, 183.)

Apologies such as Professor Kennedy makes are often owed for publishing a volume of essays collected from topical speeches and papers which extend, as these do, over many years and diverse subjects. One

cannot, however, but feel grateful to those friends of the distinguished Canadian historian who persuaded him, against his judgment, to publish this little volume.

For some years, scholars have waited with impatience for a larger scale work from the author of *The Constitution of Canada*, and of many other historical studies with the same focus. These essays serve only to whet that appetite. Though they cover a wide range of topics, they all serve to develop aspects of the first essay, "Theories of Law and the Constitutional Law of the Empire." There are admirable little studies, reprinted from articles not easily accessible, on "The Nature of Canadian Federalism," "The Disallowance of Provincial Acts," "Law and Custom in the Canadian Constitution," and "Some Aspects of Canadian and Australian Federal Constitutional Law," and two final and more recent essays on "The Imperial Conferences, 1926-30: The Statute of Westminster" and "Interpreting the Statute of Westminster." Professor Kennedy's own position as a conservative who is willing to take *some* risks (but not too many!) with the structure of the Empire is indicated by the dedication to Richard Bedford Bennett, Canadian prime minister, and by his laudatory mention of the Hon. C. H. Cahan, secretary of state.

There is less overlapping than might be expected from the nature of the essays. Australian federalism and the disallowance of provincial acts by the Dominion government get some repetition in treatment, and there is an annoying flavor of unnecessary legal latinity and verbiage in the essays. But they make many good and some new points, and make them clearly and well.

One may note for possible criticism that the Australian cases on the immunity of federal instrumentalities from state taxation, and *vice versa*, do not appear to have been carried beyond the famous Engineers' Case, *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide S. S. Co. Ltd.* (1920) 23 C.L.R. 129. This case reversed the previous Australian judicial practice of exempting instruments of the states from federal interference on the American doctrine of reciprocal federal immunity of instruments of government. Subsequent cases have elaborated and limited this reversal of judicial doctrine.

There are valuable sections on nationality, unfortunately not given in the detail which Professor Kennedy, from his work on *The Law of Nationality in Canada*, might have afforded. Similarly, the legal and constitutional position of the governor-general after the passage of the Statute of Westminster is usefully, though briefly, treated.

One may differ with many of Professor Kennedy's opinions on juristic theory and some of his detailed comments. But the work is one of true scholarship and a useful contribution.

W. Y. ELLIOTT.

Harvard University.

Financing Municipal Recreation. BY RANDOLPH O. HUUS. (Menasha, Wisconsin: The George Banta Publishing Company. 1935. Pp. xxiii, 249.)

Recreation under present-day municipal conditions has attained such a prominent position among municipal services that a book devoted solely to the problem of financing municipal recreation is to be welcomed both by municipal authorities and by the interested public. The purpose of the present treatise, as stated by the author, is "to consider the problems of municipal recreation in the light of approved financial practices and to discuss critically the bases used in deriving revenue and making expenditures." Considerable space is given, also, to an "analysis of general trends and objectives as expressed in recreation budgets."

The work is divided into two parts: Part One deals with income and other means of increasing recreation services and facilities, and Part Two considers expenditures, with the emphasis upon budget procedure and budget set-ups.

In the introduction, "the value of active recreation as a municipal function . . . which can lay claim to an adequate share of the income derived from the general tax levy" is presented with vigor. Part One, in five chapters, gives critical consideration to the several possible sources of revenue, including general taxation, special assessments, excess condemnation, gifts, transfers, leases, and permits; and income from park and recreation properties. In dealing with each of the above sources, the author justifies his conclusions regarding the extent of the use of such source by the application of criteria relating to the nature of the recreational activity being financed. The specialized or restrictive features of certain activities justify the collection of special charges or fees from the participants, for example, in the case of golf or tennis. While on the other hand, playgrounds for children, on account of the health and social factors, should be financed, in the main, by the general taxpayer.

A strong plea is made for more centralized and unified control over the financing of recreational activities. The author favors relying upon the general tax funds for "substantial support" of the recreational program; considers "special tax levies . . . contrary to the best interests of both active recreation and the general municipal good," since he believes that "their use interferes with adequate control over municipal finance and hampers comprehensive city planning"; would give serious consideration to special assessments "when general tax funds are not available"; considers doubtful the practical value of excess condemnation under American municipal conditions; recognizes the value of gifts and donations, but warns against the frequent entanglements accompanying such gifts; and favors fees and charges only when "sound and definite policies are established" (pp. 229-230).

Part Two, in three chapters, discusses expenditures for municipal

recreation, preparation of the annual budget, and financial planning. The author concludes that "satisfactory norms for individual cities can be established, based on probable income available, the local needs, clearly determined objectives, and accepted recreation standards"; that "more attention should be given . . . to functional classifications and to unit cost information"; that "good budget practices are highly important from the viewpoint of effective administration, economy, financial planning, and the public interest in active recreation"; and that "a long-term plan for capital needs should be carried out by means of a series of yearly work programs, and should be closely related to the annual work programs for current purposes" (pp. 230-231).

Although the author has incorporated into the treatise materials from "a first-hand study of twenty-five systems of municipal recreation in twenty-one selected Eastern and Middle Western cities," a considerable portion of the treatise consists of citations on financial affairs from well known authorities on municipal finance, including A. E. Buck, Paul Studensky, C. E. Rightor, Russell Forbes, and P. H. Cornick, and of materials on recreational planning gleaned from the publications of the National Recreation Association and the writings of I. B. Nash, L. H. Weir, and others.

The value of the treatise as a contribution to recreational administration would have been enhanced had the author depended more on the first-hand material obviously available. A few conspicuous defects in composition and punctuation might have been avoided by more careful proof-reading. The treatise contains a well selected bibliography.

ORREN C. HORMELL.

Bowdoin College.

Public Utility Valuation for Purposes of Rate Control. BY JOHN BAUER AND NATHANIEL GOLD. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. xxii, 477.)

For political scientists, this book is a welcome addition to the literature in the increasingly important field of public utilities. Dr. Bauer's views on the regulation of public utilities have been known by the interested public for more than a decade through his enthusiastic interest in the subject, presented in his book *Effective Regulation of Public Utilities* (1925), in numerous magazine articles, by public addresses, by lectures at Cornell, Princeton, and Columbia, and especially by his participation in rate cases as an expert representing the consumer or the public. Dr. Gold, also a lecturer on public utilities, member of the New York bar and co-worker with Dr. Bauer in several rate cases, has contributed, through his legal knowledge and experience in court cases, to the analysis and interpretation of court decisions.

The book is published under the auspices of the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, and is edited by Professor James C. Bonbright, who is editing a series of studies on legal valuation. Professor Bonbright promises in the final volume of the series to give his own opinions on the principles of valuation. It may be noted here that students of the subject should not overlook Professor Bonbright's statement, which the authors accept and expand, that "in truth, so far as we know, there is not a single accredited economist who does not concede that *value*, as the word is used in the law of eminent domain, damages, taxation, etc., is logically unfitted to serve as the basis of public utility rate control" (p. ix).

Although the authors inform the reader that they are discussing the subject of public utility valuation for the purpose of rate-making, they survey the much broader field of an adequate rate-base and of public control in general.

Part III, the most constructive portion of the book, presents the broader aspects of "the present system of rate regulation and offers suggestions for effective revision. It centers on the requirements of a proper rate base both as to effective rate-making and as to the broader aspects of public control." Part I deals with the valuation concept as embodied in legislation and in decisions of the courts. Part II presents an analysis of the legal and administrative steps pursued in determining valuation.

In Part I, the authors discuss the criteria by which legislatures and courts determine whether a business is vested with special public interest which subjects it to special public control. The conclusion is reached that the decision depends upon the flux of varying circumstances that bring about popular discontent. To make a business a *public utility*, judicial sanction is needed in addition to legislative action. The importance of determining a reliable rate-base is shown, and the legislative and judicial interpretation of "fair value" is traced: (1) prior to *Smyth v. Ames*, (2) from *Smyth v. Ames* to the World War, and (3) from the World War to 1934. The significance of some of the recent cases, however, has not been presented fully.

The significance of changing price levels is discussed, and the fact is pointed out that prior to the Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corporation case the courts failed to consider that factor in passing on "fair return on fair value." The authors believe that the decision in the Los Angeles case gives hope that commissions may be required "merely to deal fairly with utilities," and not be "held to specific reproduction cost procedure" (p. 108).

"Fair value," as interpreted by the courts in its relation to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, is dealt with in much detail in Part II, valuation procedure is analyzed and criticized, and the factors of depreciation, land values, and going concern value are

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examined. It may be suggested that an analysis of the recent decision in *Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.*, 292 U.S. 151 (1934), would have thrown considerable light on recent trends in the court's dealing with fair value.

Part III, presenting the authors' constructive contributions to the problem of rate control, contains certain significant conclusions, among which are: Criteria for a proper rate base and effective regulation include "the rate base . . . must be capable of systematic administration; . . . provide for definite protection of both investors and consumers; . . . maintain the financial stability of companies; . . . make available new capital as needed for public service, but prevent dislocation of capital additions; . . . encourage progressive development in industries and service to the public; . . . and provide rate flexibility for development purposes . . ." (p. 371). Also, "the dependence upon reproduction cost as a basis of valuation results in the almost inevitable default of rate control" (p. 382).

The authors propose in a convincing manner what they consider an effective substitute for the fluctuating rate-base of the past. They would provide a fixed value for rate-making that would result in a fixed return, including the provision for reserve set up in good times to assure returns to investors in poor times. They are confident that court precedents and constitutional barriers are not insuperable in making the desired transition.

ORREN C. HORMELL.

Bowdoin College.

Capitalism and Its Culture. BY JEROME DAVIS. (New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 1935. Pp. xvii, 556.)

There is nothing novel in a book that attacks capitalism. But a book that undertakes to examine capitalism searchingly and scientifically with a view to determining its total costs to men, women, and children in all walks of life and in all phases of life is novel. That is exactly what this book does. Not only the costs but the merits of capitalism are presented. There is an excellent chapter on "The Case for Capitalism," and its benefits and alleged benefits are mentioned and commented upon throughout the book.

Much confusion concerning the merits of capitalism arises out of the fact that many people associate the capitalist system with technological development, machinery, public libraries, research foundations, and great universities, as if only the proponents of capitalism believe in these things. The essence of capitalism, as Dr. Davis sees it, "is that the economic machine shall be run for the private profit of the few." Democracy, if it ever existed in economic life, has given way to "corpocracy," and it is through the corporate system that *control* of wealth has been centralized

in a handful of bankers and industrialists responsible to no one but themselves.

Dr. Davis accepts without question the proposition that "if we used our production facilities to the full, nearly every family in America could live according to the scale of material comforts which an income of from \$10,000 to \$20,000 would have provided in 1929." Apparently the report on "America's Capacity to Produce" published by the Brookings Institution, and throwing some doubt on the "economy of abundance" point of view, had not yet been published. No mention is made of it in the excellent bibliography which appears at the end of the book. However, one does not need to agree with Dr. Davis that, "scattered all over the world are natural resources which potentially can furnish us with a wealth of things beyond our wildest dreams," to subscribe to the statement that "the central aspects of the *capitalistic distribution process* is that it is a device to *maintain scarcity* and so maintain high profits."

The heart of the book is the analysis of the social repercussions of the profit motive—its influence on the press, the pulpit, radio, the schools, recreation, the farmer, the worker, etc., supported by great quantities of facts and figures and presented in a most readable and most enlightening manner.

Dr. Davis does not do much predicting nor much advocating. He believes, apparently, that the era of capitalism is almost over, but he is quite willing to admit that some decades may elapse before the closing finale. He does not, however, urge the adoption of any particular economic system in place of capitalism. Yet here and there through the book he does speak of the necessity for economic planning and of the merits of consumer and producer coöperatives and of public ownership.

The possibility of an imperialistic war to change the picture is clearly recognized, although the influence of the psychology of nationalism aside from the profit motive is disregarded. But whether war comes or not, the author sees three possibilities in the next ten years. These are reform of capitalism, capitalistic fascism, and a new non-capitalistic economic system. The American people are sincerely anxious that success in the reform attempts shall be achieved. Capitalistic fascism, if it comes, will be disguised as a "back to the constitution" movement, or an "away with national regimentation and bureaucracy" campaign. If a dictatorship is created, it "will be but the interlude before revolution;" for dictatorships of single individuals do not permanently endure.

On the whole, the book is splendidly organized and delightfully written, and it will undoubtedly be widely read and extensively quoted throughout the world.

E. ALLEN HELMS.

Ohio State University.

International Socialism and the World War. BY MERLE FAINSOD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1935. Pp. xi, 238.)

This work is the latest addition to the distinguished list of volumes known as the Harvard Political Studies, published under the auspices of Harvard University's department of government. As the title indicates, its purpose is to follow the fortunes of the international Socialist movement through the war years from August, 1914, to the creation of the Third International at Moscow in March, 1919. A splendid opening chapter is devoted to the immediate effects of the outbreak of the War upon the Second International. The paralysis which overcame Socialist efforts at collaboration for peace and the divisions which the War produced within the ranks of the various national sections of the International are portrayed vividly. Succeeding pages tell of the widening rift between those Socialists who supported the war policies of their respective governments and the minorities who opposed them and of the efforts of the latter, supported by like-minded Socialists of neutral countries, to resume international collaboration in the Zimmerwald, Kienthal, and abortive Stockholm Conferences. From this point onward, discussion centers upon the efforts of Lenin and his radical left-wing followers to convert these Socialist minorities from pacifism to a militant policy of class war—efforts which, as the author indicates, became increasingly successful as the War was prolonged, and which culminated, after the Russian Revolution, in the formation of the Communist International. A description of the formal establishment of this body and of the efforts to revive the Second International at the Berne Conference in 1919 form an appropriate conclusion for the volume.

The story has been told before in English and in other languages; but it has probably never been set forth from a wider background of specialized knowledge of the subject nor with greater detachment. The carefully selected excerpts from official documents which stud the text, the conscientious documentation, and the extensive bibliographies are hardly needed to assure the reader that Dr. Fainsod has labored with a scholar's tirelessness and with a scholar's devotion to truth. No less noteworthy than these qualities of his research is the success with which the author has embedded his immediate subject in the realities of European belligerency. The victories and defeats of the War, the advent of revolutions, national propagandas and censorships, and the difficulties of transport and communication are factors, the influence of which upon his immediate problem he is as careful to note as the doctrinal and personal conflicts within Socialist ranks and the resolutions of Socialist party congresses. The result is a volume which is at once specialized political history and an essay in political theory.

It is to be regretted that the presentation of a work generally so admi-

nable should have been marred by occasional repetition of subject-matter. The fault occurs often enough to irritate the reader. A glaring example is the assassination of Count Stuerghk, the Austrian premier, a description of which, on page 109, is repeated on page 115 without benefit of perceptible change in phraseology. Other examples may be found on pages 130 and 132, and again in the contents of pages 163, 164, and 165. This reviewer sincerely hopes that in the volume on the Third International which the author has promised us in his preface, such consideration will be given the presentation of the contents as is merited by the superior quality of his research and the place his books are destined to occupy in a scholar's library.

ARNOLD J. ZURCHER.

New York University.

Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919; Wilsonian Diplomacy, the Versailles Peace, and French Public Opinion. BY GEORGE BERNARD NOBLE.
(New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. x, 465.)

When Colonel House and the Allied leaders were discussing the armistice terms to be imposed on Austria, the Italian representative read a long list of the demands which his country insisted on making upon the vanquished foe. Clemenceau thereupon asked with the characteristically cynical irony: "Aren't you going to demand the Emperor's pants?" The question spoke volumes. It was symbolic of French disdain and disregard for Italian aspirations which has been one source of so much irritation between the two sister Latin nations. The episode was also symbolic of the greedy, selfish imperialism which became vocal in almost all of the victor nations the moment the German foes had been vanquished, and which unfortunately dominated the atmosphere of the whole Peace Conference.

It is this atmosphere that Professor Noble has recreated, so far as French public opinion is concerned, in an admirable book for which historians have long been waiting. He was exceptionally well qualified for his difficult task, for he was present at the Peace Conference and had as his daily duty the furnishing of the American delegation with a full analysis of the French press day by day. His thousand-odd quotations and footnotes show how fully and meticulously he has been able to make use of this material garnered in 1919. He has also enjoyed a Social Science Research Council grant which enabled him to revisit Paris, as well as to make use of the valuable collections in the Hoover War Library.

In an excellent introductory chapter, he analyzes and classifies the Paris and provincial press, as well as the political parties and forty-six "non-political associations," as exponents of public opinion. While not

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failing to note the nuances in each group, he finds it convenient to make three groups: Right, Center, and Left. On this basis, he then proceeds in ten chapters to give a history of the Peace Conference's discussion of the more fundamental points. In each chapter or section he states first what the Conference did or tried to do, and then follows it with well-chosen brief comments from the French press or other organs of public opinion. For many readers, he has no doubt struck a happy balance between diplomatic narrative and press comment. The present reviewer, however, wishes that he had tipped the balance so that there would have been less narrative and more press comment. The former is now more or less familiar from the works of House, Baker, Miller, Seymour, Temperley, Tardieu, etc., but the press comment, especially of the lesser and provincial papers, is relatively unknown or inaccessible in this country.

How far did the French press represent the opinion of the French people and of the French government? How far did Clemenceau control or influence the press as a means of strengthening his own hand, and how far was he influenced by it? These are subtle and elusive problems which the author answers to some extent; but we wish that out of the abundance of his knowledge he might have dealt with them more fully. We need more light on the murky, though much-discussed, connections between the press on the one hand and the Quay d'Orsai, the censor, the Comité des Forges, the big banks, and the munition-makers on the other.

Nevertheless, despite this criticism, Professor Noble's book is likely to be the definitive work on the subject. Though he evidently has an immense amount of newspaper material, he has thoroughly digested it. Moreover, he disentangles the various threads of the different negotiations in a way that is as clear and informing as it is readable and interesting.

The general impression left by the whole book, especially by the first chapter, is one of profound sadness that the press of 1919 seems to suggest that the French were in such a psychopathic shell-shocked condition that they could think only of their own sufferings, that they desired only vengeance upon the vanquished, and that they totally lacked any capacity either to understand the needs of other countries or to comprehend Wilson's idealism. Nevertheless, the author comes to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that "it is highly probable that wider publicity of the Conference proceedings would have had a doubly beneficial effect on the negotiations as a whole. . . . Secret diplomacy, combined with rigid control of the press in France, had shackled the President, and stricken from his hands his most useful weapons" (pp. 314, 328).

SIDNEY B. FAY.

Harvard University.

The People's King; George V: A Narrative of Twenty-five Years. BY JOHN BUCHAN. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1935. Pp. 289.)

The Reign of George V; An English Chronicle. BY D. C. SOMERVEL. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1935. Pp. viii, 533.)

Each of these two books presents a general, and mainly political, history of the twenty-five years during which George V has occupied the throne, dealing not only with internal affairs in Great Britain, but also with changes in the status of the British dominions and other areas of the Empire, and with the international events of the times. Covering the same period, from much the same point of view, they have a good deal in common; but there are differences in emphasis and judgments on some matters.

Mr. Buchan, early in his work, expresses the view that "no epoch in the life of a nation is exactly outlived by a sovereign's reign." Mr. Somervel, toward the end, states that "the reign of George V took shape in one's mind as a distinct period of history." Both in fact arrange their material with some attention to dramatic effect. Mr. Buchan presents the story in three parts—before, during and after the War. Mr. Somervel has five sections: *The Unfinished Melodrama: 1910–1914; The Epic: 1914–1918; The Aftermath: 1918–1922; Convalescence: 1922–1929; Relapse—and Recovery: 1929–1934.* Mr. Buchan gives relatively more space to the War; Mr. Somervel gives much more attention to the years since the War.

Both writers hold Austria and Germany directly responsible for the War, though Mr. Somervel also considers that the explosion of 1914 was made inevitable by forty years of armed peace, as the treaties of peace were made inevitable by four years of war. Mr. Somervel finds it a war in which every belligerent made repeated and disastrous mistakes. Mr. Buchan also finds errors of judgment and the defects of their good qualities in the leaders on both sides, but emphasizes the "fundamental errors" of France and Germany at the first battle of the Marne. To Mr. Somervel, "the mysterious battle of Jutland" in result was entirely negligible. To Mr. Buchan, it "did no good, but it also did us little harm." On these, and many other matters, there will be differences of opinion. Both writers, on the whole, take the view that the British leaders did about as well as could be expected under the conditions and according to their lights.

In discussing internal affairs, both writers are resolutely conservative; they consider that British institutions have survived the shock of the War and its aftermath, and are mildly optimistic that the country is now well on the road to recovery. Published in the year of the King's silver jubilee, with an election probable before long, the books will serve to support the present government.

As to the personal activity of the King, both writers find that he has

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performed the duties of a constitutional monarch with success. In several political crises, he has intervened for the purpose of securing an harmonious settlement, as in connection with the House of Lords in 1910, Ireland in 1914 and 1921, and in the formation of the National Government in 1931. Neither, however, notes the steps taken in 1923 when Baldwin rather than Curzon became prime minister. His social activities and his travels to distant parts of the Empire have given George V a closer contact with the people than previous monarchs, and have aroused a feeling of affection for him displayed on a number of occasions long before the jubilee celebration.

JOHN A. FAIRLIE.

University of Illinois.

After Hitler's Fall: Germany's Coming Reich. BY PRINCE HUBERTUS LOEWENSTEIN (London: Faber and Faber. 1934. Pp. xxxvi, 281.)

This book, written by an able and energetic descendant of old and prominent Catholic families in Germany, has two aims: "firstly, to write into one single current the various divergent tendencies of today which hold the future within them, and to fill the hopeless and apathetic with new faith; secondly, at a time of concrete needs in our political and social life and future, to suggest outlines which may, at the decisive moment, become a binding law." The present work follows one which was entitled *The Tragedy of a Nation*, in which the author dealt with the collapse of the Weimar system and described present-day Germany. And, according to the author, it precedes by a few months another book which will include "a complete constitution for the coming Reich."

The idea and form of the coming Reich is dealt with here from an essentially spiritual point of view. An attempt is made to "prepare a political and cultural sphere of thought capable of translation into practice after the collapse of National Socialism, which can already be foreseen." Prince Loewenstein writes vigorously and intensely and gives us much that is keen and well-informed. He is, of course, pleading a cause, and at times he is quite naïve and visionary (pp. 90, 94, 105, 168, for instance). But he insists that "this book will be incomprehensible to those who attempt to judge it by traditional standards." "How often," he writes, "has it been proved that the European crisis originates far more in the psychological than in the economic or political sphere!"

There is, indeed, a lot of good sense in the book, even though this feature is somewhat vitiated by the boasting and the rather ambitious schemes for political and social reform which are given. But it is always gratifying to find an active mind looking into the future with a view to helpfulness in the confusion which attends changes in political society. The author shows not only a deep interest in Germany's future, but also

a profound and intimate knowledge of her history, including the recent period. His frank, outspoken but not vindictive, attitude makes the book stimulating. Students of Germany will profit by the book, though they will not find it indispensable.

JAMES K. POLLOCK.

University of Michigan.

Challenge to Democracy. BY C. DELISLE BURNS. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1935. Pp. viii, 240.)

This volume of the Social Action series, edited by Alvin Johnson, is a stimulating analysis of the nature of public policy in a democracy, of the task which confronts democratic politics today, of the work before educators in making the democratic community, and of the relation between "leaders and nobodies" in meeting the challenge as defined.

Mr. Burns believes in democracy, and he favors the reader with a lucid and persuasive exposition of his notion of it, a notion which depends for its realization upon extending more widely "the sense of community" and upon implementing this sense of community with institutions adequate to provide the common goods upon which emotional loyalties can be developed and become available for the support of policy in behalf of the good of all members of the community. He disbelieves in dictatorships, whether fascist or communist, not alone because the common good which they offer is exclusive with respect to Jews, Socialists, and capital owners respectively, nor because they exclude the important "good" of "choosing one's own good," but affirmatively because the common good can be realized even more fully within the democratic tradition. The crisis facing democracy consists in the test as to whether it can create, in practice, "a new life in common, more inclusive and more intimate" than any offered by dictatorships.

Mr. Burns then sets forth the kind of community with which public policy in a democracy must be concerned, drawing upon the experience of modern urban life, of national life, and of life in the family of nations to point his definition of such a community as one in which each person finds a place "in which his work counts for more than his own gain." Nor does he ignore the problem of making "emotionally effectual the kind of advantage" at which public policy in a democratic community is aimed.

Mr. Burns is under few illusions as to the magnitude of the effort necessary to invigorate anew or to create "the sense of unity with others in a common task" which must be characteristic of the future democracy if it is to meet the challenge of the present crisis. His chapters on "The City," "The Nation," and "The Family of Nations" do not evade the problems presented and reveal a fine touch of imaginative appeal. Here are practical fields in which democracy can answer the question: "For whom is public policy intended?"

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Even more to the point is the author's query, "What is public policy intended to do for them?" In reply, he lays down certain measurable advantages which he proposes as the objectives of democratic public policy, viz., (1) health, (2) wealth, and (3) "that spontaneity in work and play and the avoidance of obstructive persons and events which the ordinary man means by "happiness." These measurable advantages can be secured only by the creation of institutions designed to produce them and the use of such institutions in public policy. The chapters dealing with how to obtain such institutions and the use of them are charged with pertinent and realistic suggestions for making democratic polity effective in its answer to this query. Especially does he recognize the limitations of formal education of the young in this task; the immediacy of the problem requires that the present adult generation be reached.

No better statement of the responsibilities of leadership nor any finer appreciation of the potential response available from the "nobodies" is known to the reviewer. Mr. Burns has not only enriched the literature of democracy, but suggested the path along which liberal democracy may renew its faith and enthusiasm and its militant, aggressive course of action.

RUSSELL M. STORY.

Pomona College.

BRIEFER NOTICES

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

It is difficult to determine whether former Governor Alfred E. Smith, in the opening of his book *The Citizen and His Government* (Harper and Bros., pp. ix, 264), is casting aspersions at a Hoover commission or whether he is making a simple innocent declaration. "This is not," he says (or insists), "a book about governmental trends." Since the author deals with many changes that he hopes will come to pass, he is not optimistic enough in any case to call them trends. At the opening of the last chapter, he sets down what students of government have often thought. "One of the very strange things about our usually progressive American people is that they never seem to insist upon bringing the governmental machine up to date and keeping the governmental machine in harmonious step with the marked progress that has been made in every other form of human endeavor during the last half-century." The book deals not alone with very elementary problems of civics, but with the more complex problems of finance and governmental reorganization. Over three-quarters of the work treats of New York State, about which the author's knowledge is second to that possessed by no other authority. His chapter on "First Principles and the Local Political Club," while drawing too

much from the Tammany tradition, is, nevertheless, an excellent guide to the young man who yearns to enter politics by the organization route. In this chapter, however, Al Smith should be the last person to neglect making a statement or two on the subject of where the district leader's money comes from. One looks in vain for that important information on first principles. Or is that not one of the principles? The student of politics will find in the book many acceptable suggestions for reform of government and politics. Each one of these reforms is supported by the wisdom gathered through many years of honorable public service. The chapter on "Back Stage in a National Campaign" could with good reason be changed to read "Why Our Presidents Die Young." The picture of the harassed and overworked presidential candidate is as perfect as it is distressing. This book is not written by Al Smith of the American Liberty League, but by Al Smith, moderate progressive and constructive statesman. The style is direct and simple. There is no bitterness towards anyone, although he does think that Hoover might have debated a bit more with him in 1928. A reading of this book will raise in the minds of many citizens the question of why there is no way in the present American system of government of using the talents of such a man as former Governor Smith.—JEROME G. KERWIN.

Following the plan of their analysis of the campaign of 1928, Professors R. V. Peel and T. C. Donnelly have contributed, in *The 1932 Campaign* (Farrar and Rinehart, pp. viii, 242), an interesting and careful analysis of the most recent presidential contest. A rather inadequate review of the Hoover administration is followed by chapters on the candidates for nomination, the pre-convention campaign, the nominating conventions, the campaign organization, the issues, the tactics, the nominees, and the minor parties. Valuable maps and charts, along with a table on the income, business, and general economic status of the candidates, accompany the textual material. The authors claim that they "have tried to be as objective as possible," but that "they have not allowed their desire to be fair to restrain them from stating pointedly their evaluations of the men and the methods of the campaign." It is not, however, difficult to discover where the sympathies of these students of politics rest. After a complete reading of this work, there is likely to emerge a strong suspicion that the plan for Herbert Hoover is "back to the Yuanmi and Babilowia Gold Mines." The strongest condemnation of Roosevelt seems to be that he shook his head too much and broke the long-distance smile record. Among the campaign problems that one should like to have had the authors consider more fully are the underlying causes of the Smith-Roosevelt feud, the convention story of the defection of California's McAdoo from the embattled anti-Roosevelt die-hards, the social and

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economic forces operating to make the result what it was, and finally what was wrong with the Socialist campaign that made it one of the most complete fade-outs in political history. Should not also a great deal more importance be attached to Mr. Roosevelt's speech before that stalwart organization, the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco? This book, however, is a joy to read. The treatment is scientific, but there is no painful effort to make the study more scientific than science. It is fascinating reading, as any good book on politics—that most human of all studies—should be. The authors have not only noted accurately and well the tactics and strategy of the campaign, but they have caught its spirit. It is to be hoped that Professors Peel and Donnelly will give us another study in 1936, and of as many more of our quadrennial political circuses thereafter as their span of life permits.—JEROME G. KERWIN.

The student of government who reads Harold L. Ickes' *Back to Work; The Story of PWA* (Macmillan, pp. xv, 276) is apt to lay the book down with conflicting emotions. On the one hand, the work is popular, obviously hurriedly done, and containing occasional repetitions and contradictory statements; on the other hand, the Public Works Administrator has told a story of the sailing of uncharted seas, of the surmounting of difficulties that seemed almost insuperable, in an honest and straightforward manner, and with such obvious conviction and sincerity that the reader cannot fail to be impressed. He must realize more fully than before that the slowness with which the program got under way was not due entirely to "red tape"; that the size of the program was almost beyond the power of conception; and that it affected, in some way, nearly every legitimate activity of government in almost every state. The book sketches the background of the National Industrial Recovery Act, with special reference to the public works sections, the text of which is reprinted in the Appendix. There were innumerable questions of policy to be solved; the form of the organization had to be determined, and hundreds—ultimately thousands—of competent persons had to be assembled and moulded into a working unit. It describes the huge road-building program, with its effect in favor of improved rural schools, the improved school and hospital facilities which PWA made possible, and the assistance given to CCC. Several of the great reclamation and power projects are described at length, emphasis being laid upon the fact that all of these were a part of a comprehensive plan, and that all of them are required by law to be self-liquidating. The chapter on TVA includes the government's side of the widely publicized controversy with the Duke interests regarding the Greenwood county, South Carolina, project. PWA assisted many railways, including the Pennsylvania's electrification project, as well as the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the facilities of air trans-

portation. It contributed greatly to the cause of public health, through assistance given to the control of communicable diseases, to the quarantine service, swamp drainage, sewage systems, etc. Mr. Ickes discusses also the housing program, with its emphasis on slum clearance and low-cost housing, as well as the effect of the total program in getting men back to work. The philosophy behind the program has been that, if private capital would not invest to hire men and start the wheels of industry moving again, the task must be undertaken through the credit of the federal government. It is urged also that there must be some planning program of public works which will make possible the combating of future depressions, when and if they occur, in somewhat the same way that we prepare for war. This is a sound philosophy. The book will be a valuable original source for students working on the period of the New Deal.—W. BROOKE GRAVES.

In the May (1935) number of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, pp. 1-239, leaders in their respective fields, too numerous to deal with individually within the limits of this brief review, under the general subject, "Pressure Groups and Propaganda," present a scholarly and highly significant analysis of the background, technique, nature, and importance of propaganda activities in modern government, giving particular emphasis to the efforts of such pressure groups as the American Federation of Labor, the American Medical Association, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and the American Farm Bureau Federation. They show how propagandist activities, particularly with reference to business groupings, have developed in amount and method in the United States, indicating clearly how mass communication and the struggle for power both here and abroad have intensified the struggle for control of public opinion and of the agencies of government. They show how pressure groups brought the New Deal into existence and how some of them subsequently, for selfish reasons, tried, with varying degrees of success, to alter its original purpose. By piling up bit by bit a great mass of evidence, they do make it eminently clear how important, how delicately interrelated, and how fraught with possibilities of danger to the general welfare are the selfish activities of pressure groups. The evidence adduced indicates that these groups must either be induced to coöperate to promote the general interest, be checked by a constantly alert public, or be harnessed in some way, possibly by functional representation in government, if honest, efficient, responsible government is to be maintained.—DANIEL B. CARROLL.

In *The Government of the American Public Library* (University of Chicago Press, pp. xix, 393), Dr. Carleton B. Joeckel has given us the first thoroughgoing study of "the position of the public library in the struc-

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ture of government in the United States." Here is fundamental source material, presented with finesse and scholarly appreciation by one with expert knowledge and wide experience. With proper emphasis, the author first presents the backgrounds of history and tradition from which present conditions have so largely developed. He then analyzes the principles of the legal status of the various forms of public library government. The major portion of the book discusses the forms of governmental organization. These chapters cover control by corporations or associations, school-district public libraries, libraries without boards (as under certain commission or manager city governments), and the predominant system of library board management. Three chapters are devoted to a careful study of the common form of government by boards. "On its record, the library board, in most cities, at least, has earned the right to survive." The basic fact material is gathered from a study of the government of public libraries in all cities of the country with over 30,000 population. Tables and maps are used for illustration where needed, and chapter summaries present conclusions briefly. The handling of complex material is masterly. Three concluding chapters discuss—and approve—the trend toward a large natural area for public library service, and present the problems of governmental organization involved. The book contains a selected bibliography and a satisfying index. Dr. Joeckel's work is definitive in its presentation of governmental structure as it has actually developed, and stimulating in its contribution to the literature of the movement toward the large-area regional system for public library service.—C. B. LESTER.

Report of Pennsylvania Local Government Survey: "The County," by H. F. Alderfer; "The Second Class Township," by Edward W. Carter; "The First Class Township," by Philip B. Willauer; "The Borough," by Bradford W. West; "The Third Class City," by Blake E. Nicholson (*Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. XXV, pp. 483*) adds to a rapidly growing list of local government studies which conform to no particular pattern. In some cases these studies have emphasized particular functions, such as welfare, highways, or health. Others have been concerned chiefly with the problem of government organization. This survey combines a consideration of organization with staff functions such as personnel, budgeting, auditing, records, assessments, fiscal problems, and election administration. The only line function considered is administration of justice, which is a part of the county survey. The governmental units of Pennsylvania furnished the basis for organizing the survey, and the reports are independent of each other. It is unfortunate that, in addition to the summary of major conclusions, a synthesis was not prepared which would have given to each unit of local government its place in the completed structure. This is a fundamental weak-

ness which flows from their failure to develop functional analysis. The proposal might have been theoretical, but it would at least have served as a framework in which to fit the individual conclusions and recommendations. The recommendations for changes in internal organization follow the well established principles of (a) elimination of elective officers, (b) functional organization, and (c) responsibility. The third recommendation is stated in particularly forceful language as follows: "This executive should not be a popularly elected officer, but should be chosen by the policy-determining or legislative group. He should be a trained executive and hold his position on the basis of efficiency." This is in line with the council-manager movement in cities and counties. The report recommends that a merit system be introduced in Pennsylvania, but fails to set up a system of administration, either through a state commission or otherwise. The comments in regard to the merit system are somewhat naïve in that the report suggests that tenure would not be guaranteed. Dismissals might take place without cause. The only protection lies in making future appointments from the top of an eligible list. Anyone familiar with the realism of Pennsylvania politics might well doubt whether this would follow under the plan proposed by the survey. The report follows the policy of centralization which has been used by certain states and goes even further than many in providing for centralization of control of certain staff functions, such as auditing, records, accounting, for limited state control over budgets, for county control of assessments, tax collection, and administration of justice. The authors were cautious in their recommendations, and with justification because of the opposition which such a proposal would be sure to generate. At some points, the recommendations lack, for example, any plan to make more difficult the creation of new boroughs, although it is recommended that this step should be taken. The same criticism may be made of the authority of the state administrative agency over debt. The five sections vary somewhat in style and tempo. Part I on the county is clearly outstanding, although this praise should not be regarded as criticism of the others. All show a most systematic and detailed study of the local units, and a wealth of information has been assembled which should be of the greatest value to the voters of Pennsylvania. Facts are used to back up conclusions, which are at no point extreme. A liberal use is made of maps and statistical tables, and the index works. The student of local government is able to get a comprehensive picture of the staff functions and organization of the local governments of the state.—FINLA G. CRAWFORD.

Taxation of Real Property in Pennsylvania (pp. 134), by Edward B. Logan, is a remarkably fine example of what can be achieved when a budget secretary (or other public official) is also a highly competent

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political scientist and has the opportunity, as in the present case, to guide and articulate the work of local college faculty members. The main part of the project here reported upon is a survey of real property taxation in 26 Pennsylvania counties, and in addition the volume presents an analysis of the existing system of tax administration, a consideration of the tax exemption problem in the state, and pertinent recommendations for improving the real property tax system. There are 38 tables in the first 86 pages of the study. These pages are followed by an appendix of 134 pages devoted exclusively to tables that further analyze the data by counties. A limited number of copies of the study are available for free distribution. Application should be made to Professor Logan, Bennett Hall, University of Pennsylvania.—J. T. SALTER.

The rapidly growing literature on county administration has been augmented by two studies, *Montana County Organization, Services, and Costs*, by Roland R. Renne (Montana State College, pp. 119), and *County Government in Colorado*, by Henry C. Pepper (Colorado Agricultural College, pp. 183). The latter, a doctoral dissertation, presents a thorough study of all phases of county government and administration in the state concerned. The Montana study is more particularly directed towards the county reform movement. Both studies serve to reinforce conclusions reached by most workers in this field as to the desirable goals of reform: achievement of the short ballot, development of a coordinating agency, county consolidation, extension of the merit system, and financial reform. Professor Renne approaches the problem of the optimum area by an interesting study of unit costs in the various offices, reaching fairly definite conclusions as to the point of lowest cost for a given degree of efficiency. It would appear that this method would constitute the most effective attack on the vested interests of office-holders. Both studies treat the problem of local indebtedness. Professor Renne's monograph includes an illuminating examination of rate of personnel turnover.—LEE S. GREENE.

The National League of Women Voters takes an effective step toward popular education in the merit system through the issuance of a pamphlet by Katherine A. Frederic under the title *Trained Personnel for Public Service* (pp. 54). Miss Frederic considers briefly the principles underlying the merit system, the present situation in all branches of government service, and the effect of the depression. Unfortunately, the civil service sins of the "New Deal" are treated with more than classic restraint. Encouragement is found in the growth of merit system standards outside the realm of legal compulsion. Public interest and pressure are cited as remedies for present abuses. With such stimulus in view, more pamphlets

like the present one are needed, specializing on points requiring attack, such as veterans' preference, discrimination against married persons, and specific examples of political sabotage.—LEE S. GREENE.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS

Many volumes concerned with China's political evolution and problems have been published since the Revolution. Few, however, have attempted a systematic description and analysis of the new governmental system, probably because such a study, under existing political conditions, would have seemed premature. The new order has, however, attained an ideological stability, and the new governmental institutions, in their broad outlines, have apparently assumed a permanent form. Consequently, a systematic study such as has been undertaken by Professor Chih-Fang Wu in his *Chinese Government and Politics* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, pp. xv, 473), should be welcomed by those interested in China and also by students of comparative government. Professor Wu writes objectively and dispassionately, but gives reason to believe that his position, in terms of party politics, is that of a right-centrist. His volume is organized according to the fairly standard textbook plan. The first three chapters survey China's constitutional development from the Reform Movement to the period of Kuomintang ascendancy. The major events and movements are presented, but without exceptional penetration or originality. It is especially to be regretted that the period 1923-30 is not treated more exhaustively and critically. The Russian influence, for example, is totally disregarded. Chapters IV-VI introduce the reader to the new one-party, five-power system of government. The five yuans are described and evaluated in Chapters VII-XI. The last five chapters are given over to the legal and judicial system, national finance, party politics (in which the evolution of Kuomintang is emphasized), local government, and foreign relations. Sixteen appendices include the most important constitutional documents. The volume will be found valuable for its clear and systematic description of the governmental organization. The reader will find the complexities of the five-power system, and the relationship of the party organs to the government, simplified and made understandable. While the treatment of Chinese politics is not so satisfactory, the author does help to bring confusion into reasonable order by a simple statement of the relationships of the various parties and factions.—HAROLD M. VINACKE.

Current public interest in Italian foreign policy makes exceedingly timely the publication by the Royal Institute of International Affairs of a brief study entitled *The Economic and Financial Position of Italy*

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(Information Department Papers: No. 15, pp. vi, 61). As a convenient presentation of pertinent factual and statistical material, this little brochure is clearly the best thing available. Here in compact form is the structure, actual and projected, of the corporative state, the policy of rationalization and its effects, and a general analysis of all phases of the economic and financial situation as it was during the early months of the present year. In keeping with the traditions of the Royal Institute, the author scrupulously avoids personal opinions or judgments as to the merits of any Italian policy, but the record which he has set down is one which thoroughly justifies the position of those observers who hold that the Italian situation is critical. It is clear from this account that the stabilization of the lira in 1927 at nineteen to the dollar was a major blunder which has intensified the impact of the depression upon the Italian economic system. Whatever advantage this deliberate overvaluation may temporarily have given to Italian importers was more than offset by the speedy and inevitable decline of the export markets. When this loss was accentuated by the slump in the tourist trade and in emigrant remittances, the government either had to retreat or to adopt a policy of drastic deflation softened from time to time by huge state expenditures for public works. The adoption of the latter alternative has brought only temporary relief, while the public debt has continued to mount in an alarming fashion. It is true, as this study implies, that the maximum benefit has already been derived from most of the remedial measures adopted by the government, and one is led to speculate as to what can now be done to avoid fresh disaster. The answer to this query is probably to be found in the current newspaper headlines.—GRAYSON L. KIRK.

In a very able and scholarly volume, *Insurance or Dole?; The Adjustment of Unemployment Insurance to Economic and Social Facts in Great Britain* (Yale University Press, pp. 280), E. Wight Bakke asserts that "the whole system established by the Unemployment Act of 1934 is the most substantial recognition of a nation's responsibility to its unemployed made by any industrial country in the world." Professor Bakke has devoted himself to giving an historical and analytical survey of the steps by which the present system in Great Britain has been achieved. The English system began with an attempt to establish unemployment insurance on an actuarial basis; found the burden of unemployment far more than the limited resources of an insurance scheme could carry; and moved on to a plan of compensation based on need. A vital and confusing problem in this shift is that of distinguishing between compensation for genuine unemployment, based on need, and the dole, also based on need, but the right to which arises from a different line of reasoning. Professor

Bakke has consistently in view: (1) that the unemployed man is a human personality to be treated with respect and dignity, (2) that the causes for modern unemployment are impersonal and that the responsibility for meeting the problem rests squarely on society, and (3) that although taking care of the unemployed is a necessary obligation of the state, devising an economic system which will provide adequate employment normally is becoming increasingly a prior obligation. To students of government, the volume offers much. It indicates the evolution of legislative acts to meet the demands of a constantly changing and growing problem; it illustrates the compromises between pressure groups usually necessary in making social progress; and it gives considerable insight into the problem of administrative discretion in applying general rules and generally defined terms to concrete and individual instances. The author has written the book with the problem of the United States in mind, and it should be a valuable aid to members of Congress and other social planners. Appendices summarize the history of British unemployment insurance, the scheme of unemployment insurance, and the scheme of unemployment assistance, and also present numerous pertinent tables.—HARVEY PINNEY.

In his *Railway Nationalization in Canada* (Macmillan Co. of Canada, pp. 358), Leslie T. Fournier presents a dispassionate account of Canada's experiences with respect to the ownership and operation by the government of one of the two large railroad systems of the country. In spite of the fact that certain groups in the United States argue that the nationalization of the Grand Trunk systems has been successful, it is pointed out in this study that the Canadian government, since 1917, has lent to the system \$546,225,437, has made other payments of \$157,752,530, and has been unable to collect accrued interest of \$417,390,941. The government's total investment up to 1933 was \$1,121,368,908. Political influence and pressure are observed in the administration of the property; the public insists upon expenditures and upon improvements in service and traffic not justified by the earnings. People are much more conscious of the character of railway service available to them than they are interested in the operating deficits and their effect upon the Dominion's fiscal situation. For the future, the author is in favor of unified management, preferably private, of the National lines and of the Canadian Pacific.—HENRY R. TRUMBOWER.

A large number of letters contributed to newspapers during the last twenty years by A. Berriedale Keith have been brought together and republished as a memorial volume to his late wife. The volume bears the title *Letters on Imperial Relations, Indian Reform, Constitutional and*

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International Law (Oxford University Press, pp. xx, 370), which fairly indicates the wide range of the subjects touched upon in the letters. Professor Keith is revealed as a brilliant controversialist, who maintains with ease his scholarly balance when writing on the topics of the day. It is remarkable how often principles and points of view are met with in these letters, which were originally expressed in argument, but which later guided the actions of governments and have become generally accepted. Naturally there is a good deal of repetition in letters on similar subjects contributed to different periodicals, but this only serves to drive home some of the author's points, such as the need for a permanent inter-Imperial tribunal to decide controversies between member states. In this form, these timely writings of Professor Keith will be a useful supplement to his well-known and invaluable works. A good index adds to the ease with which they may be used for this purpose. The volume as a whole represents a type of literature which is practically unknown in this country, and reveals a public service which scholars may perform.—JOSEPH R. STARR.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There are still many Americans who believe that the United States is following an isolation policy approximately as it was laid down by Washington and Jefferson. To such nationals as ardently support the continuation of such a policy, the information collected in this volume would be an unpleasant revelation. Even though the United States is not a member of the League of Nations, we find it a member of and actively supporting twenty-nine permanent international organizations. This list does not include our participation in international conferences and congresses, nor our membership in any sort of special commission for the settlement of disputes. In his *International Organizations in Which the United States Participates* (Brookings Institution, pp. x, 370), Laurence F. Schmeckebier confines attention to those permanent international organizations which the United States was supporting in part by contributions at the end of 1934. They cover, for the most part, technical, social, and political subjects of an international character. Among the scientific organizations, we find such ones treated as the International Bureau of Weights and Measures and the International Institute of Agriculture. The International Labor Office and the International Office of Public Health are examples of social coöperation. The Pan American Union and the Inter-Parliamentary Union might be classed as political organizations. Other organizations, such as the Universal Postal Union, do not lend themselves to an exact classification. Each organization is described briefly as to its history, organization, and work. This summary is followed by a selected bibliography of documents and secondary

sources. The volume is an excellent reference work for all students interested in international relations.—GRAHAM H. STUART.

Important news for American students of nationalism is the appearance of Koppel S. Pinson's *A Bibliographical Introduction to Nationalism* (Columbia University Press, pp. 70). Over four hundred titles are included, divided into two categories: (1) theoretical and analytical studies, and (2) historical and regional studies. Brief critical comment is given upon each book. Only works published in the English, French, or German language, or found in translation in those languages, are considered. Books dealing generally with a particular age, country, or individual are excluded, as are works dealing with the purely juristic, administrative, and formal political aspects of the nationality problem. No attempt is made to treat the works of the inspirers, leaders, and theorists of the nationalist movements in western Europe; a list of such persons, however, appears at the beginning of the section on each geographical region. The publishers and authors intend to issue a revised and supplementary edition approximately every five years.—DONALD C. BLAISDELL.

In his *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (D. Appleton-Century Co., pp. xiii, 293), Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis gives a scholarly and entertaining account of American diplomatic relations during the critical years from 1775 to 1783. The principal merit of the book rests on the fact that, unlike any previous work in this field, it is based on researches in both printed and unprinted material on both sides of the Atlantic. The author shows how, before the Revolution, America became a stake of European diplomacy and was indirectly involved in European wars and rivalries. While praising the perspicacity of early statesmen, such as Franklin, Jay, and Adams, he credits Thomas Paine with being the first to perceive clearly that the independence of America would give her the great advantage of being freed from such entanglements. The value of the volume is enhanced by a bibliographical note and a series of historical maps.—J. M. MATHEWS.

POLITICAL THEORY AND MISCELLANEOUS

Another type of early Germanic law is now made accessible to those who read English more readily than they read twelfth or thirteenth century Norwegian. In *The Earliest Norwegian Laws* (Columbia University Press, pp. ix, 481), Professor Lawrence L. Larson has given us an excellent translation of the laws of the two groups of Norwegian shires known from their respective places of meeting as Gula and Frosta. Germanic law and its administration always was inherently a matter of memory and oral tradition. That it was reduced to writing shows some

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external influence, probably that of the Church, acting directly and through its influence on royal administration of government. The Law of the Frostathing purports to be issued by Hakon the king (Hakon IV); and he tells us that in his new arrangement he has guarded against disturbing the old plan on which the book of the Frostathing had been arranged. The old law of the Gulathing is mingled with royal decrees. These laws closely resemble the Anglo-Saxon and the Salic laws, with occasional striking divergences. Like them, we find here a detailed list of wrongs and the tariff to be paid for each wrong by the wrong-doer. What is suggested in the Salic law and the Anglo-Saxon law is stated here clearly and in great detail. The wergeld was a family matter, not an individual affair—from the payment made by the slayer to the son of the slain man (the value of thirty-two cows) to the twelve silver pennies to be paid by the son of the slayer's maternal aunt to the son of the slain man's maternal aunt, and thence on to the thirteenth degree of relationship. For every third offense, the injured person must seek revenge, not composition. Revenge, by royal edict, must be taken against the criminal only, and not against some other member of his family. The occasional ordeal and the ever-present compurgation are the methods of trial. We find here a thorough treatment of topics such as status, property, tenancy, theft, inheritance, and coast-defense, some of which either receive but slight attention in the Anglo-Saxon and the Salic laws or are entirely missing. A most helpful index and glossary add to the practical value of this collection of laws of the North.—WILLIAM H. PAGE.

Seven essays on the problem of government control of economic functions are presented in a small volume edited by Benjamin E. Lippincott, entitled *Government Control of the Economic Order* (University of Minnesota Press, pp. 119). Five are by economists and two by political scientists, and all were presented in formal or informal fashion at the political theory round table of the American Political Science Association in December, 1933. The necessity of some form of control in the United States is presented by Gardiner C. Means, and the economic limitations of government control by Gerhard Colm. Methods of control operative abroad are discussed by Emil Lederer (government control in Russia), Walter Thompson (government and the economic order in Sweden), and Otto Nathan (cartels and the state in the light of German experience). Two political forms that facilitate economic control are discussed by John Thurston (government proprietary corporations in Great Britain) and Arthur Feiler (public enterprise in Germany). Although no attempt is made to reach agreement or final conclusions upon the continuance or abolition of the capitalist system, the writers concur that the American government ought to embark upon some form of control other than

regulation. The desirable extent of control from the economic standpoint is likewise left in uncertainty, as is also the question of the most useful form of political organization for the purpose. Helpful analyses and comparisons of Russian communism, Swedish coöperatives, German cartels, and English and German government corporations are presented.—HAROLD R. BRUCE.

Too rarely does an eminent scholar successfully turn his acumen to new realms. Yet Professor Frederick Soddy of Oxford, Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, has produced his third major monetary work in *The Role of Money: What It Should Be, Contrasted with What It Has Become* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., pp. x, 214). Amplified here are certain recommendations of a decade ago which are now advocated by Father Coughlin, Irving Fisher, Senator Nye, Congressman Patman, *et alii*. Such principles include requiring banks to keep a dollar in currency behind each dollar of checking deposit, and government using currency to redeem national debt and to pay governing expenses, all, however, in consonance with price-index stability. But new thoughts are legion. Both money and capital are "irrepayable debts" (p. 160); therefore government should, by taxation, amortize capital debts. The gold standard is a "gilded fraud" (p. 30) which "drags all nations down to the level of lowest" (p. 126). Orthodox economics would have the millennium arrive by accumulating so much capital that everyone could "presumably live on the interest of mutual indebtedness" (p. 8). In cash-credit ratios, checking deposits are really money and must not be "lumped together" with time deposits, which are really investments. To term the "alchemy" (p. 30) of credit-creation as sound and governmental currency-expansion as "unsound and immoral" is "the most gargantuan farce of history" (p. 52). To money-lenders, "prosperity is a curse" (p. 118) because their profits depend upon "maintaining supplies of hard-working borrowers" (p. 68); hence monetary "half-truths and once-truths" abound (p. 21). So—space permitting—one could dwell at length upon: "ergosophy" (p. 9); "credit-money a tax" (p. 39); "nothing for something" (p. 25); "true-blue treason" (p. 82); democracy "betrayed" (p. 31); Marxism "obsolete" (p. 11); bad money "embroiling nations" (p. 114); "God, Caesar, and science" (p. 10); causes of "political controversies" (p. 12); "Roosevelt" (p. 206); "solution of unemployment" (p. 149); "honesty the best monetary policy" (Chap. ix); or, finally, the useful and annotated bibliography.—RICHARD A. STADERMAN.

The more important of the speeches and reports delivered at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union—the first such party congress in three years—are collected in *Socialism*

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Victorious (International Publishers, pp. xii, 719). The speakers, including Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others, invariably stress the present unity of the party and the rapid progress being made in industrial and agricultural development. But they also do some plain speaking about the continued shortage and poor quality of consumers' goods, and about bureaucratic inefficiency in the administration of state enterprises and local party units, the time wasted in writing resolutions and making endless reports. Kaganovich explains the necessity for the new Control Commission and the "political departments" (1934) to centralize control and supervision and to combat the inefficiencies of bureaucracy; and Stalin explains (pp. 87-88) that to give the new Commission sufficient authority it must be connected with both government and party. For the railroads, Voroshilov demands "real labor discipline" that shall proceed *absolutely from top to bottom* (p. 264). In referring to Bolshevik theory, Kaganovich makes a bold, unqualified assertion of the *inevitability* of socialism (p. 199). But Stalin gives to this vexed question of "inevitability" the Leninist interpretation, which stresses the activity of a revolutionary party as a necessary condition of successful proletarian revolution (pp. 16-17). Manuilsky, after reviewing the work of national sections of the Third International and the problems they face, concludes that "the most important conditions for a revolutionary crisis of the world capitalist system are not yet present, that the forces of the proletarian revolution have not yet matured for the decisive battle" (p. 319). One cannot but be impressed by repeated evidence of the unique position held by Stalin. His name appears perhaps more frequently than that of Lenin, and no speech is complete without a deferential tribute to his leadership. "Once Comrade Stalin has taken up the question of transport in real earnest, then, comrades, it will be no joking matter" (Voroshilov, p. 264). The volume contains also the Resolutions and Decisions of the Congress, the rules of the C.P.S.U., and the composition of the central organs of the party. A second edition of the *Summary of the Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan* (by the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., International Publishers, pp. 304) contains the material presented in the first edition, with minor corrections on the basis of later figures. *Political Economy: A Beginner's Course*, by the Marxist economist A. Leontiev (International Publishers, pp. 285) is a text-book of orthodox doctrine, mainly on questions we should call economic. For its purpose, it will probably be a useful simplification; but, except that its evidence illustrating the last stage of capitalist decline is brought up to date, it has nothing to add to the ultimate insights of Marx and Lenin.—JOHN D. LEWIS.

The second volume of the *Selected Works of Lenin* (*The Struggle for the Bolshevik Party*, edited by J. Fineberg, International Publishers, pp. xv,

568) continues the good impression produced by the first. Well translated from the texts issued by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, and admirably annotated, the selections in this volume form an excellent introduction to Lenin's thought in the critical period 1900-04, the period of the development and determination of the breach between Bolshevik and Menshevik programs. Besides the remarkable pamphlet, "What Is To Be Done?," which is reproduced almost in full, the first section contains other important discussions of organization and tactics; polemics against political liberalism and the Social Revolutionaries; several writings dealing with the peasantry and agrarian policies, among which "To the Rural Poor" is particularly interesting as an example of masterly propaganda in simple language; and articles on the question of nationalities and the organization of Jewish workers. The second section deals with the Second Congress of the party, at which the rupture between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks became definite, and richly illustrates Lenin's interpretation of the issues involved.—JOHN D. LEWIS.

In the array of contemporary biography, one rarely finds an incisive study like Professor Roland Harvey's *Samuel Gompers: Champion of the Toiling Masses* (Stanford University Press, pp. vi, 376), which is neither a conventional "life" nor a modern "biograph" but a timely and scholarly contribution. The decade since the death of Gompers gives perspective, while the present labor crisis lends additional significance to this interpretation of the principal American labor leader, whose conservative philosophy controls American labor as much in 1935 as it did in 1905. Necessarily, his biography is a history of the American labor movement; yet this study is a model of condensation, in sharp contrast with the voluminous Gompers autobiography. Though Gompers is not customarily thought of as a "political" leader, the present analysis is significant for students of political leadership, since the labor chief employs the same devices, techniques, and forces which the party leader manipulates. Character traits are not systematically evaluated, but the pugnacious, zealous, and dramatic qualities of the colorful "Sam" receive appropriate emphasis. No effort is made to show a metamorphosis in Gompers similar to that observed by Michels in European labor leaders, strikingly illustrated recently by the conduct of Ramsay MacDonald. However, the essentially libertarian bourgeois philosophy of the founder of the American Federation of Labor is not neglected. Gompers is aptly termed Jeffersonian because of his repeated urging of "voluntarism" and localism. One's imagination is teased by the thought of a discussion somewhere along the river Styx between the agrarian Jefferson and the proletarian Gompers on the merits of the New Deal. A lively style clothes scholarship with readability, especially the paradox in an Anglo-Dutch Jew, Don

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Quixote-like, inciting irate Irish-American workers in a crusade, led by a Scotch-Presbyterian president, to save the world for democracy and—Judge Gary!—J. B. SHANNON.

Regulation of the Small-Loan Business (Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 284), by Louis N. Robinson and Rolf Nugent, consists of a summary of previous publications in this field by the Russell Sage Foundation plus much additional data not found in those publications. Like the previous publications, it staunchly defends the uniform small-loan laws now existing in many states, mainly on the ground that they are a big improvement over the bootlegging loan sharks. The treatise appears to the reviewer to be a brief in defense of an institution rather than a judicial treatment, but it presents much well documented information concerning a very important subject.—HAROLD M. GROVES.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF POLITICAL INTEREST

BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN

University of Illinois

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC LAW

Books

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———. William P. MacCracken, Jr., et al., extracts from Congressional Record relating to proceedings against William P. MacCracken, Jr., and others, for contempt of Senate and on account of destruction and removal of certain papers during course of investigation of ocean- and air-mail contracts by special committee of Senate . . . Washington: Govt. Ptg. Off., 1935. 261 p. (This document, which includes the decision of the Supreme Court, is the record of the proceedings leading up to, and the decision of, an important constitutional question as to the power of the Senate in contempt cases.)

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State department. Salem claim, claim of United States on behalf of George J. Salem v. Royal Government of Egypt under protocol of Jan. 20, 1931. Washington, Govt. Ptg. Off., 1935. 2 v. (1384 p.). Arbitration series 4 (5).

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Supreme court. Invalidity of N.R.A. codes, opinion of Supreme Court, with concurring opinions of Justices Cardozo and Stone, in case of A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation and others v. United States . . . involving the question of constitutionality of live poultry code, promulgated under national industrial recovery act . . . Washington, Govt. Ptg. Off., 1935. 21 p. (S. Doc. 65, 74th Congress, 1st. sess.) This, in convenient form, is the decision which declared the N.R.A. act unconstitutional in part.

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Tercentenary commission—Committee on historical publications. This commission has to date issued some thirty small publications, of which the following are of political interest:

- I. Andrews, C. M., Connecticut and the British government.
 II. Andrews, C. M., The charter of Connecticut, 1662.
 XVI. Morse, J. M., Rise of liberalism in Connecticut, 1828-1850.
 XVII. Morse, J. M., Under the constitution of 1818: The first decade.
 XX. Dutcher, G. M., and Bates, A. C., The fundamental orders of Connecticut.
 XXIV. Buckley, W. E., The Hartford convention.
 XXV. Hooker, R. H., The Spanish ship case.

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- State planning commission.* A study of Michigan. A progress report of an inventory of its resources, its physical, social, and economic character, to serve as the basis for permanent, adjustable state planning. Lansing, 1935. 276 p.
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Transactions of the supreme court of the Territory of Michigan, 1805-1814. Edited by Willam Wirt Blume. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 2v. (This is a source book of unique value in the study of the government of Michigan. The author is associate professor of law and legal research in the University of Michigan.)

NEW YORK

- Commission on the administration of justice.* This commission is issuing "Recommendations," on proposed legislation on various subjects, too numerous to be enumerated here, but extremely interesting. Albany, 1935.
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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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Report of the work of the League since the fifteenth session of the Assembly. Part I. Geneva, 1935. 117 p. (General. 1935. 2.)

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